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Summary of the Dissertation  
In today’s networked and interactive world, firms are advised to enter a dialogue with their 
existing and potential customers to better serve them and satisfy their needs (Sashi 2012). Ac-
cordingly, firms increasingly involve consumers in content and value creation such as in the 
development of new products or personalized customer experiences (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004), creating more intimate long-term customer-firm relationships (Sashi 
2012). Such behavior has been addressed in the context of customer engagement referring to 
“customer’s behavioral manifestations that have a brand or firm focus, beyond purchase, re-
sulting from motivational drivers” (van Doorn et al. 2010, p. 254). Such customer engage-
ment can go as far as that highly devoted consumers (see also Pimentel and Reynolds 2004) 
create advertisements for a brand that does not want to produce advertisements on its own. 
This was the case with the car brand Tesla, for which the consumer Noah Magel created an 
advertisement and put it on YouTube where already more than 20,000 consumers have 
watched it (Magel 2015). This example illustrates how consumers, empowered by new tech-
nologies, not only have access to a vast amount of information but that they also create and 
shape information (Labrecque et al. 2013).  
Such customer engagement can be highly beneficiary for firms for example in the con-
text of new product development whereby the likelihood of new product success is increased 
(Hoyer et al. 2010) or positive word-of-mouth where customers share positive recommenda-
tions about a firm or brand with potential customers, encouraging them to purchase the re-
spective product or brand (Brown et al. 2005). However, consumer empowerment and the net-
working effects in our digital age have also motivated less beneficiary forms of consumer be-
havior for firms. For example, to restore equity after an unacceptable service, some customers 
purposely spread negative word-of-mouth (NWOM) about a product or brand, discouraging 




even further than that and aggressively attack brands which can result in a tremendous brand 
damage. For example, the consumer Jeremy Dorosin became outraged when his complaint 
about a defective espresso machine was not resolved to his satisfaction by Starbucks (Flinn 
1995). He purchased an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) to gather complaints 
from other customers. He then threatened Starbucks by warning them to either apologize to 
all its customers on an entire page in the WSJ or he would take out two full pages to publish 
the complaints he had collected. As Starbucks did not apologize, he spent $ 10,000 on such an 
advertisement publishing all customer complaints that criticized Starbucks. Several news pro-
grams on national television and in newspapers conducted interviews with him and reported 
his story. In addition, he created an anti-Starbucks website and wrote a book where he shared 
his story. 
So far, the focus of research has largely been on positive consumer behavior and its 
positive aspects on companies or brands (e.g., Brown et al. 2005; Labrecque et al. 2013; Pra-
halad and Ramaswamy 2004; van Doorn et al. 2010). By contrast, negative consumer behav-
ior such as NWOM (e.g., Zhang, Feick, and Mittal 2014) or consumer boycott (e.g., Klein, 
Smith, and John 2004) have received much less attention. With regard to more destructive 
forms of negative consumer behavior such as customer revenge (e.g., Grégoire, Tripp, and 
Legoux 2009) where the consumer intends to harm the firm or brand, research has been par-
ticularly scarce, despite their damage potential. 
To address this research gap, this dissertation introduces a conceptual framework of 
aggressive consumer behavior toward brands and examines the complex psychological mech-
anisms leading to such behavior (Kähr et al. 2016). Thereby, the conceptual framework distin-
guishes between hostile aggression where the consumer has the conscious desire and domi-
nant motive to harm the brand and instrumental aggression where the consumer behaves ag-




In addition to the antecedents leading to consumer aggression, this dissertation also investi-
gates the outcomes of consumer aggression and how managers can respond to diminish its 
damage (see Figure 1).  
FIGURE 1  
Overall Framework of the Dissertation 
 
Paper 1 (Kähr et al. 2016) introduces the phenomenon of consumer brand sabotage 
(CBS) as a form of hostile aggression and develops a conceptual framework of aggressive 
consumer behavior toward brands, explaining its underlying psychological mechanisms and 
distinguishing between instrumental and hostile aggression. Manuscript 2 examines the brand 
damage of CBS as a form of hostile aggression, i.e., the processes by which a CBS activity of 
a consumer brand saboteur affects other consumers’ brand attitude and subsequent behaviors 
while taking those consumers’ cognitions and brand relationship quality into account. Finally, 
Manuscript 3 investigates how a company should respond to negative electronic word-of-




When Hostile Consumers Wreak Havoc on Your Brand: The Phenomenon of Consumer 
Brand Sabotage 
Paper 1 “When Hostile Consumers Wreak Havoc on Your Brand: The Phenomenon of Con-
sumer Brand Sabotage” (Kähr et al. 2016) introduces the phenomenon of CBS as a form of 
hostile aggression to the marketing literature. Based on aggression (e.g., Anderson and Bush-
man 2002) and appraisal theories (e.g., Arnold 1960; Moors 2009) from social psychology as 
well as in depth interviews with actual brand saboteurs, this paper provides an understanding 
of the mental escalation process leading to aggressive consumer behavior toward brands and 
distinguishes between hostile and instrumental aggression. Two quantitative studies support 
the distinction between CBS as a form of hostile aggression and existing concepts of negative 
consumer behavior such as negative WOM as forms of instrumental aggression. Furthermore, 
these studies provide empirical evidence that, in comparison to instrumental aggression, CBS 
is preceded by stronger negative emotions such as outrage, anger, and hatred, more intense 
rumination, more failed interactions, and stronger hostile thoughts and perceived identity 
threats. 
This paper contributes to academic research by developing a conceptual framework of 
aggressive consumer behavior toward brands, explaining the complex psychological mecha-
nisms leading to such behavior, and distinguishing between hostile and instrumental con-
sumer aggression. Thereby, it unites the rather fragmented literature on negative consumer be-
havior by integrating different forms of negative consumer behavior in one conceptual model. 
This paper also contributes to existing literature on consumer-brand relationships by transfer-
ring and adapting specific concepts of aggression theories to a consumer-brand relationship 
context. Furthermore, it introduces the construct of CBS to the academic literature which re-




ficient attention in academic research. This paper suggests a research agenda to stimulate fur-
ther research on this under-researched phenomenon. Finally, from this study, managers can 
learn that CBS is a new and distinct form of negative consumer behavior, containing a huge 
damage potential for brands.  
When and Why Does Consumer Brand Sabotage Cause Damage among Other Consumers? 
Manuscript 2 addresses the brand damage of the novel phenomenon of CBS, a form of hostile 
consumer aggression toward brands, by examining the processes by which a CBS activity af-
fects other consumers’ attitude toward the brand and their subsequent behavior (e.g., purchase 
intention) who observe this CBS activity. Based on an experiment with consumers who were 
confronted with an actual CBS activity, this manuscript shows that a CBS activity can harm 
the brand by decreasing consumers’ attitude toward the brand and purchase intention and by 
increasing their intention to engage in NWOM. More specifically, the results of the experi-
ment demonstrate that the damage occurs via two different mechanisms: (1) a CBS activity 
increases consumers’ perceived betrayal, decreasing their attitude toward the brand and (2) a 
CBS activity increases consumers’ perceived social identity threat, decreasing consumers’ 
purchase intention and increasing their intention to engage in NWOM. Furthermore, the re-
sults suggest that these mechanisms depend on the brand relationship quality of those con-
sumers, i.e., consumers’ brand trust and actual self-congruence with the brand. 
As such, this study contributes to existing literature on consumer aggression toward 
brands (Kähr et al. 2016), by outlining the negative consequences of hostile consumer aggres-
sion toward brands and the processes by which it affects other consumers who observe such 
hostile aggression. By including consumers’ cognitions such as perceived social identity 




behavior which is based on social psychology. Furthermore, the results add to the ongoing de-
bate on the role of brand relationship quality after brand transgressions, i.e., on the buffering 
(e.g., Hess, Ganesan, and Klein 2003; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) versus love-
becomes-hate effect (e.g., Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). The results of the experiment 
in this paper support a love-becomes-hate effect by showing that brand trust and consumers’ 
actual self-congruence with the brand increase the negative effects of a CBS activity on their 
attitude toward the brand and subsequent behavior. Finally, these findings outline that manag-
ers should respond to CBS in order to limit its damage and that they should be ready to react 
in a short period of time to prevent its damage from spreading further through NWOM. 
The Effectiveness of a Defensive versus Accommodative Response Strategy to Negative 
Electronic Word-of-Mouth: The Role of Message Credibility  
Manuscript 3 examines the damage of negative electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) as a form 
of instrumental aggression and how companies should respond to reduce its damage, depend-
ing on the credibility of the negative eWOM. Thereby, it compares the effects of different re-
sponse strategies from crisis communication (Coombs 1998; Marcus and Goodman 1991), 
i.e., an accommodative response such as an apology, a defensive response such as a denial of 
the existence of a problem, and no response to negative eWOM. With a large-scale online ex-
periment based on positive and negative online reviews, this study supports prior research 
findings that negative eWOM negatively affects other consumers’ brand evaluation (i.e., atti-
tude toward the brand and perceived service quality) and purchase intention (Chang et al. 
2015; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), thereby causing damage to the brand and company. The 
results of this study also show that an organizational response can decrease this damage and 
that the adequacy of the response strategy depends on the credibility of eWOM. More specifi-




sponse (accommodative vs. defensive) has no effect on consumers’ brand evaluation and pur-
chase intention. In contrast, when credibility of the negative eWOM is low, a defensive re-
sponse by the company increases consumers’ brand evaluation and purchase intention com-
pared to an accommodative response.   
This paper adds to the literature on consumer aggression (Kähr et al. 2016) by provid-
ing further empirical support on the adverse effects of negative eWOM as a form of instru-
mental aggression on other consumers’ brand evaluation and purchase intention. It also makes 
an important contribution to literature on the response effectiveness to negative eWOM. 
Whereas in previous research an accommodative response is generally regarded as increasing 
customers’ trust and brand reputation (Lee and Cranage 2012), a defensive response is often 
seen as threat to the brand reputation (Chang et al. 2015). However, this study suggests a 
more contingency-based point of view when determining an adequate response strategy to 
negative eWOM, e.g., by taking message credibility into account – a factor that is highly rele-
vant in the anonymous environment of the Internet (Metzger 2007). These findings have di-
rect implications for managers when deciding on whether and how to adequately respond to 
negative eWOM. 
Outlook and Further Research 
To capture and understand the complex phenomenon of aggressive consumer behavior toward 
brands and its negative consequences, this dissertation is based on a broad theoretical founda-
tion, diverse methodology (i.e., qualitative interviews, quantitative surveys, and experiments) 
as well as on extensive empirical data among 1,958 consumers. However, despite this com-
prehensive approach, there are still open questions that need to be answered with regard to ag-




Unfortunately, aggression is an omnipresent phenomenon in our world and further re-
search is needed to enable its prevention and appropriate organizational responses once it oc-
curred. Whereas this dissertation focused on aggression in the consumer-brand relationship 
and in the interaction between consumers and brands, further research is required to examine 
aggression in marketing which is directed at other targets than the brand. In our connected, 
digital world, some consumers aggressively attack other consumers who do not share their 
opinion. A recent example for such behavior can be found in the online comment section of 
an article in the Swiss newspaper 20 Minuten on the withdrawal of Samsung’s smartphone 
Galaxy Note 7 from the market (20 Minuten 2016). A consumer accused Samsung of having 
replaced the smartphones Galaxy Note 7 due to the fire risk of its battery without conducting 
any further investigations. He was then aggressively attacked by another consumer who de-
fended Samsung by stating that the new replaced series had a different problem than the series 
at product launch and accusing the consumer of being an illiterate person. A future study 
could examine when and why such consumer aggression among consumers takes place and 
how it affects the product or brand which is subject to the discussion and also the newspaper 
brand allowing such discussions in the comment section of articles. Furthermore, aggressive 
behavior in the marketplace can also stem from other sources than consumers. For example, 
employees or competitors can also act aggressively toward the company or brand such as in 
employee sabotage (e.g., Analoui 1995) or in price wars among competitors (e.g., Busse 
2002). Further research is required that examines aggressive behaviors from such other 
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Andrea Kähr, Bettina Nyffenegger, Harley Krohmer, & Wayne D. Hoyer
When Hostile Consumers Wreak
Havoc on Your Brand: The
Phenomenon of Consumer
Brand Sabotage
In recent years, companies have been confronted with a new type of negative consumer behavior: consumers who
have turned hostile andwho are strongly determined to cause damage to the brand. Empowered by new technological
possibilities, an individual consumer can now wreak havoc on a brand with relatively little effort. In reflection of this
new phenomenon, the authors introduce the concept of consumer brand sabotage (CBS). On the basis of different
underlying motives, a conceptual framework distinguishes CBS (a form of hostile aggression: harming the brand as
dominant motive) from other forms of negative consumer behavior, such as customer retaliation and negative word
ofmouth (instrumental aggression: harming a brand is only ameans to achieve other objectives, e.g., restoring equity).
This framework adapts insights from aggression and appraisal theories as well as qualitative interviews with actual
saboteurs to a consumer–brand relationship context in order to develop an improved theoretical understanding of
the under-researched phenomenon of CBS. The authors analyze the mental escalation processes of individual
consumers toward CBS and develop a road map for future research.
Keywords: marketing theory, consumer brand sabotage, brand management, consumer–brand relationships,
relationship breakdown
Online Supplement: http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jm.15.0006
Afew years ago, musician Dave Carroll got upset withUnited Airlines for breaking his cherished guitar.Due to repeated inadequate responses from United’s
management, Carroll turned hostile and produced a music
video titled “United Breaks Guitars” about his negative
experience. Since it was posted on YouTube, the video has
been viewed by more than 15 million people, causing
an estimated damage of more than $180 million to United
(The Economist 2009), as well as creating a long-lasting
impression that United “breaks guitars.” This example
illustrates a relatively new phenomenon wherein consumers
empowered by new technologies (Labrecque et al. 2013) and
driven by negative experiences with brands become hostile
and aggressively attack, with the dominant motive of causing
harm to the brands. Now, similar to saboteurs in warfare,
consumers can have a dramatic negative impact on a brand
relatively easily. In a networked, digital world, even one
single consumer can cause a brand to lose numerous existing
customers and can alienate innumerable potential customers,
which can result in millions of dollars of damage to a brand.
Thus, academics and marketing managers need to understand
this new phenomenon and, especially, what drives consumers
to engage in such hostile behavior.
Against this background, we introduce the concept of
consumer brand sabotage (CBS), which is a deliberate form
of hostile, aggressive behavior on the part of a consumer,
designed to harm a brand. This type of behavior occurs
when a consumer–brand relationship completely breaks
down (i.e., “bridges are burned”) and has been understudied
in the literature. In contrast, other forms of negative consumer
behavior, such as customer retaliation, consumer boycotts,
and negative word of mouth (WOM), represent forms
of instrumental aggression, wherein a consumer exerts
aggressive actions against a brand or company, not neces-
sarily to cause harm to the brand, but to achieve other
objectives, such as restoring equity and venting negative
emotions (Anderson and Bushman 2002). A key point is that
in the large majority of cases in which consumers are angry
or unhappy with a brand, the consumers are more likely to
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engage in instrumental aggression than CBS. However, there
are important instances in which consumers engage in a
different kind of behavior and actually try to hurt a brand.
Given the potential severe consequences of CBS, it is im-
portant for marketers to develop an understanding of what we
argue is a unique phenomenon.
In this article, we contribute to the literature on brand
management and consumer–brand relationships by introduc-
ing the new construct of CBS and developing a conceptual
framework of aggressive consumer behavior toward brands.
Guided by conceptual considerations from aggression and
appraisal theories in social psychology (person-to-person
context) as well as in-depth interviews with actual consumer
brand saboteurs, our framework develops a novel theoretical
perspective for understanding this type of behavior in a brand
relationship context. In this article, we will (1) illustrate how
CBS represents a unique form of aggressive behavior in a
consumer–brand context that merits special attention, and (2)
show that the phenomenon and concept of CBS is distinct from
other forms of negative consumer behavior (e.g., negative
WOM). Furthermore, we report some initial empirical findings
regarding CBS and its antecedents from two quantitative
studies among consumers. Our article culminates with the
development of an agenda for future research on CBS.
Managers can gain important insights from our framework
on how to recognize and to deal with the challenging new
phenomenon of CBS.
Definition of CBS
The term “sabotage” originates from the French word sabot, a
type of wooden clog that disgruntled French workers threw
into machines during the Industrial Revolution in order to
harm their companies. This phenomenon of sabotage by em-
ployees has been examined in management research (e.g.,
Analoui 1995). In marketing research, brand saboteurs have
been defined as employees who work actively against their
brand (Wallace and De Chernatony 2007). However, this
definition does not recognize that individuals outside a com-
pany can also harm the brand. Therefore, in our study, we
adopt a company-external perspective and examine sabotage
activities by consumers. We define CBS as deliberate be-
havior by customers or noncustomers who have the domi-
nant objective of causing harm to a brand through the
impairment of the brand-related associations of other con-
sumers. This definition comprises five key elements.
First, a “deliberate act” implies that an action is taken
consciously and intentionally; CBS activities are not
impulsive but thoughtful actions that are carefully selected
because of their potential to damage the brand. Thus,
sabotage refers to consumers’ conscious and planned
behavior (see Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), in contrast to
instinctive, automatic responses to stimuli (Anderson and
Bushman 2002).
Second, the word “behavior” signifies that some action
must be undertaken. Thus, thoughts of committing CBS (i.e.,
behavioral intention) without engaging in any activity or
preliminary activity (e.g., making a brand sabotage video
without publishing it) would not be classified as CBS. This
action-oriented perspective can also be found in military
law, in which “sabotage” refers to actual activities and not
just intentions (Warner 1941). CBS activities can differ
with regard to their scope and modality. Concerning
geographical and temporal scope, CBS comprises local and
global activities (Van Doorn et al. 2010) and can involve
both sporadic and customary behavior (Harris and Ogbonna
2002). With regard to modality, sabotage activities can
be either offline or online (e.g., creating and uploading a
sabotage video to the web) or can combine online and
offline activities (e.g., using social media to spur graffiti
relating to British Petroleum’s (BP’s) oil catastrophe;
Flickr 2010). However, there is no specific activity that
automatically qualifies as CBS. Rather, a particular activity
qualifies as CBS if the objective to harm a brand is the
dominant underlying motive.
Third, CBS can be executed by both customers and
noncustomers. Consumers who actually have purchased and
consumed the brand’s products can engage in CBS activities,
but people who have never experienced the brand as cus-
tomers can do so as well. This was the case for Abercrombie
& Fitch, when a noncustomer was outraged by the following
statement of the company’s chief executive officer (CEO): “A
lot of people don’t belong [in our clothes], and they can’t
belong. Are we exclusionary? Absolutely. Those companies
that are in trouble are trying to target everybody: young, old,
fat, skinny” (Denizet-Lewis 2006). As a consequence, the
consumer engaged in CBS by creating a viral YouTube and
Twitter campaign (“Abercrombie & Fitch Gets a Brand
Readjustment: #FitchTheHomeless”; Karber 2013) in which
he tried to reposition the brand as the “uncool brand for the
homeless” by asking other consumers to donate Abercrombie
& Fitch clothes to homeless people. In addition, CBS can be
committed by one individual consumer or can be the result
of a group activity whereby multiple consumers work to-
gether. For example, the brand sabotage campaign against
Abercrombie & Fitch was created by one consumer (Karber
2013), whereas graffiti relating to BP’s oil catastrophe
sprayed on buildings worldwide was created by multiple
consumers (Flickr 2010).
Fourth, the dominant objective of CBS is to harm a brand.
The objective of causing harm is consistent with the concept
of hostile aggression in social psychology, for which this
objective is a key defining element (Anderson and Bushman
2002; Baron and Richardson 1994). A brand saboteur acts
as a hostile aggressor and chooses activities that he/she
believes will cause harm to the object of his/her aggres-
sion (i.e., the brand). According to military literature, a
saboteur typically targets a crucial element of the enemy
(Lefevre 2001). This is also the case with a brand, which is a
highly valuable but also somewhat vulnerable asset of a
company and, therefore, represents a worthwhile target for
sabotage activities of consumers.
Finally, the brand saboteur tries to harm the brand by
impairing the brand-related associations of other consumers.
Because the power and true value of a brand lies in the brand
associations made and held by consumers (Keller 1993),
altering these associations in a negative way represents a key
means of causing harm to the brand.
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Distinction of CBS from Other
Related Constructs
Consumer brand sabotage represents a novel construct
that is distinct from other forms of negative consumer
behavior that have previously been discussed in the lit-
erature, such as negative WOM (e.g., De Matos and Rossi
2008), customer retaliation (e.g., Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux
2009), and consumer boycott (e.g., Klein, Smith, and John
2004). The key characteristic that distinguishes CBS from
these related constructs is the type of aggression exerted by the
consumer (i.e., hostile versus instrumental aggression): CBS
involves hostile aggression, with the consumer having the
conscious desire and dominant motive to harm the brand (see
also Anderson and Bushman 2002). The consumer does not
wish to (re)establish any relationship and is not interested in
any compensation or apology from the brand—the bridges are
burned. In contrast, in the case of instrumental aggression, the
consumer behaves aggressively against the brand in order to
achieve other objectives. Thus, aggression is exerted only as
an instrument to achieve other goals, such as to restore equity
or to vent negative emotions.
A first construct is negative WOM, which refers to
negative informal communication by consumers to other
consumers about their evaluations of goods and services
(Zhang, Feick, and Mittal 2014). It has been shown that very
dissatisfied customers use negative WOM as a form of
venting their negative emotions to achieve a feeling of relief
(De Matos and Rossi 2008). Also, prior research has argued
that consumers engage in negative WOM to restore equity
(Wetzer, Zeelenberg, and Pieters 2007).
Customer retaliation is a second construct that occurs
when a customer feels he/she has been wronged by the
company or brand and works to get even (Funches, Markley,
and Davis 2009). This definition, along with literature on
customer retaliation, shows the importance of equity theory
as a foundation of the construct of revenge and retaliation
(Funches, Markley, and Davis 2009; Grégoire, Laufer, and
Tripp 2010). In other words, the goal of retaliation is to
restore equity rather than to harm the brand per se (as is the
case with CBS, whereby—in a punitive overreaction—the
damage can go well beyond equity). Furthermore, customer
retaliation against a firm is a response to a negative trans-
action in which the retaliator must have been an actual
customer of the firm. In that respect, CBS is broader, because
it also includes actions of noncustomers (e.g., noncustomers
who disagree with communicated brand values).
A third construct is a consumer boycott, wherein
consumers refrain from purchasing the brand in order to
achieve certain objectives (e.g., Friedman 1985) such as
restoring equity (e.g., making the brand change its behavior;
Braunsberger and Buckler 2011) or venting negative emo-
tions (e.g., expressing anger about a perceived inadequate
behavior of the brand; John and Klein 2003). Furthermore,
boycott behavior can be viewed as prosocial behavior, by
which actions are intended to benefit one or more people
other than oneself—behaviors such as helping, comforting,
sharing, and cooperating (Klein, Smith, and John 2004).
This discussion of various forms of negative consumer
behavior illustrates the unique motive structure that is a key
distinguishing characteristic of CBS. In the case of negative
WOM, customer retaliation, and consumer boycotts, the two
motives of venting negative emotions and restoring equity
prevail. These behaviors are clearly different from CBS, in
which the dominant motive is to cause harm to a brand.
Not only the motives but also the types and levels of
emotions and cognitions that precede CBS are unique. In line
with aggression literature, we argue that CBS as a form of
hostile aggression is more affective than instrumental ag-
gression and, thus, is preceded by stronger negative emotions,
such as anger and hatred (see also Anderson and Bushman
2002). With regard to negative cognitions, CBS and instru-
mental aggression are drivenbydifferent cognitive antecedents.
Key cognitions associatedwithCBS are hostile thoughts, such
as the wish or imagination to harm or punish the brand (see
also Anderson and Bushman 2002), and a perceived threat to
one’s identity (see also Graham et al. 2013). In contrast,
instrumental aggression is preceded by perceived betrayal (e.g.,
Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009) and perceived power-
lessness (e.g., Grégoire, Laufer, and Tripp 2010).
Furthermore, CBS is different from other forms of nega-
tive consumer behavior on a behavioral level. Typically, CBS
activities consist of conscious, well-planned behavior in which
the consumer invests a high level of effort; it is not trivial to
truly harm brands because the brand-related associations of
other consumers are fairly stable and resilient (Keller 1993). In
contrast, consumers who engage in activities of instrumental
aggression (i.e., negative WOM, customer retaliation, con-
sumer boycott) tend to invest a lower level of effort.
As a result of the different motive structures between
CBS and instrumental aggression, and the corresponding
behaviors, there are also differences with regard to damage.
Because saboteurs tend to carefully plan and invest a high
level of effort to deliberately impair the brand-related
associations of other consumers, the potential damage
from CBS can be extremely high. Other forms of negative
consumer behavior, such as negative WOM or individual
boycotts (in which consumers typically invest less effort),
tend to be less harmful than CBS, as illustrated by a recent
study in the context of consumer boycotts, which shows that
boycott behavior launched by people using the Internet is
ineffective in inflicting economic harm on the targeted firm
(Koku 2012).
Finally, CBS is also distinct from related constructs (e.g.,
negative WOM) on a relationship level. In the case of CBS,
the consumer does not wish to (re)establish any relationship
or transaction with the brand (e.g., will never again purchase
products of the brand) and also is not interested in any
compensation or apology from the brand.With other forms of
negative consumer behavior, the goal is to restore equity or
simply vent negative emotions, while at the same time main-
taining the relationship with the brand.
Conceptual Framework
Our conceptual framework aims at providing a better under-
standing of the factors and complex psychological mechanisms
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that drive a consumer to engage in brand sabotage activities
(see Figure 1). The process begins when the consumer is
confronted with a brand stimulus that is either a product or
service failure or a company behavior that is in conflict with
the consumer’s values. The consumer evaluates this stimulus
in a primary appraisal process that involves an assessment of
the significance of the stimulus for him/her as well as specific
cognitions and emotions. The consumer then reassesses these
cognitive and emotional responses, the brand-related stim-
ulus, and the entire situation in a reappraisal process. As a
result, the consumer might ponder the situation further
(rumination) or decide to interact with the brand (e.g.,
complaining to the company). Subsequently, if the consumer
is still not satisfied after reappraisal and possible interaction
and rumination loops with the brand, the consumer decides
how to respond: with CBS activities or with other forms of
negative consumer behavior. Depending on the type of initial
stimulus—a performance-based stimulus (e.g., brand failure)
or a value-based stimulus (i.e., linked to the brand’s values)—
that is the starting point for the consumer’s mental escalation
toward CBS or instrumental aggression, we can distinguish
two paths: a performance-related and a value-related esca-
lation path.
The key objective of our conceptual framework is to
provide an understanding of these two escalation paths and
to specifically explain the consumer’s decision whether to
engage in CBS or alternative behavior. This choice is driven
by the consumer’s mental escalation process (i.e., primary
appraisal, emotions and cognitions, reappraisal, and rumi-
nation and interaction loops) and is also influenced by
contingency factors such as individual consumer character-
istics, brand attributes, and the specific consumer-brand
relationship.
This framework has been developed based on theoretical
considerations from the aggression and appraisal literature
as well as on qualitative interviews with consumers who
engaged in aggressive behavior against brands. In addition to
these theoretical considerations and our qualitative inter-
views, we also present some initial empirical findings from
two quantitative studies among consumers that concern CBS
and its antecedents.
Theoretical Considerations
Because aggressive behavior plays a central role in our
framework, we look to aggression theories from social
psychology such as the General Aggression Model (GAM;
Anderson and Bushman 2002) for guidance. We identify
useful concepts and ideas from the aggression literature and
adapt them in a unique way to a consumer–brand relationship
context in order to facilitate theory development. The GAM
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postulates that aggression results from the mental processing
of situational and personal input factors (e.g., insult by
another individual). These input factors determine the
internal state of the individual, characterized by cognitions
and emotions. The overall situation is then evaluated in an
appraisal and decision process, potentially resulting in ag-
gression. Guided by this general person-to-person response
process, we develop an understanding of a unique form of
aggressive behavior in a consumer-brand context.
It is important to note that this perspective provides an
important and unique contribution by extending previous
aggression theories in several important ways. First, in the
case of CBS, a saboteur (person) targets a brand (object).
Thus, we are studying person–object relationships, in con-
trast to traditional aggression theories in social psychology,
which focus on person-to-person aggression in the context
of interpersonal relationships.
Second, in this person–object context, a saboteur needs
to invest more cognitive effort to implement his/her ag-
gression. This occurs because brands are more abstract
than humans (even though consumers sometimes attribute
anthropomorphous characteristics to brands). Thus, aggres-
sion in a consumer–brand context might not be as easy or
straightforward as attacking another person (e.g., through
face-to-face confrontation or by using violence against the
other person).
Third, in a consumer–brand context, there is an initial
power difference between the aggressor and the object of
aggression. Unlike in interpersonal aggression, in which two
opponents often are similarly strong, the aggressor (saboteur)
in the context of brand sabotage is a consumer, who is gen-
erally much less powerful than a brand. This power gap can be
bridged as the consumer empowers him- or herself by acti-
vating other consumers whose brand-related associations
are impaired as a consequence of CBS, like David beating
Goliath.
Fourth, the interaction process for CBS is different from
that in an interpersonal context. Because the potential object
of aggression in CBS is an object and not a person, the
interactions between the consumer and the brand are often
more abstract and less direct, and therefore less intuitive,
which requires more interpretation and decoding by the
consumer. Also, the response by the brand is usually not
immediate and spontaneous, which allows more potential
rumination and interaction loops. In contrast, the GAM
takes a more immediate perspective and “focuses on the
‘person in the situation,’ called an episode, consisting of
one cycle of an ongoing social interaction” (Anderson and
Bushman 2002, p. 34; emphasis in original).
Fifth, our framework is more specific than the GAM
with regard to the input variables because we differentiate
between performance- and value-based brand stimuli. In an
interpersonal setting, there could be many more factors that
lead to aggression.
Finally, we take an external conflict perspective on values
as a driver of aggression, according to which the object
of aggression clashes with the aggressor’s personal values
(i.e., a saboteur attacks a brand if it conflicts with his/her
values, such as morality or fairness). In contrast, traditional
aggression theories adopt an internal congruence perspective
on values: a potential aggressor is more likely to engage in
aggression if he/she sees violence as an acceptable method
of problem solving. Our external conflict perspective is
important because consumers “internalize” brands to express
their identity and become especially aggressive to value
infringements by the brand because they want to protect their
identity.
In addition to aggression theories, we also draw on
appraisal theories to better understand the link between brand
stimuli and the resulting emotions and cognitions (Arnold
1960; Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose 1996). Appraisal the-
ories examine how emotions are elicited by stimuli, claiming
that there is some cognition (i.e., appraisal) involved, prior
to the elicitation of emotions, which can be conscious or
unconscious (Moors 2009). Such an appraisal perspective is
especially relevant to understanding the impact of brand
stimuli on consumers’ emotions and cognitions and the sub-
sequent escalation process toward CBS.
Qualitative Interviews
We conducted a qualitative study among seven consumer
brand saboteurs and five consumers who had engaged in
negative WOM, boycott activities, or customer retaliation
(one interview was with two individuals who together
engaged in customer retaliation). The purpose of this study
was to understand consumers’ motivation for their behavior
and the emotions and thoughts that led to it. We conducted
semistructured interviews with consumers who in the past
four years had engaged in the respective behaviors. In
selecting brand saboteurs, we required all components of our
definition of CBS to be met. We carefully studied con-
sumers’ behaviors (e.g., when they invested a large amount
of effort in their actions) to infer from their behavior their
motivation for the actions. For the interviews of consumers
who had engaged in instrumental aggression, we relied on
definitions of such behavior in the literature (e.g., for customer
retaliation, Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux [2009]; for consumer
boycott, Klein, Smith, and John [2004]; for negative WOM,
Zhang, Feick, and Mittal [2014]).
To identify interview candidates, we searched social
networking sites, video-sharing platforms, online forums,
blogs, newspapers, magazines, and journals, and dis-
tributed flyers. When selecting interviewees, we attempted
to maximize diversity with regard to the underlying brand-
related stimuli, consumers’ specific behaviors, and their
sociodemographics (see TableW1.1 in theWeb Appendix).
The interviews were conducted over a three-month period
and a later two-month period; each interview lasted be-
tween a half hour and an hour (M = 35 minutes; total =
7 hours). The interviews were divided into three sections. In
the first section, consumers described what brand behavior
and later interactions with the brand led to their behavior,
as well as how they felt and what thoughts they had in
this process. In the second section, consumers talked about
their actions against the brands, including how they
developed the idea to act in that way. The last section dealt
with consumers’ motivations and the objectives of their
behavior. We interpreted the content of our audiotaped and
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transcribed interviews through a hermeneutical approach,
in that we applied an iterative process by shifting back
and forth between the data and the literature on aggression and
appraisal to provide a well-founded ground of evidence
and reach a comprehensive conceptual framework (Adkins and
Ozanne 2005; Thompson and Haytko 1997). In the first part of
this process, we looked at the entire interview intratextually to
gain a sense of the consumer’s individual experience with the
brand and his/her corresponding thoughts and emotions,
resulting behavior, and motivation. In the second part, we
analyzed the interviews intertextually to identify patterns of
similarities and differences within these categories. In this
iterative process, we challenged and refined the emerging
framework with the data. Two of the authors independently
analyzed the interviews. There were only minor differences
between the two researchers’ analyses, which could easily be
resolved by discussion.
Preliminary Study 1
To examine the two paths of hostile versus instrumental
aggression, we conducted a survey among 683 consumers
(48.6% female, Mage = 36.4 years; for a detailed description
of the study, see section W2 in the Web Appendix). Con-
sumers from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland were re-
cruited on the crowdsourcing platform Clickworker. They
followed a link to an online questionnaire in which they were
presented (in randomized order) with six different examples
of negative consumer behavior (two CBS, two retaliation,
and two negative WOM). For the selection of the CBS
examples, we relied on our definition of CBS and insights
from the qualitative study and described CBS activities that
had actually taken place. For customer retaliation, we care-
fully selected specific examples from prior research and used
the descriptions of those examples as provided in the cor-
responding studies (Funches, Markley, and Davis 2009;
Huefner and Hunt 2000). For negative WOM, we selected
real cases as described in our interviews and on the online
review platform TripAdvisor (Mudhutter 2007).
Respondents were asked to indicate how they perceived
the consumer’s behavior in each example and to rate it on a
seven-point Likert-scale (where 1 = “not at all,” and 7 = “very
much”) for 15 variables that referred to the conceptualization
of CBS and the components of our framework. As shown in
detail in Table W2.1 in the Web Appendix, we measured
four emotions (anger, frustration, outrage, and hatred), four
cognitions (hostile thoughts, perceived betrayal, power-
lessness, and identity threat), three motives (harming the
brand, venting negative emotions, and restoring equity),
rumination and interaction loops, consumers’ unwillingness
to (re)engage in a relationship with the brand, and the per-
ceived damage caused to the brand.
Preliminary Study 2
In order to examine the two paths of brand stimuli
(performance-based and value-based stimuli) that can lead
to CBS, we conducted an experiment with a two factorial
between-subject design with 289 participants (48.8% female;
Mage = 38.7 years; for a detailed description of the experiment,
see sectionW3 in theWebAppendix).We recruited consumers
from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland on the platform
Clickworker and presented them with either a performance-
based (n = 144) or a value-based (n = 145) brand stimulus.
We described an action of a (fictitious) clothing brand in
two different ways: the performance-based stimulus was a
severe performance failure with several failed interactions; the
value-based stimulus was a statement by the brand’s CEO
that conflicts with most consumers’ values as well as
indicating unethical brand practices. We made sure that the
amount of negative aspects (i.e., number of interaction
failures and value conflicts) was the same for the performance-
based and the value-based scenario. We based these two
scenarios on the content of our interviews with brand
saboteurs and conducted a pretest to ensure we manipulated
only the intended factors (see section W3 in the Web
Appendix).
After presenting participants with one of the two sce-
narios, we conducted a manipulation check for which we
developed four items to measure to what degree the scenario
was perceived as dealing with performance (a = .95) or
values (a = .95), each with two items. The performance-
based scenario was more strongly perceived as addressing
performance (M = 4.94) than the value-based scenario (M =
3.01; F(1, 287) = 91.85, p < .01), and the value-based scenario
was perceived as more strongly addressing values (M = 5.55)
than the performance-based scenario (M = 3.93; F(1, 280) =
78.90, p < .01). There was no significant difference in the
perceived credibility of the two scenarios (Mperformance-based =
4.33, Mvalue-based = 4.00; F(1, 287) = 2.46, p = .12). We then
assessed participants’ emotions as follows: anger (a = .95)
with a three-item scale of Gelbrich (2010); frustration (a =
.85) with a different three-item scale of Gelbrich (2010);
outrage (a = .93) with the five-item scale of Lindenmeier,
Schleer, and Pricl (2012); and hatred (a = .85) with the
two item-scale of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-
Hoefler (2009). Cognitions were measured as follows: hos-
tile thoughts (a = .86) with five items that we developed on
the basis of our conceptual considerations; perceived identity
threat (a = .77) with the three-item scale of Jetten, Postmes,
and McAuliffe (2002); perceived powerlessness (a = .94)
with the four-item scale of Grégoire, Laufer, and Tripp
(2010); and perceived betrayal (a = .93) with the three-item
scale of Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux (2009). Rumination
(a = .93) was assessed with the six-item scale of Wade et al.
(2008). We then asked participants whether they would react
to the scenario (making them think about a possible action)
and to what degree they had the following motives: to cause
harm to the brand, to restore equity, and to vent negative
emotions. We also asked them to rank these motives to
identify their dominant one.
Afterward, we asked participants whether they would
continue their relationship with the brand (we developed
two items based on our conceptual considerations; a = .78).
We also assessed controls (prior experience with clothing,
credibility of the scenario, and product involvement (a = .81)
with the three-item scale of Chandrashekaran [2004]) and
sociodemographic variables. Subsequently, we discuss our
conceptual framework in more detail.
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Brand-Related Stimuli
Certain brand behaviors or brand philosophies stimulate
consumers’ mental processes, which then lead to CBS or
instrumental aggression. We categorize these brand-related
stimuli into the categories of performance-based and value-
based stimuli, which are the starting points for two different
paths toward CBS. “Performance-based brand stimuli”
refers to a brand’s failure with regard to product and service
quality. This includes defective products, inaccurate bills, late
shipments, or product shortages (Copulsky 2011). It also
comprises interaction failures, such as excessive wait times
for customer service or unfriendly responses on the customer
hotline. CBS in response to such performance-based brand
stimuli is usually conducted by a customer (vs. a non-
customer) because a customer has more touchpoints with the
brand and his/her own brand experience.
Value-based brand stimuli are linked to the brand’s
values, which become visible to consumers through the
brand’s behavior in the market. These values include the
brand’s communicated philosophy and brand identity, as well
as any demonstration by the brand of unsocial or unethical
behavior (e.g., use of child labor in offshore factories). An
example was a group of hackers (probably sympathizers of
the North Korean government) calling themselves “Guard-
ians of Peace,” who attacked Sony Entertainment (even
threatening to blow up movie theaters) because one of the
firm’s movies, The Interview, focused on an attempted
assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un (Fritz,
Yadron, and Schwartzel 2014). Value-based brand stimuli
can cause not only the brand’s customers but also non-
customers to engage in CBS activities.
Appraisal
In the next phase of our conceptual framework, consumers
perceive and evaluate brand stimuli through amental process.
A first step in this process is the primary appraisal of a
stimulus, whereby a consumer makes an assessment of the
significance and meaning of the brand stimulus for his/her
personal situation, which then results in specific emotions and
cognitions (Smith and Lazarus 1993). In accordance with
appraisal theory, we argue that a high relevance of a brand
stimulus to the consumer’s personal goals and values results
in stronger emotions (Moors 2009) and cognitions (Bushman
1998). Also, the congruence of the stimulus with a consumer’s
goals and values determines the valence of emotions (Moors
2009) and cognitions (DeWall et al. 2009). In other words,
incongruence results in negative emotions and cognitions.
Furthermore, the consumer’s negative evaluation of the
fairness and morality (equity) of the brand’s behavior also
drives his/her emotions (e.g., anger) and cognitions (e.g.,
perceived betrayal) (see also Grégoire and Fisher 2008;
Lindenmeier, Schleer, and Pricl 2012). As an example, a key
reason why one of our interviewees finally decided to start a
CBS campaign against a fashion brand was that he felt that
the brand and its “arrogant CEO” acted against important
societal values, and he accused the CEO of racism: “His quote
is like the embodiment of what we don’t like about CEOs.…
He talks about how a lot of people don’t belong in the clothes
of his brand. So he talks repeatedly about going after the all-
American kid, and when I look through all Americans I
immediately feel that is sort of code language for ‘white.’… I
guess I was kinda shocked by it, because it really seems like a
scripted language of a villain in a film rather than a position
someone would actually hold” (Interview 3).
In addition, attribution theory can explain the consumer’s
evaluation of brand stimuli (e.g., Folkes 1984, 1988). Spe-
cifically, the consumer makes a causal inference for the
occurrence of the stimulus by evaluating the brand’s re-
sponsibility for this stimulus and whether the brand has
control over it. If the consumer perceives the brand to be
responsible for and in control of the negative stimulus, it is
more likely that negative emotions and cognitions will be
elicited (see also Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose 1996).
Emotions and Cognitions
As a result of the primary appraisal of the brand stimulus, a
variety of interrelated emotions and cognitions can be elicited
and activated variously across consumers and situations
(Anderson and Bushman 2002).We identified these emotions
and cognitions on the basis of considerations from aggression
theories, the literature on negative consumer behavior, and
our interviews.
First, in our context of aggressive consumer behavior,
the key emotions have a negative valence and mostly a high
level of arousal (see also Reisenzein 1994). We consider
the following emotions to play an important role in our
framework: frustration, anger, outrage, and hatred. Accord-
ing to the frustration–aggression hypothesis, frustration is a
crucial antecedent of aggression (Dollard et al. 1939). A key
notion behind this hypothesis is that frustration results from
the interference of a stimulus or situation with the expected
attainment of a desired goal. A person becomes frustrated if
his/her goal is blocked or made unattainable. Frustration as
a response to product and service failures has also been
addressed in literature on customer retaliation and negative
WOM (e.g., Gelbrich 2010), and most of our interviewees
stated that a key emotional response was frustration, as
illustrated by this quotation: “I cannot understand how a
company can be that incompetent! Especially because I
always thought my case was that simple and clear. That was
just very frustrating!” (Interview 4).
Subsequent research further refines the basic frustration–
aggression hypothesis. A prominent refinement was that
anger was added as a mediator between frustration and
aggression (Berkowitz 1989). General appraisal theories
state that anger is usually caused by an external attribution
(Roseman 1991); something or someone else is blamed for an
aversive situation leading to anger. Thus, we postulate that
anger occurs when the consumer blames a brand for blocking
his/her goals. This prominent role of anger in our framework
was also evidenced in our interviews, in which all consumers
explicitly stated that they felt angry. One of our interviewees
said, “It was this feeling of anger … that drove me. Sh——!
This procedure drives me f——ing nuts!… I was so mad!”
(Interview 10).
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Outrage is another important emotion that predisposes
consumers to aggressive behavior. Outrage is more complex
than the basic emotion of anger and is often linked to the
interests or welfare of other consumers (Lindenmeier,
Schleer, and Pricl 2012). This emotion results from the
appraisal that a brand behaves in a way that is offensive to
decency or morality, especially if moral norms such as
fairness, justice, and political correctness have been violated
(see also Batson et al. 2007). Accordingly, we expect outrage
to occur particularly in cases of a brand’s behavior being
incongruent with a consumer’s values. As an example, one of
our interviewees became really outraged with the perceived
injustice of a large railway company. He described his
feelings after reading that the CEO had said that on shorter
routes during commuter traffic, it could be expected that
passengers would stand for 20 minutes: “I am outraged that
someone who sits on his office chair for the entire day and is
driven around in a private car believes to have the right to say
what can be reasonable for us who work eight or nine hours
a day with—compared to his work—relatively hard work. It
is impertinent! Especially because their [the carrier’s] per-
formance keeps decreasing” (Interview 11).
Hatred is another emotion that plays a key role in leading
to consumers’ aggressive behavior. In social psychology,
hatred is a very powerful negative emotion and entails a
desire to hurt, humiliate, or even kill someone (Halperin
2008; White 1996). In our interviews, hatred toward the
brand was often found among brand saboteurs: “It was really
unfair; I was so mad. Well, I maybe even felt hatred towards
the employees of my supplier. I cannot hate them for the rest
of my life. But the brand shall now bleed for it” (Interview 6).
With regard to the role of consumers’ emotions in driving
aggressive behavior, the aggression literature has indicated
that hostile aggression is more affective than instrumental
aggression and is driven by strong emotions such as anger
(Anderson and Bushman 2002). This is in line with our
findings from Study 1, which show that the levels of anger,
frustration, outrage, and hatred were significantly higher
for CBS than for instrumental aggression (IA in equations):
anger (MCBS = 6.25, MIA = 5.17; F(1, 1,347) = 214.81, p <
.01), frustration (MCBS = 5.84, MIA = 5.49; F(1, 1,018) =
18.53, p < .01), outrage (MCBS = 6.54, MIA = 6.12; F(1,
1,024) = 41.69, p < .01), and hatred (MCBS = 6.18, MIA =
4.97; F(1, 1,057) = 242.80, p < .01). These findings for anger
and hatredwere also supported by Study 2, in whichwe found
that saboteurs reported significantly higher levels of anger
(MCBS = 6.25, MIA = 5.25; F(1, 26) = 18.59, p < .01) and
hatred (MCBS = 6.18, MIA = 5.17; F(1, 259) = 6.78, p < .05)
than instrumental aggressors.
In terms of cognitions, we identified the following to be
most critical: hostile thoughts, perceived identity threat,
perceived powerlessness, and perceived betrayal. Hostile
thoughts are aggressive concepts stored in consumers’ long-
term memory that can be activated by brand stimuli
(Anderson and Bushman 2002). These thoughts include the
idea of hurting/damaging someone or something, the wish or
imagination to harm or punish someone, the impulse to attack
or destroy something, and the urge to say something rude,
inappropriate, or nasty to someone.
In our framework, hostile thoughts are activated as a
result of the primary appraisal and are mentally linked to a
brand. Our interviewees also reported such hostile thoughts:
“I wanted to harm them. I said, ‘You can delete us from your
customer file. I never want to work with you anymore.’ This
really was one of my first thoughts after I got their letter”
(Interview 6).
A perceived threat to an individual’s identity is another
cognition that forms an important source of aggressive
behavior (Graham et al. 2013). Such a threat refers to actions
or situations that challenge or diminish a person’s sense
of competence, dignity, or self-worth (Aquino and Douglas
2003). A consumer could perceive a threat to his/her self-
identity when a brand made him/her feel unimportant or not
taken seriously. This perceived threat enhances the likelihood
that a consumer will engage in aggression. Several of our
interviewees confirmed such a perceived threat to their
identity as a driver of their aggressive behavior: “As a long-
standing customer you are all of a sudden worthless. They
didn’t show any reaction, didn’t care at all. It hit me really
hard. It was as if they were saying, ‘You are not interesting for
us. We don’t care whether you are our customer or not!’”
(Interview 2).
A further important cognition in the context of aggression
is perceived powerlessness, which refers to the consumer’s
belief that he/she cannot influence the situation to his/her
advantage or that he/she cannot change the target’s (i.e.,
the brand’s) attitudes and behaviors (Grégoire, Laufer, and
Tripp 2010), so that the only “escape” could be aggressive
behavior. Such behavior can also emerge when a consumer
perceives that his/her power has been reduced (e.g., Horwitz
1956). Such power-reduction situations are experienced as
attacks, and individuals might counterattack to restore their
power (Fagenson and Cooper 1987). This feeling of pow-
erlessness is especially relevant in our consumer–brand
context because the brand often has more resources and
influence than an individual consumer. In our qualitative
study, we found that interviewees often felt powerless: “It is
just this feeling of powerlessness that drove me. Knowing
who replaces this lovely place just pisses me off! More and
more big companies eat and destroy the small ones. That just
makes me feel powerless” (Interview 10).
Finally, perceived betrayal is another important cogni-
tion, which includes perceived rejection and relationship
devaluation (Fitness 2001). It results from a customer’s belief
that a brand has intentionally violated what is normative in
the context of their relationship. This is sometimes the case
when customers believe that firms have behaved in an unfair
way, lied to them, taken advantage of them, violated their
trust, cheated, broken promises, or disclosed confidential
information. The importance of perceived betrayal in our
context was supported by our interviews: “I felt really
betrayed. Since I was a small boy I was their customer. And
now, they just presented us with the facts: ‘That’s what we are
planning and that’s what we are going to do. We don’t care
what you say!’” (Interview 11).
Regarding consumers’ cognitions, hostile thoughts, such
as the wish or imagination to harm or punish a brand, increase
the likelihood of consumers choosing the hostile path (see
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also Anderson and Bushman 2002). Furthermore, a perceived
threat to one’s identity has been found to play a key role
in conflict escalation, leading to more severe aggression
(Graham et al. 2013; Graham and Wells 2003), such as CBS.
In line with these considerations, in Study 1, we found that
hostile thoughts (MCBS = 6.20, MIA = 5.05; F(1, 1,037) =
206.69, p < .01) and perceived identity threat (MCBS = 4.10,
MIA = 3.61; F(1, 1,324) = 18.74, p < .01) were more relevant
for respondents who had engaged in CBS than for those who
had engaged in instrumental aggression. The findings
regarding hostile thoughts were supported by Study 2. We
found that those respondents who chose CBS reported sig-
nificantly more hostile thoughts (M = 4.94) than those who
chose instrumental aggression (M = 3.41; F(1, 259) = 17.36,
p < .01). In contrast, with regard to perceived betrayal and
perceived powerlessness (which are related to restoring
equity), prior research has found that these two cognitions
play a key role in leading to customer retaliation (Grégoire,
Laufer, and Tripp 2010; Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009).
In line with this research, in Study 1, we found that perceived
betrayal (MCBS = 5.00,MIA = 5.60; F(1, 721) = 29.36, p < .01)
and perceived powerlessness (MCBS = 3.11, MIA = 3.79; F(1,
1,324) = 41.03, p < .01) were more important for instrumental
aggression than for CBS.
Reappraisal and Decision
In the next phase of our conceptual framework, the consumer
interprets the brand-induced situation from an overall per-
spective. In other words, the consumer reevaluates the brand
stimuli, primary appraisal, and resulting cognitions and
emotions. There can also be repeated brand interaction and
rumination loops, and finally, the consumer makes a decision
about whether to engage in CBS or instrumental aggression,
or not to act at all. This phase is also the key mental process of
the GAM, determining the final action of the person and the
type of aggressive behavior (Anderson and Bushman 2002).
A crucial aspect of this integrative evaluation involves the
consumer’s reflection on how the situation is going to evolve
according to the expected future behavior of the brand (Smith
and Lazarus 1993). Here, the consumer makes an assessment
of whether the situation, including the brand’s behavior, will
change in the consumer’s favor (Lazarus 1991).
With regard to the choice between CBS and instrumental
aggression, consumers who believe there is a chance that the
brand’s behavior will change for the better might choose the
instrumental aggression rather than the CBS path (or might
choose to interact with the brand again). This assertion is
supported by the literature on consumer boycotts, in which it
has been found that consumers are more likely to engage in
boycotting behavior if they believe that it will influence the
firm’s behavior (Klein, Smith, and John 2004). If the con-
sumer does not see any chance for such an improvement, he/
she tends to be more willing to burn all bridges to the brand
and engage in CBS.
These considerations were also supported by our inter-
views. Consumers who engaged in instrumental aggression
believed that the brand’s behavior could still improve: “I’ve
hoped that through our protest actions they realize that they
have to change something and that they do something about
it” (Interview 11); “I wanted to put pressure on them such that
they take care of the problem” (Interview 9). On the other
hand, consumers who engaged in CBS did not expect the
behavior of the brand to improve in the future: “I didn’t
attempt to contact them. I think there isn’t any benefit to
contacting them, because they don’t really care about
complaints unless they affect sort of the bottom line”
(Interview 3); “We have really never had a similar situation.
Never did we have to cope with something like this. So far,
we have always found a solution. But this time, they really did
not even leave us a chance” (Interview 6). Also, our findings
from Study 1 confirmed that consumers who engaged in CBS
were more likely to want never to become a customer of the
brand again (MCBS = 5.38, MIA = 4.06; F(1, 1,438) = 185.67,
p < .01).
A specific phenomenon linked to the reappraisal process
in our consumer–brand context is rumination. Because a
brand’s response to a consumer’s communication can take
some time, the consumer has slack time, which can result in
rumination. Here, the consumer repeatedly thinks about the
initial negative brand stimuli, resulting negative cognitions
and emotions, and prior (repeated) failed interactions with
the brand, reflecting on their causes, meaning, and impli-
cations (Whitmer and Gotlib 2013). Rumination can worsen
consumers’ negative internal states by leading to more
intense negative cognitions and emotions, which are then
again reappraised. Thus, rumination can lead to a vicious
cycle of intensifying negativity. Such an aggravation effect of
rumination has also been found in the aggression literature:
Bushman (2002) finds that angry individuals who engaged in
rumination became even angrier and more aggressive com-
pared with other groups that did not engage in rumination.
It can therefore be argued that the more rumination loops,
the more negative the consumer’s cognitions and emotions
become (Whitmer and Gotlib 2013), thereby increasing the
probability of the consumer engaging in CBS. In other
words, a consumer will be more likely to sabotage a brand
if he/she repetitively thinks about the negative situation
and everything that went wrong, reflecting on the causes,
meaning, and implications of the negative cognitions and
emotions generated in the appraisal process. The relevance of
rumination for CBS is supported by our findings from Study
1, in which we found that for consumers who engaged in
CBS, the level of rumination prior to their hostile action
was significantly higher than for consumers who engaged
in instrumental aggression (MCBS = 5.49, MIA = 4.32;
F(1, 1,040) = 134.31, p < .01).
A consumer’s interpretation of a brand-induced situation
during reappraisal is followed by a decision of how to react to
the situation. In preparation for this decision, the consumer
first elaborates on what action options he/she has for cop-
ing with the negative brand-induced situation. These include
doing nothing (and cognitively redefining the situation as less
important or less critical; Lazarus 1991), constructively
interacting with the brand (e.g., complaining to the com-
pany), or engaging in instrumental aggression or CBS against
the brand. In general, the consumer will select a specific
action option if he/she sees that alternative asmost likely to be
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effective in improving the negative brand-induced situation
(Smith and Lazarus 1993). For example, the consumer could
decide not to attack the brand but to interact constructively
with it (e.g., formal customer complaint) if he/she perceives
the brand to be responsive to critique. This can be illustrated
by one of our interviews, in which a consumer was dissat-
isfied with the quality of a shirt she bought from an online
retailer. She first complained through e-mail because she
had a positive image of the retailer’s service orientation and
believed that her problem could be solved with such a formal
complaint: “I thought it can’t be that my shirt is ruined after
only wearing it once. So far, I have always had positive
experiences with the brand. That’s why I thought that
writing a complaint would resolve the issue” (Interview 8).
With regard to the role of the number of failed interac-
tions in driving aggressive behavior, we argue that multiple
negative interactions with a brand (interaction loops) should
drive consumers toward CBS because they will increase the
negativity of resulting emotions and cognitions and create the
impression that there is no chance for a constructive and
positive solution (see also Graham and Wells 2003). This
argument was supported in our interviews with brand sab-
oteurs: “It has reoccurred again and again. Each time, after
they realized their mistake, another unjustified bill arrived.
This is impossible! Did they go completely mad? Every time,
I stood again at the same spot and had to reinitiate com-
plaining that the bill was unjustified. You could even talk of a
tactic of attrition from them. Of course, after all that you can
no longer have any positive attitude towards that brand!”
(Interview 1); “I was not taken seriously by them. That’s very
clear. I contacted them so many times. If they had reacted
or written to me earlier, I would not have gone that far”
(Interview 7). Our results from Study 1 also support this
notion: more failed interactions were reported for consumers
who had engaged in CBS than for those who had engaged in
instrumental aggression (MCBS = 4.41, MIA = 3.06; F(1,
758) = 107.80, p < .01).
As an alternative to such a constructive interaction, or as
a result of failed interactions with the brand, a consumer
can decide that the best action option is to act aggressively
against the brand. In this case, he/she can choose between
CBS and instrumental aggression. We argue that the choice
of CBS versus instrumental aggressive behavior is deter-
mined by the motives consumers form as a result of the
reappraisal. Consistent with aggression theory (e.g., Anderson
and Bushman 2002), CBS is exerted by consumers with the
dominant motive to harm the brand. Such an explicit
objective to harm was always in evidence in our interviews
with brand saboteurs: “[With my viral social media cam-
paign against the brand,] I can do damage to the company. Of
course, I could just have boycotted the company, but boy-
cotting actually does not make a difference” (Interview 3).
Thus, CBS is typically more harmful than instrumental
aggression; this assertion was supported in Study 1, in which
CBS activities were associated with significantly higher
damage than activities of instrumental aggression (MCBS =
6.02, MIA = 3.68; F(1, 1,307) = 782.64, p < .01). Also,
saboteurs perceive the brand as their enemy and do not wish
to (re)establish any relationship with it: “I never ever want to
work with them again!” (Interview 6); “I believe it just took
too long. I had enough! If it had only occurred once, it would
probably have been OK. But the entire story took about 1.5
years. Then, a lot needs to happen [before] you become a
customer of that brand again. Even if they had a better and
cheaper offer than others—I really don’t care!” (Interview 1).
In contrast, instrumental aggression is not dominated by
the objective to harm the brand (Anderson and Bushman
2002). Rather, consumers use aggression as a means to
achieve other objectives. A first key motive of instrumental
aggression is the restoration of equity, which is relevant for
customers who feel they have been wronged by a company or
brand and want to get even (Funches, Markley, and Davis
2009). One of our interviewees, for example, stated, “They
presented us with a fait accompli and didn’t ask for our
opinion. By refusing to show the train ticket, we also wanted
to annoy them” (Interview 11). Venting negative emotions
is a second key motive of instrumental aggression and is
important for very dissatisfied customers who want to
achieve a feeling of relief (De Matos and Rossi 2008). In our
interviews, this was supported: “I did not really want to harm
them [the brand]. I wanted to vent my anger and also to put
pressure on them that they react” (Interview 9).
Further support for this distinction was provided by Study
1. As illustrated in Table W2.1 in the Web Appendix, the
motive to harm reached significantly higher values for re-
spondents who engaged in CBS than for those who engaged
in instrumental aggression (MCBS = 6.34, MIA= 4.61; F(1,
1,204) = 390.19; p < .01). Furthermore, the results show that
for CBS, harming the brand was clearly the dominant motive
(Mharming the brand = 6.34, vs. Mrestoring equity = 6.07; t(441) =
4.40, p < .01 andMventing negative emotions = 6.18; t(441) = 2.59,
p < .05). In contrast, for instrumental aggression (negative
WOM and customer retaliation), the dominant motives were
restoring equity (Mrestoring equity = 5.74, vs. Mharming the brand =
4.61; t(883) = 22.55, p < .01) and venting negative emotions
(Mventing negative emotions = 5.59, vs. Mharming the brand = 4.61;
t(883) = 18.06, p < .01).
It is important to note that consumers who have chosen
instrumental aggression can still decide to engage in CBS in a
next step or escalation round, especially if they perceive the
brand’s response to their instrumental aggression as unsat-
isfactory. We expect such a two-step escalation to CBS with
an initial focus on instrumental aggression to be more likely
to occur in the case of performance-based brand stimuli. In the
case of value-based brand stimuli, a direct escalation toward
CBS (without prior instrumental aggression) is more likely.
In our Study 2, out of 261 respondents who were con-
fronted with an initial brand-related stimulus and answered
the respective question, 17 chose to engage in CBS (i.e., to
harm the brand was their dominant motive), of which 13 had
seen the value-based stimulus and 4 the performance-based
stimulus. The other 244 respondents chose instrumental ag-
gression (i.e., to restore equity or to vent negative emotions as
their dominant motive). Of these, 114 had seen a value-based
stimulus and 130 a performance-based stimulus. These
findings could indicate that value-based brand stimuli lead
more directly to CBS than performance-based brand stimuli.
To further investigate this idea, we conducted a mediation
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analysis using PROCESS model 4 (bootstrapping of 10,000
samples; Hayes 2013). The value- versus performance-
based stimuli were dummy-coded as value-based = 0 and
performance-based = 1. We found that the performance-
based brand stimulus increased the motives of restoring
equity and of venting negative emotions, which both in turn
increased the motive of causing harm to a brand (restoring
equity: a1b1 = .1465, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [.0202,
.3035]; venting negative emotions: a2b2 = .3087, 95%
CI = [.1138, .5269]). Independent of this mechanism, the
performance-based (vs. value-based) stimulus had a negative
effect on the motive to cause harm to a brand (c9 = -.7398,
95% CI = [-1.1450, -.3345]). Thus, we found evidence that
consumers who are confronted with a performance-based
brand stimulus might first engage in instrumental aggression
before (in a next escalation round) committing CBS. On the
other hand, value-based brand stimuli could lead more
directly to CBS (or could be mediated by other factors).
Contingency Factors
The choice of CBS versus instrumental aggression is also
influenced by contingency factors referring to the consumer’s
personality, his/her relationship with the brand, and the brand
itself. Following the literature on aggression as well as our
qualitative study, we identified three specific contingency
factors that affect this choice: aggressive consumer person-
ality, consumer–brand relationship quality, and singularity of
the brand personality.
People with an aggressive personality perceive more
hostility and aggression in situations than people with a less
aggressive personality (Anderson and Dill 2000). As a
result, a consumer with an aggressive personality will be
more likely to feel provoked by a brand and to respond with
aggressive behavior. Furthermore, due to his/her heightened
sensitivity to situational provocation, less provocation is
needed to evoke aggressive behaviors in such a consumer
(Marshall and Brown 2006). Also, an aggressive consumer
will be more likely to turn a potential conflict situation into a
hostile one (Anderson, Buckley, and Carnagey 2008).
The consumer–brand relationship quality represents
another contingency factor that affects the choice of
aggression path. In general, a high-quality relationship
should buffer the negative effects of a product or service
failure because the consumer is more tolerant with regard
to brand transgressions (Hess, Ganesan, and Klein 2003;
Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998), making CBS less
probable. In contrast, consumers with a low-quality brand
relationship do not have such tolerance and will more likely
respond with CBS. However, it is also possible that con-
sumers with high expectations of the brand would perceive a
brand failure as betrayal (Thompson, Rindfleisch, and Arsel
2006), leading to a “love-becomes-hate” effect (Grégoire,
Tripp, and Legoux 2009) and thereby increasing the like-
lihood of CBS. This possibility is illustrated by the following
quote of a brand saboteur: “We had a really good cooperation
for a long time. These were great people. But, well, they have
really let us down. I don’t trust them anymore. Really, they
betrayed me” (Interview 6).
Singularity of brand personality also forms an important
contingency factor that influences the choice of aggression
path. The focus and single-mindedness of a brand personality
profile as intended by management determines the singular-
ity of the brand’s personality (Malär et al. 2012). In other
words, a highly singular brand focuses on a single concept or
idea and has high values on only one brand personality
dimension (e.g., Harley-Davidson, which focuses on the
personality dimension of ruggedness; Malär et al. 2012).
Although singularity has been defined as important driver of
brand performance, it can raise the likelihood that consumers
will sabotage a brand. By focusing on one personality
dimension, a brand might be perceived as clearer and less
complex (Malär et al. 2012); however, a singular brand
personality also makes any conflict with a consumer’s
personal values stronger and more apparent. For example,
Abercrombie & Fitch’s brand strategy was to target the cool,
popular, and attractive kids, which led to a rather exciting
brand personality (see Aaker 1997). Such a strong focus on
excitement might have polarized consumers, resulting in
some consumers’ strong value conflicts with this positioning.
Also, saboteurs could see such a positioning as a chance to
demonstrate that the values some brands hold and commu-
nicate are strongly unethical in the saboteurs’ eyes. The
relevance of such a singularity for consumers is illustrated by
the following quote of one of our brand saboteurs: “It’s not
that what [brand] does is so much worse than what everybody
else does. It’s that it is bad in such a perfect example”
(Interview 3). For instrumental aggressors, the singularity of
the brand personality will likely be less relevant because they
primarily want to restore equity with the brand that has caused
them harm in some way, or to vent their negative emotions
about the brand.
Academic Implications
The chief objectives of our article are to improve our
understanding of CBS and to stimulate the study of this
underresearched phenomenon in marketing. In line with
these objectives, we develop a conceptual framework of
consumers’ aggressive behavior toward brands and advance
knowledge in this area in three major ways.
First, we introduce CBS as a relatively new construct to
the academic literature. This concept reflects a phenomenon
that can increasingly be observed in practice but that has not
yet been investigated sufficiently in academic research. We
conceptualize CBS as a hostile form of aggressive behavior
with the dominant objective of harming a brand through
the impairment of the brand-related associations of other
consumers. We therefore distinguish CBS from previously
studied concepts of negative consumer behavior that represent
a more instrumental form of aggression (e.g., negativeWOM),
by which consumers attempt to achieve other goals, such as
restoring equity or venting negative emotions. Overall, by
introducing the concept of CBS to the literature, we highlight
the need for a better understanding of this new and increasingly
important phenomenon.
Second, we explain the inception of CBS among indi-
vidual consumers from a mental-process perspective. Guided
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by previous theory and research as well as qualitative
interviews, we develop a novel and more comprehensive
perspective on negative consumer behavior and the processes
by which it forms. Our theoretical focus is in line with calls
for a stronger theoretical foundation (Cheung and Thadani
2010) as well as for a more integrative explanatory approach
(e.g., De Matos and Rossi 2008; Lovett, Peres, and Shachar
2013) made in prior research on other forms of negative
consumer behavior. These suggestions have been made
against the background that prior conceptual and empirical
studies on instrumental aggression have tended to focus on
fewer, more isolated antecedents (e.g., perceived betrayal). In
contrast, in our integrative conceptual framework, we take a
more comprehensive perspective, including not only relevant
antecedents examined in prior research but also important
additional antecedents that have not yet been addressed (i.e.,
perceived identity threat, hostile thoughts, hatred, and rumi-
nation). By highlighting the key mental processes, our frame-
work provides a better understanding of when and why
consumers choose the hostile or the instrumental path of
aggression against brands. Also, by addressing the choice
between CBS and instrumental aggression (i.e., considering
several negative consumer behaviors simultaneously in one
conceptual model), we integrate the rather fragmented lit-
erature on negative consumer behavior, which has generally
examined one type of negative behavior at a time (e.g.,
studies on consumer boycotts or negative WOM).
Third, we complement and support our conceptual frame-
workwith qualitative interviews and two quantitative studies.
Our interviews with brand saboteurs enable an internal
perspective on the mental processes and motivation that lead
to CBS (i.e., we interviewed saboteurs regarding their
emotions, cognitions, and motives). In addition, our quan-
titative studies support our distinction between CBS (as a
form of hostile aggression) and existing concepts of negative
consumer behavior (instrumental aggression, such as neg-
ative WOM). We not only conceptually argue but we also
empirically show that CBS is driven by the motive of
harming a brand, whereas for instrumental aggression, other
motives prevail (e.g., restoring equity). Furthermore, we
provide empirical evidence that, in comparison with instru-
mental aggression, CBS is preceded by stronger negative
emotions (especially outrage, anger, and hatred), more
intense rumination, more failed interactions, and hostile
thoughts and perceived identity threats (rather than perceived
betrayal or powerlessness).
Agenda for Future Research
On a general level, research is needed to empirically test
our conceptual framework of consumer aggression against
brands. This could then lead to a new conceptual discussion
and refinement of our framework. The following are just a
few examples that should be of interest for future research.
Research is needed to more specifically examine why con-
sumers make the critical decision to harm a brand. We have
identified key constructs and stages, but their roles in this
decision need to be empirically examined in more detail. In
particular, it is important to examine how certain brand-related
stimuli and emotions and cognitions are more likely to drive a
consumer toward CBS than toward instrumental aggression. It
is also critical to understand the importance of rumination and
failed interaction loops for a consumer’s decision to engage in
CBS, especially in comparison with the other drivers of CBS,
such as emotions and cognitions. In this context, research is
needed to better understand how many rumination and failed
interaction loops it takes to drive consumers to engage in
CBS. Also important is understanding which specific factors
prompt a consumer to intensively ruminate andwhat indicators
signal companies that a consumer has entered into a critical
rumination process. These are only a few issues that arise
directly from our conceptual framework, and there are clearly
others related to each of the variables and stages, which
provide promising research opportunities (because these
issues have been discussed earlier in the article, they will
not be repeated here). In addition, there are a number of
additional avenues for future research that could broaden or
even go beyond our framework. We now discuss these
potential areas and provide specific research questions.
First, in our framework, we have identified and discussed
a set of relevant contingency factors that influence con-
sumers’ choice of hostile versus instrumental aggression
(aggressive personality, brand relationship quality, and
singularity of brand personality), and the roles of these
contingency factors need to be investigated. However, there
are other contingency variables that merit attention as well.
In particular, sociodemographic variables (e.g., age, gender,
education) should influence a consumer’s choice of aggression
path. For example, literature on aggression has suggested that
men show higher levels of aggression than women (Baron
and Richardson 1994); therefore, in the current context, men
should be more likely to engage in CBS. Also, psychographic
variables, such as personality type and level of extroversion,
could play a key role. Research in social psychology has
shown that people with type A personalities are more prone to
hostile aggression (Check and Dyck 1986) and therefore
might be more likely to engage in CBS. Furthermore, the
literature on employee sabotage has identified high extro-
version as an important driver of sabotage (Harris and
Ogbonna 2002).
Furthermore, there are also other potentially important
contingency variables, such as brand equity, that are related
to the brand. Prior research on antibranding has shown that
more antibrand websites exist for brands with high brand
equity than for brands with lower brand equity (Krishnamurthy
andKucuk2009). Thus, high-equity brands could have a higher
risk of being the target of CBS than low-equity brands. Fur-
thermore, contingency variables regarding the consumer–brand
relationship, such as brand attitude, could play an important role
in consumers’ choice of aggression path because a very neg-
ative brand attitude will favor hostile aggression. Taking all this
together, future research needs to broaden the contingency
perspective of our framework:
RQ1: What are the roles of contingency factors related to the
consumer (e.g., gender, type A personality), the brand
(e.g., brand equity), and the consumer–brand relationship
(e.g., brand attitude) in the consumer’s choice of aggression
path?
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Future studies should also consider contingency factors
outside of the consumer–brand dyad, including techno-
logical, sociocultural, and market-related developments. As
only a few examples, new technologies such as the Internet,
social media, and smart mobile devices empower consumers
to implement CBS much more easily (Labrecque et al. 2013).
Also, CBS is more likely to occur now due to sociocultural
developments; specifically, consumer social activism has
become more prominent in many countries, facilitating world-
wide social antibrand movements (Hollenbeck and Zinkhan
2006). From a market perspective, competitive intensity could
favor CBS because the greater availability of product and
services from competitors could make a consumer less con-
cerned about attacking a single brand. Thus, we propose the
following research question:
RQ2: What are the technological, sociocultural, and market-
related factors that make a consumer more likely to
engage in CBS?
Within our conceptual framework, we have discussed
the mental escalation process focusing on the consumer–
brand dyad. Further research could broaden this dyadic view
to a network perspective and, thus, broaden our conceptual
framework. For example, other consumers could interact
with a potential saboteur, which might have an impact on his/
her mental escalation process. There might also be different
effects with regard to group dynamics. Negative feedback
from other consumers could serve as a type of reinforcement
for a potential saboteur’s intention to pursue the hostile path
toward CBS. On the other hand, venting anger can produce a
positive improvement in an individual’s psychological state
(Bushman 2002) such that after such a cathartic interaction
with other consumers, a potential brand saboteur will refrain
from engaging in CBS. This leads us to the following
research question:
RQ3: How do interactions with other consumers affect a
potential brand saboteur’s choice of aggression path?
Although our conceptual framework focuses on con-
sumers’ mental escalation processes leading to CBS, future
studies need to also provide a better understanding of the
negative consequences of CBS. Needed is an examination of
how other consumers perceive and evaluate the activities
of brand saboteurs (who intend to impair the brand-related
attitudes of those other consumers). The credibility of
CBS activities plays a crucial role here: if CBS actions were
perceived as highly credible, they might be more likely to
change other consumers’ attitudes in a negative way, and the
consequences of CBS would thus be much more harmful.
Therefore, we need to understand the drivers of credibility in
the negative context of CBS. Prior research on the ante-
cedents of credibility in a positive context has shown that
source credibility is generally based on trustworthiness and
expertness (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953). These findings
could also apply to our CBS context. Brand saboteurs might
be regarded as trustworthy because they are third-party
sources and have little motivation to include false infor-
mation about a brand (Chatterjee 2001). Research also needs
to investigate the differences in the drivers of credibility
depending on the valence of the context (e.g., positive WOM
vs. CBS). In the context of online reviews, prior research has
found that disclosing the identity of the reviewer more
strongly increases the credibility of the negative than the
positive reviews (Kusumasondjaja, Shanka, andMarchegiani
2012). Thus, consumers might base their evaluation of the
expertise and trustworthiness of a saboteur on different or
additional indicators, compared with their evaluation in a
positive context. This leads us to the following question:
RQ4: What drives the credibility of CBS activities among other
consumers?
Furthermore, the negative consequences of CBS are
also determined by the diffusion of information about CBS
activities among other consumers. A key challenge here is to
understand what drives the speed and breadth of diffusion of
information about CBS activities, because a more intense
diffusion will increase the brand damage from CBS. Further
research on this issue could draw on psychological research
that has shown that individuals share information with others
more intensively if they perceive this information to be
important (e.g., Steinel, Utz, and Koning 2010). Thus, we put
forth the following research question:
RQ5: What factors drive the intensity of diffusion of infor-
mation about CBS activities among other consumers?
Our conceptual framework deals with the antecedents of
and the process leading to CBS. Knowledge regarding these
drivers of CBS makes it possible to monitor potential brand
saboteurs so that they can be detected in an early phase of
their mental process toward CBS (e.g., consumers who have
already developed high levels of hostile cognitions and
emotions and have engaged in negative interaction loops and
intensive rumination). Such a recognition of likely saboteurs
prior to their actual engagement in CBS activities would
enable companies to prevent CBS by mollifying and recon-
ciling those potential aggressors. Further research is needed to
determine whether such a prevention approach can be an
effective and also cost-efficient marketing strategy. Also
reasonable would be an ex post perspective, whereby com-
panies try to detect CBS immediately after it has occurred
rather than preventing it (with the goal of limiting the damage
to the brand). With both perspectives, research is needed to
understand which specific CBS prevention and response
tactics and activities are most suitable. This prompts the fol-
lowing research question:
RQ6: When and how should companies respond to CBS: ex ante
to prevent it, or only ex post, after it has occurred, to
reduce its damage?
If a company chooses a CBS-prevention approach, it
has two general implementation options, which need to be
examined and evaluated in future studies. First, managers
can try to de-escalate the situation by accommodating the
potential saboteur and constructively reducing the level of
stress by offering some form of redress. For example, in our
interviews, we found that saboteurs often felt ignored,
exploited, and fooled by the brand because of its supremacy,
and, thus, they had the perception that their power had been
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reduced. Restoring a consumer’s perceived power after a
negative interaction, by engaging in reconciliation activities
or offering apologies, could therefore be a valuable strategy
for resolving an aggressive conflict (Fagenson and Cooper
1987). Such a reconciliation strategy seems to be applicable
in the case of performance-based brand stimuli, but it could
be less adequate in the case of a value-based CBS escalation
context.
Second, a company facing the threat of CBS could try to
deter potential saboteurs from engaging in CBS activities by
pointing out the negative consequences of such behavior to
the saboteur. As an example, the company could signal its
determination to take legal action against saboteurs (see
Grégoire, Laufer, and Tripp 2010). However, such a deter-
rence strategy also has potential negative effects. Trying to
deter a potential saboteur could backfire and even increase
his/her determination to act aggressively against the brand
(see also Gruca and Sudharshan 1995). And if the “bullying”
of potential saboteurs became public, it could also cause
substantial damage to the brand’s image among other con-
sumers. Future studies need to conceptually discuss and
empirically evaluate these different CBS prevention options
and also to examine how to best implement them. This idea
leads us to the following research question:
RQ7: Which CBS prevention approach should be taken by
companies, and how should each approach be imple-
mented? Should companies mollify potential brand
saboteurs or, rather, actively deter them from engaging
in CBS?
The future insights from research on the damage potential
of CBS, prevention of CBS, and adequate response to CBS
once it has occurred need to be expanded beyond our con-
ceptual framework by investigating the implications for
marketing organization and capabilities. Given the tremen-
dous damage that can result from CBS, we need to examine
which organizational and marketing resources are best suited
to prevent and to adequately respond to CBS. We need to
understand which organizational structures, processes, cul-
tures, and capabilities are best suited to deal with CBS. As an
example, to recognize potential saboteurs and also to detect
CBS immediately after occurrence, a company’s monitoring
and market-sensing capabilities could play an important role
(Day 1994). Also, once CBS has occurred, crisis manage-
ment and communication capabilities could be relevant in
order to reduce the negative impact of sabotage. This leads us
to the following research question:
RQ8: Which organizational structures and processes, cultures,
and marketing capabilities enable firms to prevent CBS
and to adequately respond to CBS once it has occurred?
Such a resource-based research perspective is also needed
in a more specific area of marketing: companies might need
to adapt their customer relationship management (CRM)
strategies, systems, and processes to account for the new
phenomenon of CBS. Prior CRM-related research has
focused primarily on the opportunities and positive outcomes
of customer–brand relationships. A key point of our con-
ceptualization is that there is also a dark side of branding that
needs to be taken into account in CRM. This point leads us to
our final research question:
RQ9: When and how should companies adapt their CRM
strategies, systems, and processes to deal with the phe-
nomenon of CBS?
Managerial Implications
Our study also provides important insights and recom-
mendations for managers. On a conceptual knowledge level,
our study provides managers with the key insight that CBS is
not only a new and distinct form of negative consumer
behavior but is also destructive, with a huge damage potential
for brands, whereby even a seemingly weak consumer can
attack a strong brand. Our framework also highlights that
CBS is not a spontaneous action; rather, it results from a
conscious mental process that often involves an escalation of
repeated negative interactions with a brand. Thus, managers
might have the opportunity to detect CBS before it occurs. In
contrast, many other brand crisis phenomena (e.g., severe
product failures, accidents; Pearson and Mitroff 1993) arise
suddenly, without sufficient prior warning signs, such that
managers can often only react to situations that have already
damaged the brand.
Furthermore, it is important for managers to realize that
brand saboteurs are different from instrumental aggressors,
who often are only dissatisfied customers who want to restore
equity or vent negative emotions. Instrumental aggressors are
usually still interested in (re)establishing and improving their
relationship with the brand and, therefore, tend to be more
constructive andmore open to a reconciliation with the brand.
In contrast, brand saboteurs have a hostile mindset and have
burned all bridges with the brand. In other words, they are in
a kind of a personal war with the brand. Often, they will
demonstrate excessively harmful behavior and invest sig-
nificant effort and creativity into their activities. Saboteurs
often confront managers with highly innovative and even
unprecedented sabotage activities. Also, many saboteurs are
ideology-inspired consumers and are therefore especially
determined. Taking into consideration these different char-
acteristics, managers should expect a much higher damage
potential from CBS than from instrumental aggression. What
makes matters worse is that the negative outcomes of CBS
can arise very fast and, due to the potentially viral character of
CBS, become destructive in a very short time.
Against that background, CBS requires special mana-
gerial attention, which brings us to a managerial action level.
Given the potential severe consequences of CBS, there are
two key questions that merit managerial attention: (1) How
can companies detect CBS before its occurrence? and (2)
How should companies respond immediately after CBS has
occurred, so that the damage can be contained? Therefore, the
insights from our study could change how marketing man-
agers operate in the future, with regard to both preventing and
responding to CBS.
For CBS prevention and response, there is a strategic
and an operational level. At the strategic level of CBS
prevention, a key contribution from our research is that, given
the extreme damage potential of CBS and also the high
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relevance of value-based brand stimuli, managers should
consider more defensive branding strategies. Currently,
brand managers differentiate and even polarize brand posi-
tioning strategies to focus on specific customer segments and
to more effectively implement their intended brand person-
alities (e.g., Malär et al. 2012). Such a highly differentiated
approach to brand positioning is risky in a networked mar-
keting environment challenged by the threat of CBS. As a
result, managers should consider more balanced brand
positioning strategies that combine the focus on attractive
customer segments with the defensive intention not to affront
too many consumers who might even not be customers of the
brand. In this context, a company should have a clear position
and strategy regarding what its managers can publicly state
about the brand and what specific values can be communi-
cated. This was an important issue in one of our brand
sabotage interviews, wherein a fashion brand CEO’s public
comments communicated values that so strongly conflicted
with the interviewee’s values that the saboteur decided to
engage in CBS activities.
Concerning the strategic level of CBS response, man-
agers need to understand that, given the huge damage
potential of CBS, it is a strategic must to develop an explicit
response strategy for how to deal with CBS once it has
occurred (Copulsky 2011). Not only is the CBS attack public
but the managerial response to it is as well. Therefore, man-
agers need to define explicit and clear strategies for how
to respond to CBS. Response strategies could include (1)
appeasement, or apologizing to both the saboteur and the
public (e.g., by writing a personal apology to the saboteur
and also making a public one, such as in a press statement);
(2) counterstatements that objectively address, for example,
an initial performance failure for which the company was
blamed by the saboteur (e.g., by making it clear that the
alleged performance failure was due to external factors not
controllable by the firm); or even (3) a counterattack that,
for example, questions the honesty and objectiveness of
the saboteur (e.g., claiming that the saboteur made false
accusations).
On an operational level of CBS prevention and response,
managers can improve their social media monitoring and
CRM systems in such a way that they can effectively and
quickly detect the imminent outbreak of sabotage (even at
the individual consumer–brand relationship level). More
specifically, companies can train their big-data algorithms to
monitor social media. For example, Dell actively monitors
social media with such algorithms in real time in their social
media “war room.” In the current context, these algorithms
can focus on the appropriate CBS-detecting keywords
(e.g., those that indicate strong hatred, frustration, hostile
thoughts, or rumination concerning the brand that are ex-
pressed among individual consumers through social media).
Ideally, such a CBSmonitoring system could alert managers
that a CBS attack was imminent (e.g., because an individual
consumer showed an extremely high level of negative emo-
tions after several failed interaction loops with the brand),
which would then allow managers to try to prevent CBS by
reconciling with potential saboteurs through de-escalation
techniques. Companies can also adapt their CRM systems
so that they do not only track transactional exchanges between
the brand and its customers but also are able to monitor and
detect negative emotions and cognitions toward the brand
expressed by customers during their interactions with
employees.
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WEB APPENDIX W1: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON OUR QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
TABLE W1.1 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
Informant(s) Age Sex Education Profession Consumer Behavior 
Consumer brand sabotage     
1 44 Male Apprenticeship Head of Communication 
Sabotage: Anti-brand campaign with satirical replacement of the 
promotional slogans 
2 30 Female University degree Trainee public relations and marketing 
Sabotage: Writing to customers of the brand on how mendacious the 
brand is, creating a poster about the mendaciousness of 
the brand and taking it to a demonstration 
3 26 Male University degree Professional writer Sabotage: Creating and uploading a video to YouTube that puts the brand in a bad light 
4 47 Male Matura (qualification for University entrance) Investment management 
Sabotage: Creating an anti-brand blog about the negative experienc-
es with the brand 
5 43 Male University degree Professional blogger Sabotage: Disgracing the brand on his own professional blog 
6 38 Male Higher vocational  training CEO 
Sabotage: Posting a letter about how wrong the brand behaved on 
Facebook and the firm's homepage and sending it to cus-
tomers 
7 77 Female Higher vocational  training Retired 
Sabotage: Publishing an article on the negative experiences with the 
brand in a newspaper 
Instrumental aggression      
8 25 Female University degree Student of Business  Administration 
Negative word-of-mouth: Posting a negative comment about the 
company’s service on Facebook 
9 41 Male Higher vocational  training Entrepreneur 
Negative word-of-mouth: Posting a picture and a negative comment 
about the product on Facebook and Twitter 





Male Elementary school 
Computer scientist 
(freelancer) and music 
and light engineer 
Customer retaliation: Refusal to show ticket in a train in return for 
the perceived bad performance and service they receive as 
customers 
III 
WEB APPENDIX W2: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON STUDY 1 
Additional Information on the Research Method 
Prior to the main part of our survey, we conducted an instructional manipulation check (IMC) 
to convert satisficing participants into diligent participants (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Da-
videnko 2009). This is especially important, as the quality of the answers strongly depends on 
how precisely participants read our examples of aggressive consumer behavior. Participants 
had to follow the instructions, otherwise they had to redo the IMC until they answered it cor-
rectly. There were two bipolar seven-point scales with poles labelled – “no” - “yes” for the 
first scale and “very rarely” - “very often” for the second scale (scales that without a question 
do not make sense). Participants were then instructed not to mark any value in the first scale 
(“no” - “yes”) and in the second scale (“very rarely” – “very often”) to mark the midpoint of 
the scale (i.e., the fourth point). They were also informed that this task serves to avoid ran-
dom clicking. If they completed the task successfully, they could continue to rate our exam-
ples. If not, they were presented with the same task again. These participants were at the 
same time informed that, unfortunately, they had not followed the instructions and that they 
had to read the instructions again and to complete the task.  
After the IMC, we presented participants with the different examples that they should 
rate on overall 15 dimensions (see also Table W2.1). In order to reduce the length of the sur-
vey and to avoid respondents’ fatigue, we split the 15 items in three subsets and participants 
were randomly assigned to evaluate one of these subsets of dimensions for each of the six 
examples. Before we showed participants the examples, we instructed them to read each ex-
ample carefully and to answer questions based on the described behavior from their own per-
sonal perspective and independently of the prior task (i.e., independently of the IMC). We 
also mentioned that these were real examples that actually took place. After each example, 
we asked participants to indicate how they perceive the consumer’s behavior (or thoughts or 
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feelings respectively) in the various rating scales (overall 15 dimensions rated on seven-point 
Likert-scales ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very much”). 
Examples of Study 1 
Customer retaliation 1. A customer waited in line for almost six hours to have his credit 
checked, only for it to be rejected. He then saved 32,052 coins over two years to pay for his 
next purchases at the shop. The transaction required 11 shop assistants and lasted three hours. 
After the incident the customer said “I spent two years putting all the coins together, it was a 
lot of work, but I feel that I've got my satisfaction now“ (Funches, Markley, and Davis 2009, 
p. 232). 
Customer retaliation 2. A customer purchased a power tool with knowledge regarding their 
lifetime unconditional guarantee which a sales person told him was displayed on all their 
tools. The tool broke 14 days after purchase and the customer went to return the tool. The 
salesperson then said the guarantee was on hand tools only, not power tools. However, they 
had 90-day guarantee on power tools and then she asked him for his receipt. The customer 
threw the receipt away earlier because of his prior knowledge of the guarantee. They wouldn't 
trade or refund his money. So he went and traded the broken tool for a new tool on his own 
and left the store (Huefner and Hunt 2000, p. 66). 
Consumer brand sabotage 1. A customer of a coffee chain bought an espresso machine for 
$169 as a wedding present for a friend. Unfortunately, he discovered that it was broken. He 
called the coffee shop several times but his complaint could not be resolved to his satisfac-
tion. Thereupon, he collected complaints from other customers through an advertisement in 
the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Furthermore, he threatened the coffee chain by warning them 
to either apologize to all its customers on an entire page in the WSJ or he would take out two 
full pages publishing the complaints he had gathered. Because the coffee chain did not apolo-
gize, he spent $ 10,000 on such an ad, criticizing the coffee shop and publishing all customer 
V 
complaints. Several news programs on TV and in newspapers reported his story. Also, he 
took several interviews that were shown on television. In addition, he created an anti-brand 
page where he shared his story (Flinn 1995). 
Consumer brand sabotage 2. A consumer was bothered by the business practices of a fashion 
brand which burns faulty clothing, rather than giving it to charity. In an interview, the CEO 
said that the company rather wants the “cool kids” as customers and that “a lot of people 
don’t belong [in their clothes], and they can’t belong.” After the consumer read this, he creat-
ed a negative video about the brand which he uploaded to YouTube. In the video, he pointed 
at the exclusionary business practices of the company and made fun of the CEO by showing a 
very unfavorable picture of him and comparing him with an ugly, arrogant, and brutal tyrant 
(who is not cool himself). In the video, he requested all people to donate clothes of the fash-
ion brand to homeless people such that they wear the clothes and thereby change the brand to 
an “uncool” brand for the homeless. The video was viewed by eight million people. In addi-
tion, several news programs on television and in newspapers reported his story. Later, the 
CEO lost his position as chairman of the board and then left the company (Glazek 2013; Kar-
ber 2013). 
Negative word-of-mouth 1. A customer bought his favorite bread from his usual shop for a 
Sunday brunch to which he had invited his friends. When he cut the bread, he found a big bug 
that was baked into the bread. He was strongly bothered as this happened at a brunch with his 
friends and after this incident, nobody felt like eating the bread anymore. Thereupon, he took 
a picture of the bug in the bread and posted it on Facebook and Twitter, also mentioning the 
brand name of the bread (thereby linking it to the company’s Facebook page and Twitter pro-
file; Interview 9). 
Negative word-of-mouth 2. A hotel manager asked a group of friends for a cash deposit of 
£30 per person for any possible damages. At the check-out, the hotel manager stated that he 
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had found cigarette burns in one of the carpets in one of the rooms and that he was keeping 
everyone’s deposits to pay for the damage. For the guests of the hotel it was clear that the 
cigarette burn was not caused by them. No one in their group was a smoker and it was clear 
that the cigarette burn had already been there for some time because dirt and fluff on the floor 
could be seen through the hole in the carpet. Thereupon, one of the group described the nega-
tive experience with the hotel in a negative comment on the reviewing platform TripAdvisor 
(Mudhutter 2007). 
Additional Information on the Sample  
In our sample, 27.8% of the participants had a University degree, 25.3% apprenticeship, 18% 
Matura, 17.6% higher vocational training, 3.8% compulsory education, 4.4% other education, 
and 2% of participants had no educational qualification. Of the 683 participants, 630 
(92.24%) passed the IMC in the first attempt. 42 (6.15%) participants failed the IMC once, 5 
(0.73%) twice, 3 (0.44%) three times, and also 3 (0.44%) four times.
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TABLE W2.1 
MEAN COMPARISONS CBS VERSUS INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION OF STUDY 1 








Emotions and cognitions     
Anger 
  
1.07** F(1, 1,347) = 214.81 
CBS 6.25 1.08 
  IA 5.17 1.67 
  Frustration 
  
.35** F(1, 1,018) = 18.53 
CBS 5.84 1.43 
  IA 5.49 1.53 
  Outrage 
  
.43** F(1, 1,024) = 41.69 
CBS 6.54 1.06 
  IA 6.12 1.26 
  Hatred   1.21** F(1, 1,057) = 242.80 
CBS 6.18 1.23   
IA 4.97 1.51   
Hostile thoughts   1.15** F(1, 1,037) = 206.69 
CBS 6.20 1.28   
IA 5.05 1.54   
Perceived identity threat 
 
.49** F(1, 1,324) = 18.74 
CBS 4.10 2.00 
  IA 3.61 1.90 
  Perceived powerlessness 
  
.68** F(1, 1,324) = 41.03 
CBS 3.11 1.85 
  IA 3.79 1.82 
  Perceived betrayal   .60** F(1, 721) = 29.36 
CBS 5.00 2.03   
IA 5.60 1.60   
Motives and other variables     
Objective to harm 
  
1.73** F(1, 1,204) = 390.19 
CBS 6.34 1.28 
  IA 4.61 1.87 
  Restoring equity 
    CBS 6.07 1.38 
  IA 5.74 1.49 
  Venting negative emotions 
   CBS 6.18 1.15 
  IA 5.59 1.61 
  Rumination   1.18** F(1, 1,040) = 134.31 CBS 5.49 1.63 
  IA 4.32 1.96 
  Interaction   1.36** F(1, 758) = 107.80 CBS 4.41 2.37 
  IA 3.06 1.98 
  Unwillingness to (re)engage in relationship 1.32** F(1, 1,438) = 185.67 
CBS 5.38 1.71   
IA 4.06 1.75   
Caused damage to the brand 
 
2.33** F(1, 1,307) = 782.64 
CBS 6.02 1.27 
  IA 3.68 1.86 
  ** p < .01, a: Due to rounding mean differences may not correspond with differences between the means in 
this table.  
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WEB APPENDIX W3: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON STUDY 2 
Scenarios as Brand Stimuli 
Value-based brand stimulus. When reading the newspaper, you come across an article that 
describes an interview with the CEO of an established fashion brand for clothing. In this in-
terview, the CEO mentions what customers he would like the brand to have: “In every school 
there are the cool and popular kids, and then there are the not-so-cool kids. Candidly, we go 
after the cool kids – attractive kids with a great attitude and a lot of friends. A lot of people 
don’t belong [in our clothes], and they can’t belong. Are we exclusionary? Absolutely.” 
In this newspaper article, it is also mentioned that this is not just an empty statement by 
the CEO and that he actually implements it. There are no jeans and t-shirts in oversize – only 
for slim customers or children respectively. Furthermore, in their advertisements, there are 
only attractive and popular kids who even make fun of the less popular kids. Also, the clothes 
of the newest fashion collection that could not be sold in the current season are not donated to 
the poor (like many other fashion brands). Instead the company burns these clothes such that 
the brand will not be worn by poor people. The CEO even admits this policy publicly with 
the following argument: “We are no brand for the poor. They shouldn’t wear our clothes at 
all.” He concludes the interview with the statement: ”You know, poverty pisses me off!” Be-
low this interview, a picture shows the quite unattractive CEO. 
The journalist closes the article by reporting on the practices of the brand. According to 
investigations, the suppliers of the fashion brand manufacture the clothes with child labor in 
developing countries under almost inhuman working conditions (no toilet breaks, no daylight, 
and bad air due to chemicals to conserve the textiles). The fashion brand forces the suppliers 
to lower their prices and almost drives them to such a behavior. At the same time, the fashion 
brand publicly supports charity events for children in developing countries and pretends to be 
interested in those children’s well-being. 
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After being informed of these facts, assume you have written a letter to the CEO in 
which you asked him to express himself in a more friendly manner toward all children and to 
cease child labor. However, the CEO has replied personally to your letter with the cynical 
response: “You must have been such a fat and unpopular kid yourself. To you I probably 
wouldn’t have sold my clothes either.” 
Performance-based brand stimulus. You have bought a very expensive shirt from an 
established fashion brand for a child in your family. When you washed it for the first time, 
the shirt already lost its color and a few buttons fell off as well. Also, the child got a rash 
from wearing the shirt because the brand uses chemicals to conserve the textiles. The child 
cried because of the rash and is also sad because the shirt doesn’t look nice anymore. Since 
you gave the shirt to the child as a present, he/she blames you and is angry and offended.  
In response, you have called the company’s service hotline and complained. On the 
phone, you have been stalled and put off again and again. A refund of the purchase price has 
been rejected with explanation that you probably haven’t washed the shirt correctly.  
You have called five times and every time, there was another person on the phone and 
you had to present your story each time. One employee even made fun of you and did not 
take you seriously. Another employee recommended that you buy another shirt. Yet another 
employee stated that this was impossible and that you must be lying. After several follow 
ups, you have received a replacement of inferior quality. The shirt is also too small and in 
another color which has made a further bad impression on the child.  
After that, an excessively high bill for the replacement shirt arrived. When you refused 
to pay this bill, a debt collection agency was assigned and this resulted in a record in the debt 
collection register for you. After paying the bill, you have then written a letter and requested 
the cancellation of your record in the debt collection register. The company did not consider 
your request even though you have paid the unjustified bill.  
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Finally, you have arrived at the point where you cannot rent a desired apartment after a 
time-consuming application as the landlord does not want to rent to anybody who has a rec-
ord in the debt collection register.  
Additional Information on the Pretest 
Sample of the pretest. We conducted a pretest with 63 participants (46% female, Mage = 40.0 
years). We recruited consumers from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland on the platform 
Clickworker and presented them with either a performance-based (n = 29) or a value-based (n 
= 34) brand stimulus. In our sample, 38.1% of the participants had an apprenticeship, 23.8% 
University degree, 15.9% higher vocational training, 14.3% Matura, 6.3% compulsory educa-
tion, and 1.6% of the participants had no educational qualification.  
Quality assessment concerning the scenarios in the pretest. To assess whether the brand 
stimuli were perceived as dealing with performance or values respectively, we asked partici-
pants to rate the two items “The scenario mostly addresses values” and “The scenario mostly 
addresses the performance of the brand (of the company and its employees)” on a seven-point 
Likert-scale with 1 = “I totally disagree” and 7 = “I totally agree”. The performance-based 
scenario was more strongly perceived as addressing performance (M = 5.03) than the value-
based scenario (M = 3.53, F(1, 61) = 9.77, p < .01) and the value-based scenario was more 
strongly perceived as addressing values (M = 5.09) than the performance-based scenario (M = 
3.86, F(1, 61) = 6.35, p < .05).  
To ensure that we did not manipulate any unintended factor, we also assessed the sever-
ity of the two scenarios by measuring dissatisfaction (α = .80) with the three-item scale of 
Grégoire and Fisher (2008) and additionally with the item “The described scenario was” 
“very negative” (= 1) to “very positive” (= 7). Blame attribution (α = .91) (i.e., blaming the 
brand for the negative scenario) was assessed with the three-item scale of Grégoire, Laufer, 
and Tripp (2010) and arousal (α = .82) with the four-item scale of Mano and Oliver (1993). 
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Unless indicated otherwise, we measured all items on a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from 
1 = “I totally disagree” to 7 = “I totally agree.” There was no significant difference between 
the performance-based and the value-based scenario with regard to dissatisfaction (Mperfor-
mance-based = 5.53, Mvalue-based = 5.27, F(1, 61 ) = .44 , p = .51), whether it was perceived as 
“very negative” (= 1) to “very positive” (= 7) (Mperformance-based = 1.79, Mvalue-based = 1.50, F(1, 
52 ) = 1.20 , p = .28), blame attribution (Mperformance-based = 5.48, Mvalue-based = 5.93, F(1, 51 ) = 
1.43 , p = .24), and arousal (Mperformance-based = 5.03, Mvalue-based = 4.93, F(1, 61) = .07, p = .79).   
Additional Information on the Experiment 
Sample of the experiment. In our sample, 35.6% of the participants had an apprenticeship, 
35.3% University degree, 16.6% Matura, 8.0% higher vocational training, 3.5% compulsory 
education, and 1.0% of the participants had no educational qualification.  
Measures for the experiment. For the measures of our manipulation check, we added two 
items to the measurement from the pretest “The scenario mostly deals with values” and “The 
scenarios mostly deals with the performance of the brand (the company and its employees)”. 
To measure hostile thoughts, we developed the following five items based on our conceptual 
considerations: “I would like to punish the brand (and its employees)”, “I have the impulse of 
damaging a store or building of the brand”, “I have the impulse to attack the brand (and its 
employees)”, “I have the urge to insult the brand (and its employees)”, “I have the urge to say 
something nasty to the brand (and its employees)”. Furthermore, to measure participants’ 
intention to terminate the relationship, we developed the two items “even if the brand (and its 
employees) apologized or offered me a refund, I would terminate my relationship with the 
brand and never purchase products of that brand again” and “In case the brand apologized or 













 Pretest     
Manipulation check     
Addresses performance 
 
1.51** F(1, 61) = 9.77 
Performance-based 5.03 1.74   
Value-based 3.53 2.03   
Addresses values   1.23* F(1, 61) = 6.35 
Performance-based 3.86 1.75   
Value-based 5.09 2.07   
Severity of the scenarios     
Dissatisfaction   .25 F(1, 61 ) = .44 , p = .51 
Performance-based 5.53 1.56   
Value-based 5.27 1.49   
Very negative – very positive  .29 F(1, 52 ) = 1.20 , p = .28 
Performance-based 1.79 1.18   
Value-based 1.50 .90   
Appraisal     
Blame attribution   .45 F(1, 51 ) = 1.43 , p = .24 
Performance-based 5.48 1.67   
Value-based 5.93 1.23   
Arousal   .09 F(1, 61) = .07, p = .79 
Performance-based 5.03 1.43   
Value-based 4.93 1.27   
Main experiment     
Manipulation check     
Addresses performance  1.94** F(1, 287) = 91.85 
Performance-based 4.94 1.63   
Value-based 3.01 1.81   
Addresses values   1.62** F(1, 280) = 78.90 
Performance-based 3.93 1.66   
Value-based 5.55 1.42   
Perceived credibility of the scenario .33 F(1, 287) = 2.46, p = .12 
Performance-based 4.33 1.77   
Value-based 4.00 1.84   
Emotions and cognitions     
Anger   1.00** F(1, 26) = 18.59 
CBS 6.25 .85   
IA 5.25 1.71   
Hatred   1.01* F(1, 259) = 6.78 
CBS 6.18 1.29   
IA 5.17 1.56   
Hostile thoughts  1.53** F(1, 259) = 17.36 
CBS 4.94 1.66   
IA 3.41 1.45   
** p < .01, * p < .05 a: Due to rounding mean differences may not correspond with differences between the 
means in this table. 
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WEB APPENDIX W4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
TABLE W4.1 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Questions 
RQ1 
What is the role of contingency factors related to the consumer (e.g., gender, type A 
personality), the brand (e.g., brand equity), and the consumer–brand relationship 
(e.g., brand attitude) in the consumer’s choice of aggression path? 
RQ2 What are the technological, socio-cultural, and market-related factors that make a consumer more likely to engage in CBS? 
RQ3 How do interactions with other consumers affect the potential brand saboteur’s choice of aggression path? 
RQ4 What drives the credibility of CBS activities among other consumers? 
RQ5 What factors drive the intensity of diffusion of information about CBS activities among other consumers? 
RQ6 When and how should companies respond to CBS: ex ante to prevent it, or only ex post, after it has occurred, to reduce its damage? 
RQ7 
Which CBS prevention approach should be taken by companies, and how should 
each approach be implemented? Should companies mollify potential brand saboteurs 
or, rather, actively deter them from engaging in CBS? 
RQ8 Which organizational structures and processes, cultures, and marketing capabilities enable firms to prevent CBS and to adequately respond to CBS once it has occurred? 
RQ9 When and how should companies adapt their CRM strategies, systems, and processes to deal with the phenomenon of CBS? 
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When and Why Does Consumer Brand Sabotage  
Cause Damage among Other Consumers? 
Only recently, research has identified and conceptualized the new phenomenon of con-
sumer brand sabotage as a form of hostile aggression where hostile consumers have the 
dominant motive of harming a brand. Despite its high damage potential, academic re-
search has not yet examined whether and how CBS affects other consumers and dam-
ages the brand. This article addresses this research gap and examines the potential dam-
age of CBS and the processes by which CBS affects other consumers’ attitude toward 
the brand and subsequent behavior (i.e., purchase intention and negative word-of-
mouth [NWOM]). Based on an online-experiment with 186 participants which were con-
fronted with an actual CBS activity, this article shows that CBS can indeed damage the 
brand by decreasing consumers’ attitude toward the brand and purchase intention and 
by increasing their intention to engage in NWOM. Moreover, indirect effects of CBS on 
consumers’ attitude and subsequent behavior through consumers’ cognitions (e.g., per-
ceived betrayal) were significant for consumers with a high brand relationship quality 
but not for consumers with a low brand relationship quality. Thereby, this article pro-
vides additional evidence for a love-becomes-hate effect of the brand relationship quality 





Recently, researchers conceptualized the phenomenon of consumer brand sabotage (CBS) re-
ferring to a “deliberate behavior by customers or noncustomers who have the dominant objec-
tive of causing harm to a brand through the impairment of the brand-related associations of 
other consumers” (Kähr et al. 2016, p. 26). One of the best known examples of CBS resulted 
from the following statement of the former chief executive officer (CEO) of the fashion brand 
Abercrombie & Fitch (A&F): “Candidly, we go after the cool kids. We go after the attractive 
all-American kid with a great attitude and a lot of friends. A lot of people don’t belong [in our 
clothes], and they can’t belong. Are we exclusionary? Absolutely. Those companies that are 
in trouble are trying to target everybody: young, old, fat, skinny” (Denizet-Lewis 2006). To 
vent the outrage generated by this statement, the consumer Greg Karber created a viral sabo-
tage video about A&F in which he asked consumers to donate their clothing of A&F to home-
less people in order to reposition the brand as “the uncool brand for the homeless” (Karber 
2013). He uploaded the video to YouTube where it was viewed by more than eight million 
people and several news programs on television and in newspapers reported the story (Glazek 
2013). Later, the CEO lost his position as chairman of the board and left the company (Peter-
son 2014; Trefis Team 2014). However, to date, it is unknown what consequences CBS bears 
for the brand and how CBS activities affect other consumers who observe it. For example, in 
the case of the CBS video on A&F by Greg Karber, did his CBS video really damage the 
brand? Did it affect consumers’ attitude and subsequent behavior toward A&F? Or did these 
consumers just watch the video as mere entertainment, remaining unaffected by its negative 
description of the brand? 
In their article, Kähr et al. (2016) examined the complex psychological mechanisms 
that lead consumers to sabotage a brand. Thereby, they studied the dyadic relationship be-





CBS affects other consumers who observe the CBS activity has not yet been examined by re-
search. This paper gives further insights for understanding the consequences of CBS and the 
processes by which a CBS activity affects other consumers, enabling managers to intervene 
and take adequate measures to decrease a possible damage of CBS. Thereby, it focuses on 
three key questions: (1) Does a CBS activity affect other consumers’ attitude toward a brand 
and their subsequent behavior, i.e., their purchase intention and intention to engage in nega-
tive word-of-mouth (NWOM)? (2) How are consumers affected by a CBS activity: i.e., which 
psychological processes and cognitions lead to the change in consumers’ attitude toward the 
brand, purchase intention, and NWOM? (3) To what extent can a strong brand relationship of 
these consumers buffer the negative effects of a CBS activity? 
In general, the focus of research has been on positive consumer behavior such as cus-
tomer engagement, especially value co-creation as for example in personalized customer ex-
periences and customer participation in the development of new products, and its positive 
consequences for companies (e.g., Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004; Sashi 2012; van Doorn et 
al. 2010). In comparison, research on negative consumer behavior and its impact on other 
consumers and the involved company is rather scarce. In this context, existing studies have 
primarily examined NWOM and its consequences for companies’ sales (e.g., Chang et al. 
2015; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). Far less research has addressed the damage of other forms of 
negative consumer behavior such as customer revenge (e.g., Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 
2009) and consumer boycott behavior (e.g., Koku 2012), and, to the best of our knowledge, 
no study examined the consequences of CBS.  
In better understanding the processes by which a CBS activity by a consumer brand 
saboteur affects other consumers, the role of consumers’ cognitions such as perceived be-
trayal are highly relevant. In the context of brand transgressions, prior research has already 





2001; Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009) acts as strong predictor of consumers’ subsequent 
behavior such as revenge (Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). At the same time, a violation 
of relational norms has been shown to decrease consumers’ attitude toward the brand (Ag-
garwal 2004). However, to the best of our knowledge, research on the consequences of nega-
tive consumer behavior has not yet looked at the cognitions of other consumers who were not 
directly involved in the brand transgression but who observe such consumer behavior and 
how these cognitions affect their attitude toward the brand and subsequent behavior. 
As brand saboteurs try to harm a brand by impairing the brand-related associations of 
other consumers, the brand relationship of these consumers represents a key aspect in the pro-
cesses by which CBS affects these consumers. In the context of service failures, prior research 
has reported non-conclusive effects for the role of the brand relationship quality in attitude 
formation and subsequent behavior of consumers involved in the service failure. In general, a 
high-quality relationship should buffer the negative effects of a product or service failure as 
the consumer is more tolerant with regard to brand transgressions (Hess, Ganesan, and Klein 
2003; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998). However, recent research suggests that the 
contrary may also occur. Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux (2009) reported that those consumers 
with a high brand relationship quality perceived a service failure as betrayal and, conse-
quently, felt a stronger desire for revenge than consumers with a low brand relationship qual-
ity. In contrast to existent literature which examined the role of the brand relationship quality 
of the consumer directly involved in the service failure, in our setting, we focus on the role of 
the brand relationship quality of a non-involved consumer who observes a CBS activity re-
sulting from a prior brand failure (e.g., service failure or brand behavior in conflict with the 
consumer brand saboteur’s values).  
This paper starts with the development of hypotheses related to the potential negative 





CBS activity affects these consumers. Subsequently, these hypotheses are tested with an 
online-experiment where 186 participants are confronted with an actual CBS activity. Finally, 
this paper closes with a discussion of the results and relevant implications for academic re-
search and practice.  
Conceptual Background 
The Effect of Exposure to a CBS Activity on Consumers’ Perception of and Behavior to-
ward the Brand 
In contrast to research on the impact of brand transgressions which studies the direct effect of 
brand transgressions on the customer involved (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004; Smith and 
Bolton 1998; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998), this study examines how CBS as a 
possible result of a brand transgression affects other consumers. Thus, in our research setting, 
we are not looking at the dyad between the brand and the consumer involved (in our context 
the consumer brand saboteur) but at the consumer that observes a CBS activity and how this 








In examining the effect of a CBS activity on other consumers’ perception of and be-
havior toward the brand, we focus on key constructs that are highly relevant in the context of 
the damage of CBS: (1) consumers’ attitude toward the brand because of the strong link be-
tween attitudes and individuals’ subsequent behavior (Ajzen 2001) and (2) consumers’ pur-
chase intention which serves as proxy for their actual behavior, influencing companies’ sales. 
Prior research reported that more and more consumers rely on other consumers’ experiences 
with products and services to form their attitude and make purchase decisions (Bughin, 
Doogan, and Vetvik 2010; Sparks, So, and Bradley 2016). These findings can be explained by 
the higher trustworthiness attributed to consumer reviews on products, services, or brands by 
other consumers compared to the communication from brands or companies (Chiou and 
Cheng 2003; Dickinger 2011; Park, Lee, and Han 2007; Senecal and Nantel 2004). Another 
reason why consumers increasingly base their attitude toward the brand and purchase inten-
tion on other consumers’ experience reports can be found in their function to reduce the risk 
in a buying situation. As products and especially services are difficult to evaluate prior to con-
sumption, other customers’ experience reports can serve as a substitute of consumers’ own 
experiences and, thereby, reduce the risk in a buying decision (Litvin, Goldsmith, and Pan 
2008). Based on these findings on consumer reviews, we expect that a CBS activity should 
also be regarded as more trustworthy than company communication as the message is com-
municated by a consumer and not the company. Thus, the CBS activity could serve as a sub-
stitute for consumers’ own experiences, influencing their attitude toward the brand and pur-
chase intention.  
Another highly relevant construct in the context of the damage of CBS is NWOM be-
cause it represents an efficient mechanism to spread the message of CBS further. It refers to 
negative “informal communications directed at other consumers about the ownership, usage, 





261). Research on the motives for NWOM found that consumers engage in NWOM to vent 
their negative emotions associated with a negative consumption experience (Hennig-Thurau 
et al. 2004). As such, a CBS activity can serve as a source for such negative emotions associ-
ated with a negative brand experience for other consumers. As conceptualized by Kähr et al. 
(2016), brand saboteurs have made a severely negative experience with the brand based on its 
performance (e.g., product failure) or based on its behavior that stands in conflict with their 
values (e.g., use of child labor in offshore factories). Consumers who observe the CBS activ-
ity may experience the same or similar negative emotions as the brand saboteur because the 
brand’s behavior as described in the CBS activity might contradict what they would have ex-
pected of the brand. Consequently, they may feel the urge to talk about the CBS activity and 
the brand’s behavior with others to vent their negative emotions and, thus, engage in NWOM.  
Instead of the negative emotions being triggered by unfulfilled expectations with re-
gard to the brand’s behavior, it is also possible that empathic reactions can cause the negative 
emotions of the consumers who observe the CBS activity. According to research in social 
psychology, empathy refers to “an affective state that stems from the apprehension of an-
other's emotional state or condition, and that is congruent with it” (Eisenberg and Miller 1987, 
p. 91). Furthermore, recent empirical findings in neuroscience and social psychology state 
that empathy could be produced by an action representation which in turn triggers the emo-
tional responses of empathic individuals which indicate that empathy arises automatically and 
nonconsciously (Carr et al. 2003; Chartrand and Bargh 1999). Thus, consumers who observe 
a CBS activity of another consumer may automatically and nonconsciously share his or her 
negative emotions through empathic reactions. Additionally, in their meta-analysis, Eisenberg 
and Miller (1987) reported that empathy leads to prosocial behavior such as helping others. In 
a marketing context, research on advertisements found that watching advertising dramas led 





and Stern 2003). Thus, observing a CBS activity by another consumer may lead to empathic 
responses by other consumers, which may decrease their attitude toward the brand. Observing 
a CBS activity could also motivate them to engage in prosocial behavior such as protecting 
other consumers from the negative experience the saboteur made or helping the saboteur by 
sharing the content of the CBS activity with others, i.e., by engaging in NWOM. In this case, 
the negative effect of CBS does not just end with the consumer who has seen the CBS activity 
but it may spread further. Therefore, based on research on word-of-mouth as well as research 
on empathy from social psychology, we suggest (see Figure 2): 
H1: Consumers who have been exposed to a CBS activity have (a) a more negative at-
titude toward the brand, (b) a lower purchase intention, and (c) a higher intention to 
talk negatively about the brand (compared to those who have not been exposed to a 
CBS activity). 
FIGURE 2 
Overall Conceptual Model 
 
The Mediating Effect of Consumers’ Perceived Betrayal and Social Identity Threat 
Besides the question of whether or not consumers’ are affected by observing a CBS activity, a 
second relevant question is how consumers are affected: i.e., which psychological processes 





and NWOM? Prior research on brand transgressions identified the cognition of perceived be-
trayal which arises due to a violation of relational norms (Fitness 2001; Grégoire, Tripp, and 
Legoux 2009) as strong predictor of consumers’ subsequent behavior such as revenge (Gré-
goire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). At the same time, a violation of relational norms has been 
shown to decrease consumers’ attitude toward the brand (Aggarwal 2004). Consequently, 
consumers’ perceived betrayal could be an interesting mechanism affecting consumers’ sub-
sequent attitude toward the brand after exposure to a CBS activity. On the other hand, prior 
research showed that consumers use brands to express who they are and to communicate their 
social identities (Belk 1988; Escalas and Bettman 2003; Tuškej, Golob, and Podnar 2013). In 
case their social identity is threatened (e.g., when the brand has a very negative public image 
and the brand can no longer be used to positively distinguish oneself from other out-groups), 
research in social psychology suggests that individuals try to leave or dissociate themselves 
from the group the social identity threat stemmed from (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Thus, con-
sumers who experience a perceived social identity threat after exposure to a CBS activity may 
try to disengage with the brand by no longer purchasing the brand and by talking negatively 
about it. Therefore, in our context, we focus on the two key cognitions from social psychol-
ogy, perceived betrayal and social identity threat, to examine the process by which CBS af-








Perceived Betrayal. Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux (2009, p. 21) defined betrayal as “a 
customer’s belief that a company has intentionally violated what is normative in the context 
of their relationship.” In their study, they found that customers with a high brand relationship 
quality perceived a transgression as a violation of the normative rules in a relationship and felt 
betrayed by the brand. Thereby, they examined the relationship between the customer who 
experienced the brand transgression and the brand that caused the transgression. In contrast, 
our study examines the effect of the consumer–brand relationship in the context where the 
consumer is only an observer of the brand transgression (here: the brand’s behavior described 
in the CBS activity) and is not directly involved. In the context of interpersonal betrayal, Fit-
ness (2001, p. 6) conceptualizes betrayal somewhat more open than Grégoire, Tripp, and 
Legoux (2009) as “any kind of relational transgression may be appraised by relationship part-
ners as a betrayal, depending on the extent to which relational expectations and trust have 
been violated.” Consequently, in the context of CBS, if the observing consumer perceives the 
brand’s behavior (as criticized in the CBS activity) as a violation of one of his or her rela-
tional expectations or trust, he or she might feel betrayed, similarly to when he or she was di-
rectly involved in the brand transgression. Furthermore, prior research has not only shown 
that perceived betrayal leads to behavioral outcomes such as revenge (Fitness 2001; Grégoire, 
Tripp, and Legoux 2009). Aggarwal (2004) also reported that a violation of relational norms, 
which represents the basis for betrayal, can decrease consumers’ attitude toward the brand. 
Therefore, we suggest that an exposure to a CBS activity leads to perceived betrayal by con-
sumers which in turn decreases their attitude toward the brand.  
H2: The impact of CBS exposure on other consumers’ attitude toward the brand is me-
diated by their perceived betrayal.  
Perceived Social Identity Threat. Consumers use products or services to express who 





(2003), consumers use products and brands to form self-images and to show these images to 
other consumers or to themselves. The expression of self-images to relevant others derives 
from social identity theory which states that a social identity consists of “those aspects of an 
individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as 
belonging” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, p. 16). Such social categories or groups can involve gen-
der, race, demographic categories, and membership in organizations (Bhattacharya, Rao, and 
Glynn 1995) or brands (Escalas and Bettman 2003; Lam et al. 2010; Stokburger-Sauer, Rat-
neshwar, and Sen 2012). As such, consumers can purchase and talk about their experiences 
with brands (i.e., engage in word-of-mouth) to express their belonging to this social category 
or group and, thereby, communicate their social identities.  
Social identity theory postulates that individuals are strongly motivated toward con-
trasting their in-groups favorably with any outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986). Moreo-
ver, social identity theory states that individuals aspire a positive social identity which can be 
achieved by belonging to a group that is in a positive way distinctive from relevant out-groups 
(Scheepers and Ellemers 2005). As such, purchasing clothes from a brand like A&F which 
claims to be a brand for the young and cool kids may cause a consumer to feel belonging to 
A&F and, consequently, to the cool and young kids which in turn forms part of his or her so-
cial identity. When individuals can no longer distinguish their in-groups favorably from any 
outgroup, a state of social identity threat arises (Scheepers and Ellemers 2005). A CBS activ-
ity can put a brand in a severely bad light, jeopardizing the superiority of this social group 
(i.e., the brand) against other out-groups (other brands). As a result, a CBS activity may lead 
to a perceived social identity threat of the consumer who observes it. Such a perceived social 
identity threat is especially relevant for consumers’ purchase intention and NWOM. By pur-
chasing products or brands and by talking about them, consumers express their belonging to a 





to others. Research in social psychology suggests that individuals who feel threatened in their 
social identity attempt to leave or detach themselves from the group in which they perceived 
the social identity threat (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In our context, consumers could leave the 
brand by stopping to purchase its products and, additionally, by talking negatively about it. 
Therefore, we suggest that observing a CBS activity may lead to a perceived social identity 
threat, decreasing the consumer’s purchase intention and increasing his or her intention to en-
gage in NWOM.  
H3: The impact of CBS exposure on other consumers’ (a) purchase intention and (b) 
intention to talk negatively about the brand is mediated by their perceived social iden-
tity threat. 
The Moderating Role of Brand Relationship Quality 
From a managerial perspective, it is not only important to understand the mechanisms by 
which CBS activities affect other consumers, but also to know which consumers are affected 
most. Will those customers that are loyal and trust the brand remain unaffected by the CBS 
activity? Prior research in the customer–brand transgression literature showed that the brand 
relationship of customers can have both a buffering and an amplifying effect on the impact of 
a brand transgression on the customer (Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009; Hess, Ganesan, 
and Klein 2003; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998). For example, Hess, Ganesan, and 
Klein (2003) reported that customers with higher expectations of relationship continuity also 
experienced greater satisfaction with the service performance after recovery. Similarly, Tax, 
Brown, and Chandrashekaran (1998) found evidence that prior positive experiences with the 
brand attenuated the effects of poor complaint handling. On the other hand, Grégoire and 
Fisher (2008) and Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux (2009) discovered that a strong consumer–





they reported that customers with a high level of brand relationship quality perceived a trans-
gression as a violation of the normative rules in a relationship and felt stronger betrayed by 
the brand than consumers with a low level of brand relationship quality which in turn in-
creased their desire for retaliation against the company.  
To examine whether a strong consumer–brand relationship weakens or reinforces the 
effect of an exposure to a CBS activity on consumers’ attitude toward the brand and subse-
quent behaviors, we subsequently discuss literature on the brand relationship quality more in 




Brand Relationship Quality. Brand relationship quality is generally conceptualized as 
higher-order construct comprising different dimensions such as satisfaction (Aaker, Fournier, 
and Brasel 2004; Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, and Gremler 2002; Nyffenegger et al. 2014), 
commitment (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004; Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009; Hennig-





Legoux 2009; Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, and Gremler 2002; Nyffenegger et al. 2014), passion 
(Nyffenegger et al. 2014), intimacy (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004; Nyffenegger et al. 
2014), partner quality (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004) or social benefits (Grégoire, Tripp, 
and Legoux 2009), and self-connection (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004). Although the 
studies differ with regard to the number and type of dimensions used to conceptualize the 
brand relationship quality, most research agrees that satisfaction, commitment, and trust are 
key constructs of the relationship quality (e.g., Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004; Grégoire, 
Tripp, and Legoux 2009; Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004; Nyffenegger et al. 2014). In our context, 
consumers who are exposed to a CBS activity do not need to be actual customers of the brand 
but can also be potential customers who have not (yet) purchased products or services of the 
brand. Consequently, many dimensions such as (behavioral) commitment or satisfaction can-
not be applied to our context because they require consumers to be actual customers of the 
brand. Therefore, in our context, we focus on three key constructs of relationship quality 
where consumers do not need to be actual customers of the brand: (1) consumers’ trust in the 
brand, (2) consumers’ identification with the brand, and (3) consumers’ actual self-congru-
ence with the brand with the latter two as forms of self-connection with the brand.  
Brand Trust. Brand trust refers to “the willingness of the average consumer to rely on 
the ability of the brand to perform its stated function” (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001, p. 82) 
and allows consumers to make confident predictions about a relationship partner to meet his 
obligations (Nyffenegger et al. 2014). Thereby, trust consists of the two dimensions credibil-
ity and benevolence (Doney and Cannon 1997). Credibility refers to the expectancy of an in-
dividual that he or she can confide in the relationship partner’s (written) word and benevo-
lence to the relationship partner’s genuine interest to behave in line with the other partner’s 
well-being and mutual benefit. Therefore, brand trust has been identified as crucial predictor 





maintained (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001). However, its intimate connection to relational 
expectations also makes trust essential for betrayal because the violation of these expectations 
or norms can lead to perceived betrayal (Fitness 2001; Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). 
This even holds true for consumers that are not customers of the brand but who have expecta-
tions how the relationship with the brand should work (e.g., about proper conduct in the rela-
tionship) (Fitness 2001). Therefore, in our setting, we suggest that those consumers who trust 
the brand most will be affected strongest by the exposure to a CBS activity in terms of their 
perceived betrayal. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H4: The impact of CBS exposure on other consumers’ perceived betrayal will be 
stronger for consumers with high trust in the brand than for those with low trust in the 
brand. 
Consumer–Brand Identification. Lam et al. (2010, p. 235) define consumer–brand 
identification (CBI) as “a consumer’s psychological state of perceiving, feeling, and valuing 
his or her belongingness with a brand.” CBI has also been referred to as social identification 
because organizations, groups, and brands are seen as social objects (Kim, Han, and Park 
2001) and brands that consumers identify themselves with help to express their social identity 
(Escalas and Bettman 2003). Therefore, in the context of social identity threats, we expect 
that only those consumers will perceive a social identity threat who have a high CBI. On the 
other hand, those consumers with low CBI should not perceive a social identity threat after 
observing a CBS activity. Thus, we suggest: 
H5: The impact of CBS exposure on other consumers’ perceived social identity threat 
will be stronger for consumers with a high CBI than for those with a low CBI. 
Actual Self-Congruence. Malär et al. (2011, p. 36) defined consumers’ actual self-con-





brand’s personality.” Thereby, the self refers to the “totality of the individual’s thoughts and 
feelings having reference to himself as an object” (Rosenberg 1979, p. 7) and is often concep-
tualized from a multidimensional perspective in that the self consists of the actual, ideal, so-
cial, and ideal social self (Sirgy 1982). The actual self is how the consumer perceives him- or 
herself (in contrast to the ideal self, which refers to how a consumer would like to perceive 
him- or herself; Sirgy 1982). According to prior research, self-congruence can reinforce con-
sumers’ responses to a brand’s behavior in terms of their emotions, attitudes, and behavior 
(e.g., Aaker 1999; Grohmann 2009; Malär et al. 2011). For example, Grohmann (2009) found 
that consumers’ affective, attitudinal, and behavioral responses related to the brand were posi-
tively affected by their self-congruence with respect to consumers’ sex role identity and mas-
culine and feminine brand personality. Similarly, Malär et al. (2011) reported a significant 
positive relationship between actual-self-congruence and emotional brand attachment. There-
fore, in the context of perceived betrayal and social identity threat, we suggest that consum-
ers’ actual self-congruence with a brand has a reinforcing effect on the impact of consumers’ 
cognitions (i.e., perceived betrayal and social identity threat) on consumers’ attitude toward 
the brand, purchase intention, and intention for NWOM. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H6a: The impact of perceived betrayal on consumers’ attitude toward the brand will be 
stronger for consumers with a high actual self-congruence than for those with a low 
actual self-congruence with the brand. 
H6b,c: The impact of perceived social identity threat on other consumers’ (b) purchase 
intention and (c) intention to talk negatively about the brand will be stronger for con-
sumers with a high actual self-congruence than for those with a low actual self-con-





The Moderated Mediation Effects of Brand Relationship Quality with Perceived Betrayal 
and Social Identity Threat 
Taking these moderating effects together with our hypothesized mediating effects, we suggest 
three moderated mediation effects where the consumers’ brand relationship quality (e.g., 
brand trust) influences the indirect effects of an exposure to a CBS activity on consumers’ at-
titude toward the brand and subsequent behavior via the mediators (e.g., perceived betrayal) 
(see Figure 5).  
FIGURE 5 
Moderated Mediation Model 
 
In line with literature in social psychology on interpersonal trust and betrayal (e.g., Fit-
ness 2001) as well as recent research findings in marketing of a love-becomes-hate effect 
(Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009), we suggest that those consumers with a high level of 
brand trust feel betrayed after exposure to a CBS activity, decreasing their attitude toward the 
brand. Those consumers with a low level of brand trust should feel less betrayed and, conse-
quently, the effect of their perceived betrayal on their attitude toward the brand should be 
weaker. In addition, based on findings from prior research that self-congruence can reinforce 





Aaker 1999; Grohmann 2009; Malär et al. 2011), we suggest an enhancing effect of consum-
ers’ actual self-congruence with the brand on the effect of perceived betrayal on their attitude 
toward the brand. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H7: Brand trust and consumers’ actual-self congruence with the brand moderate the 
indirect effect of CBS exposure on their attitude toward the brand (through perceived 
betrayal). Specifically, perceived betrayal will mediate the indirect effect when brand 
trust and actual self-congruence are high but not when one or both are low. 
As consumers who strongly identify with a brand can use this brand to express their 
social identity toward others (Escalas and Bettman 2003), we expect that only those consum-
ers perceive a social identity threat who have a high CBI, decreasing their purchase intention 
and increasing their intention for NWOM. On the other hand, those low in CBI should per-
ceive a lower level of social identity threat as this brand plays little part in their social iden-
tity. Consequently, the effect of a perceived social identity threat on consumers’ purchase in-
tention and NWOM should be weaker for those with low CBI than for those with high CBI. 
As in H7, we also expect a reinforcing effect of consumers’ actual self-congruence on the im-
pact of perceived social identity threat on their purchase intention and intention for NWOM. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H8: CBI and consumers’ actual self-congruence with the brand moderate the indirect 
effect of CBS exposure on consumers’ (a) purchase intention and (b) intention to talk 
negatively about the brand (through perceived social identity threat). Specifically, per-
ceived social identity threat will mediate the indirect effect when CBI and actual self-






We conducted an online experiment with a 2 (CBS vs. no CBS) x 2 (time) mixed-factorial de-
sign. The first factor was between subjects and the second within subject. Thereby, the no 
CBS condition served as control group. We recruited consumers from Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland on the crowdsourcing platform Clickworker to participate in a study on con-
sumer–brand relationships with two measurement times with an interval of two weeks in be-
tween. Unless indicated otherwise, we used seven-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = “com-
pletely disagree” to 7 = “completely agree” for all measures in this study. 
Sample and Procedure 
299 participants took part in the first study and 186 participated in the follow-up study (48.9% 
female, Mage = 30.55; 100 CBS, 86 no CBS). As we chose a CBS video in which the brand 
A&F was sabotaged, a brand that targets young people, we only allowed people aged 18 to 45 
to participate in our experiment to enable actual self-congruence with the brand. On average, 
participants had a rather low brand awareness (M = 3.574, SD = 1.825), little brand experi-
ence (M = 1.914, SD = 1.432), and an average product involvement (M = 4.229, SD = 1.576). 
Applying a one-way independent analyses of variance (ANOVA), the profiles of initial partic-
ipants at Time 1 and participants at Time 2 were compared to examine a possible response 
bias: gender, product involvement, brand experience, and brand awareness did not signifi-
cantly differ but those who dropped out at Time 2 were significantly younger (MTime 1 without 
Time 2 = 28.6, SD Time 1 without Time 2 = 7.859) than those who completed both parts of the experi-
ment (M = 30.6, SD = 7.193, F(1, 296) = 4.905, p < .05). 
In the beginning of the two studies, participants had to indicate a linking variable 





studies were completely anonymous. Subsequently, we measured their mood. At Time 1, par-
ticipants were then asked about their brand awareness and given some general information 
about the brand A&F. Afterwards, we measured the moderators, mediators, dependent varia-
bles, control variables, and socio-demographics (i.e., age, gender, and education). At Time 2, 
we randomly assigned participants to either the CBS video, “Fitch the Homeless” by Greg 
Karber (Karber 2013), or a filler video, which contained a news report on Google’s autono-
mous car (Computer Bild TV 2014). After the videos, we measured the manipulation check, 
mediators, dependent variables, and control variables.  
Independent Variable 
At Time 2, participants were randomly assigned to either the CBS condition or the control 
group (no CBS). In the CBS condition, participants watched the CBS video about A&F by 
Greg Karber as described in the introduction of this paper. To ensure that participants under-
stood the message, German subtitles were displayed and also copied as a text below the video. 
In the control condition (no CBS), participants watched a filler video by Computer Bild TV 
which showed a news report on Google’s autonomous car (Computer Bild TV 2014). It 
started with some information on the current state of the research and showed a consumer 
driving in an autonomous car for the first time. Both videos lasted 2.24 minutes. At Time 2, 
we asked participants, how credible the content of the videos was (see also Bonifield and Cole 
2007). A one-way independent ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference be-
tween the credibility of the filler video (M = 5.198, SD = 1.446) and the CBS video (M = 
4.880, SD = 1.506, F(1, 184) = 2.135, p = .146). 
Pretest 
To control that our filler video had no significant effect on consumers’ mood, we conducted a 





Austria, Germany, and Switzerland on the platform Clickworker. To assure that the video did 
not affect mood, we measured mood with the two-item seven-point Likert scale (1 = “very 
bad” / ”very sad”), 7 = “very good” / ”very happy”) by Hansen and Wänke (e.g., “How do 
you feel at the moment?”; 2011) before (Cronbach’s α = .879) and after (Cronbach’s α = .888) 
exposure to the filler video. A paired-samples t-test showed that there was no significant dif-
ference between the mood before (M = 5.111, SE = .143) and after the video (M = 5.244, SE 
= .145, t(44) = −1.337, p = .188).  
Manipulation Check 
To make sure that participants perceived the video of Greg Karber as CBS, we asked them to 
indicate to what degree they felt that the producer of the video intended to harm A&F and to 
what degree the producer had the objective of harming A&F (Cronbach’s α = .979). With M = 
4.590 (SD = 1.832), participants did perceive the video of Greg Karber as CBS. 
Moderating, Mediating, Dependent, and Control Variables 
Brand trust, CBI, and consumers’ actual self-congruence with the brand were measured as 
moderators and perceived betrayal and social identity threat as mediators. The moderators 
were measured only at Time 1 (pre-measure) and the mediators at Time 1 (pre-measure) and 
Time 2 (post-measure). Consumers’ attitude toward the brand, purchase intention, and inten-
tion for NWOM were measured at both times as dependent variables (pre- and post-
measures).  
Brand trust was measured with the four-item scale by Nyffenegger et al. (e.g., “I trust 
A&F,” Cronbach’s α = .945; 2014), CBI with the six-item scale from Kim, Han, and Park 
(e.g., “When I talk about this brand, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’,” Cronbach’s α = 
.916; 2001), actual self-congruence with the two-item scale by Malär et al. (e.g., “The person-





.933; 2011), perceived betrayal with a four-item scale adapted from Grégoire, Tripp, and 
Legoux (e.g., “When I think of A&F, I feel betrayed,” Cronbach’s αTime 1 = .943, αTime 2 = 
.966; 2009), perceived social identity threat with a three-item scale adapted from Jetten, 
Postmes, and McAuliffe (e.g., “When I think of A&F, I feel threatened,” Cronbach’s αTime 1 = 
.891, αTime 2 = .892; 2002), brand attitude with the five-item scale using a seven-point seman-
tic differential (e.g., “unappealing” – “appealing,” Cronbach’s αTime 1 = .951, αTime 2 = .957) 
and purchase intention with the five-item scale again using a seven-point semantic differential 
both from Spears and Singh (e.g., “never” – “definitely,” Cronbach’s αTime 1 = .963, αTime 2 = 
.979; 2004), and NWOM with the three-item scale from Romani, Grappi, and Bagozzi (e.g., 
“I intend to say negative things about A&F to friends, relatives, and other people,” 
Cronbach’s αTime 1 = .954, αTime 2 = .966; 2012) (see Table B.1 in Appendix B for all items). 
Because consumers’ experience and knowledge of the brand and its products affect 
their attitude and behavior (see also Petty and Cacioppo 1986), we measured participants’ 
product involvement, brand awareness, and brand experience as controls at Time 1. To ensure 
that our effects are not the result of recent contact with the brand, we asked participants’ at 
Time 1 and 2 when they last came in contact with the brand. Also, we measured participants’ 
mood at Time 1 and 2 because participants’ transient mood state can affect their responses 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Finally, we requested our participants to indicate whether they had 
already seen the video as this might influence the videos’ impact on our dependent variables.  
We measured product involvement with the five-item scale of Malär et al. (e.g., “Be-
cause of my personal attitudes, I feel that clothes ought to be important to me,” Cronbach’s α 
= .967; 2011), brand awareness with the two-item scale together with the three-item scale for 
brand associations from Yoo and Donthu (e.g., “I can recognize A&F among other competing 
brands,” Cronbach’s α = .896; 2001) and combined the scales for brand experience and prod-





item scale (e.g., “Have you ever bought A&F?,” Cronbach’s α = .946). Mood was again 
measured with the two-item scale from Hansen and Wänke (Cronbach’s αTime 1 = .881, αTime 2 
= .946; 2011). Regarding their last contact with the brand, we asked participants at Time 1 to 
indicate when they last came in contact with A&F (1 = “less than a week,” 2 = “1-3 weeks,” 3 
= “1-3 months,” 4 = “4-6 months,” 5 = “7-12 months,” 6 = “more than a year,” and 7 = “I 
have never come in contact with A&F prior to this study”). When they already came in con-
tact with A&F, we asked them to indicate the valence of this last contact on three seven-point 
semantic differentials ranging from 1= “very negative” to 7 = “very positive,” 1 = “very un-
pleasant” to 7 = “very pleasant,” and 1 = “very bad” to 7 = “very good” (Cronbach’s αTime 1 = 
.973). At Time 2, we asked them to indicate how many times they have come in contact with 
A&F since our last survey (1 = “never,” 2 = “1-3 times,” 3 = “4-6 times,” 4 = “7-10 times,” 
and 5 = “more than 10 times”). To indicate the valence of their last contact, we used the same 
scale as at Time 1 (Cronbach’s αTime 2 = .982). At Time 2, we also asked them whether they 
had already seen the video: 2.3% had already seen the filler video and 6% the CBS video. 
Results 
The Negative Effect of an Exposure to a CBS Activity on Consumers’ Perception of and 
Behavior toward the Brand – The Baseline Effect 
To test the baseline effect of an exposure to a CBS activity on consumers’ attitude toward the 
brand, purchase intention, and intention for NWOM, we conducted a multivariate analysis of 
covariance (MANCOVA) with the dependent variables at Time 1 as well as our control varia-
bles as covariates. Using Roy’s largest root, there was a significant effect of CBS exposure on 
consumers’ attitude toward the brand, purchase intention, and intention for NWOM (Θ = 
.374, F(3, 169) = 21.080, p < .001) (see Figure 6 and Table B.2 in Appendix B). Those partic-
ipants who watched the CBS video had a significantly lower attitude toward the brand (EMM 





the brand (EMM = 3.956) than those who have seen the filler video (EMMbrand attitude = 3.940, 
EMMpurchase intention = 2.995, EMMNWOM = 2.365). Among the control variables, brand experi-
ence had a significant effect on the dependent variables at Time 2. However, results did not 
change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis. Thus, these results 
show that a CBS activity can indeed harm the brand by decreasing consumers’ attitude toward 
the brand and purchase intention and by increasing consumers’ intention to engage in NWOM 
about the brand, providing evidence for hypotheses H1a-c.  
FIGURE 6 
Baseline Effect of the Exposure to a CBS Activity on Consumers’ Attitude toward the 
Brand, Purchase Intention, and NWOM  
 
The Mediating Effect of Consumers’ Perceived Betrayal and Social Identity Threat 
We conducted mediation analyses using ordinary least squares path analysis with PROCESS 
model 4 (bootstrapping of 10,000 samples; Hayes 2013) to examine the mechanism by which 
the CBS activity had an effect on our dependent variables.  
Attitude toward the brand. We conducted a first mediation analysis with CBS as inde-
pendent variable (0 = control group, 1 = CBS), attitude toward the brand at Time 2 as depend-































perceived betrayal at Time 1 as well as our control variables as covariates. We also included 
perceived social identity threat at Time 1 and 2 as covariates into our analysis as perceived 
betrayal and social identity threat showed a high correlation (r = .733, VIF = 2.160). How-
ever, the degree of discriminant validity based on the requirements of Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) was sufficient for these two constructs. According to them, discriminant validity is 
given if the average variance extracted (AVE) is higher than the squared correlations between 
the respective constructs. In our case, the AVE for perceived betrayal (AVE = .876) and so-
cial identity threat (AVE = .742) both exceeded the squared correlation of the two constructs 
(r2 = .537). With said covariates included, we found a non-significant indirect effect (ab = 
−.039) where the bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval included zero (−.1265, 
.0208). When we excluded perceived social identity threat at Time 1 and 2 from the analysis, 
the indirect effect was significant (ab = −.303) where the bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confi-
dence interval (CI) did not include zero (−.4938, −.1528). Thus, exposure to the CBS video 
increased consumers’ perceived betrayal (a = 1.111), which in turn decreased their attitude to-
ward the brand (b = −.273). Independent of consumers’ perceived betrayal, the exposure to a 
CBS activity decreased their attitude toward the brand (c′ = −.811, p < .001). Among the con-
trol variables, brand experience had a significant effect on brand attitude at Time 2. However, 
results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis (see 
Table B.3 in Appendix B). These results show that an exposure to a CBS activity increases 
consumers’ perceived betrayal which in turn decreases their attitude toward the brand, provid-
ing some support for hypothesis H2. However, this effect was only observed when perceived 
social identity threat was excluded from the analysis.  
Purchase Intention. We conducted a further mediation analysis with CBS as independ-
ent variable, purchase intention at Time 2 as dependent variable and perceived social identity 





Time 1, perceived betrayal at Time 1 and 2 as well as our control variables as covariates. As 
can be seen in Table B.4 in Appendix B, participants who watched the CBS video experi-
enced a stronger social identity threat than those who watched the filler video (a = .443) and 
participants who perceived a stronger social identity threat reported a lower intention to pur-
chase products of A&F (b = −.202). A bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval for 
the indirect effect (ab = −.089) was entirely below zero (−.2002, −.0086). Independent of par-
ticipants’ perceived social identity threat, watching the CBS video decreased participants pur-
chase intention at the 10% significance level (c′ = −.315, p = .095). Among the control varia-
bles, brand awareness had a significant effect on perceived social identity threat at Time 2 and 
brand experience and the last contact at Time 2 on purchase intention at Time 2. However, re-
sults did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis. 
NWOM. A further mediation analysis with CBS as independent variable, perceived so-
cial identity threat at Time 2 as mediator, and NWOM at Time 2 as dependent variable, again 
with perceived social identity threat and NWOM at Time 1, perceived betrayal at Time 1 and 
2 as well as our control variables as covariates revealed similar results. Consumers who were 
exposed to the CBS video perceived a stronger social identity threat than those of the control 
group (a = .469) and consumers who perceived a stronger social identity threat reported a 
higher intention to talk negatively about A&F (b = .364). A bias-corrected 95% bootstrap con-
fidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = .171) was above zero (.0221, .4095). Independent 
of participants’ perceived social identity threat, watching the CBS video increased consumers’ 
intention for NWOM (c′ = .949, p < .001) (see Table B.5 in Appendix B). Among the control 
variables, none had a significant effect on consumers’ intention for NWOM at Time 2 and the 
results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis.  
These results indicate that consumers may indeed have used the brand to express their 





decreased their intention to purchase products of the brand and increased their intention to 
talk negatively about it, providing evidence for our hypotheses H3a and H3b.  
The Moderating Effect of the Brand Relationship Quality 
We conducted moderation analyses using ordinary least squares path analysis with PROCESS 
model 1 (Hayes 2013), to probe (a) how the effects of an exposure to a CBS activity on con-
sumers’ perceived betrayal and social identity threat depend on brand trust and CBI and (b) 
how the effects of perceived betrayal and social identity threat on consumers’ attitude toward 
the brand, purchase intention, and intention to talk negatively about the brand depend on their 
actual self-congruence with the brand.  
Perceived Betrayal. A moderation analysis with CBS as independent variable (0 = 
control group, 1 = CBS), perceived betrayal at Time 2 as dependent variable and brand trust 
as moderator with perceived betrayal at Time 1 as well as our control variables as covariates 
revealed a marginally significant interaction effect (b3 = .304, t(171) = 1.901, p = .059). By 
applying a spotlight analysis probing the moderation at the mean level of the moderator as 
well as one standard deviation above and below the mean, we found that the exposure to a 
CBS video compared to the control group increased consumers’ perceived betrayal among 
those with “moderate” (θ(X→Y)|M=4.496 = 1.565, p < .001) and “low” trust in the brand 
(θ(X→Y)|M=2.991 = 1.108, p < .001) but only at the 6% significance level among those with very 
“low” brand trust (θ(X→Y)|M=1.485 = .650, p = .059; see Figure 7 and Table B.6 in Appendix B). 
Among the control variables, none had a significant effect on perceived betrayal at Time 2. 
Nevertheless, the interaction effect was significant at the 5% level (p = .014) when we ex-
cluded control variables. These results, although only significant at the 6% level, suggest that 
brand trust increases the effect of an exposure to a CBS activity on consumers’ perceived be-






The Moderating Effect of Brand Trust of the Impact of an Exposure to a CBS Activity 
on Perceived Betrayal 
 
Perceived Social Identity Threat. A moderation analysis with CBS as independent var-
iable, perceived social identity threat at Time 2 as dependent variable and CBI as moderator 
with perceived social identity threat at Time 1 as well as our control variables as covariates 
revealed a non-significant interaction effect (b3 = −.146, t(171) = −.608, p = .544). Among the 
control variables, none had a significant effect on perceived social identity threat at Time 2 
and results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis. 
These results show that CBI did not moderate the effect of an exposure to a CBS activity on 
perceived social identity threat, rejecting hypothesis H5. 
Attitude toward the brand. A moderation analysis with perceived betrayal at Time 2 as 
independent variable, brand attitude at Time 2 as dependent variable and actual self-congru-
ence as moderator with brand attitude and perceived betrayal at Time 1 as well as our control 
variables as covariates revealed a significant interaction effect (b3 = –.099, t(170) = –2.275, p 
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on brand attitude among those with a “moderate” actual self-congruence (θ(X→Y)|M=3.968 = 
−.505, p < .001) and a less strong effect among those with “low” (θ(X→Y)|M=2.505 = −.360, p < 
.001) and very “low” actual self-congruence (θ(X→Y)|M=1.042 = −.215, p < .01; see Figure 8 and 
Table B.7 in Appendix B). Among the control variables, age significantly affected brand atti-
tude at Time 2. However, results did not change whether or not we included the control varia-
bles into the analysis. As suggested in hypothesis H6a, actual self-congruence reinforced the 
negative effect of perceived betrayal on consumers’ brand attitude.  
FIGURE 8 
The Moderating Effect of Actual Self-Congruence on the Impact of Perceived Betrayal 3 
on Brand Attitude 
 
Purchase Intention. A further moderation analysis with perceived social identity threat 
at Time 2 as independent variable, purchase intention at Time 2 as dependent variable and ac-
tual self-congruence as moderator with perceived social identity threat and purchase intention 
at Time 1 as well as our control variables as covariates revealed a significant interaction effect 
                                                 
3 Note.—  Labels of perceived betrayal represent the mean level (“Low”: M = 2.593) as well as one standard de-
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(b3 = −.102, t(170) = −2.104, p < .05). By applying a spotlight analysis, we found that con-
sumers’ purchase intention was strongest negatively affected by their perceived social identity 
threat among those with a “moderate” (θ(X→Y)|M=3.968 = −.458, p < .001) and “low” actual self-
congruence (θ(X→Y)|M=2.505 = −.309, p < .001) and less strong among those with a very “low” 
actual self-congruence (θ(X→Y)|M=1.042 = −.160, p < .05) (see Figure 9 and Table B.8 in Appen-
dix B). Among the control variables, none had a significant effect on purchase intention at 
Time 2 and results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the 
analysis. As suggested in hypothesis H6b, consumers’ actual self-congruence reinforced the 
negative effect of their perceived social identity threat on their purchase intention. 
FIGURE 9 
The Moderating Effect of Actual Self-Congruence of the Impact of Perceived Social 
Identity Threat 4 on Purchase Intention 
 
NWOM. We conducted a last moderation analysis with perceived social identity threat 
at Time 2 as independent variable, NWOM at Time 2 as dependent variable and actual self-
                                                 
4 Note.—  Labels of perceived social identity threat represent the mean level (“Low”: M = 2.961) as well as one 
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congruence as moderator. Perceived social identity threat and NWOM at Time 1 as well as 
our control variables served as covariates. This analysis revealed that the effect of consumers’ 
perceived social identity threat on their intention to talk negatively about the brand is not de-
pendent on their actual self-congruence (b3 = .045, t(170) = .944, p = .346). Among the con-
trol variables, none had a significant effect on consumers’ intention for NWOM at Time 2. 
Also, results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analy-
sis. As indicated by these results, actual self-congruence does not reinforce the effect of con-
sumers’ perceived social identity threat on their intention to engage in NWOM, rejecting hy-
pothesis H6c.   
Conditional Mediation Analyses with Perceived Betrayal and Social Identity Threat as Me-
diators and Brand Relationship Quality as Moderator 
We calculated conditional mediation analyses using ordinary least squares path analysis with 
PROCESS model 21 (bootstrapping of 10,000 samples; Hayes 2013) allowing for two differ-
ent moderators to probe how the mediations of CBS exposure on our dependent variables via 
perceived betrayal and perceived social identity threat depend on the brand relationship qual-
ity (i.e., brand trust, CBI, and actual self-congruence). 
Attitude toward the brand. A first conditional mediation analysis was conducted with 
CBS as independent (0 = control group, 1 = CBS), perceived betrayal at Time 2 as mediator, 
attitude toward the brand at Time 2 as dependent variable, and brand trust and actual self-con-
gruence as moderators. Thereby, brand trust was included as moderator on the path from CBS 
exposure on perceived betrayal and actual self-congruence as moderator on the path from per-
ceived betrayal on brand attitude. In our analysis, we included perceived betrayal and brand 





covariates. A spotlight analysis revealed that the exposure to the CBS video increased con-
sumers’ perceived betrayal only among those with “moderate” brand trust which in turn only 
decreased the attitude toward the brand of those consumers with “moderate” (θ(X→M→Y)|MBrand 
Trust=4.496, MActual Self-Congruence=3.968 = −.167, 95% CI = [−.3873, −.0107]) and “low” actual self-
congruence (θ(X→M→Y)|MBrand Trust=4.496, MActual Self-Congruence=2.505 = −.106, 95% CI = [−.2566, 
−.0047]) but not among those with “very low” actual self-congruence (θ(X→M→Y)|MBrand 
Trust=4.496, MActual Self-Congruence=1.042 = −.046, 95% CI = [−.1687, .0343]) and neither among those 
with relatively “low” and “very low” trust. Independent of consumers’ perceived betrayal, the 
exposure to the CBS video had a negative effect on their brand attitude (c′ = −.650, p < .001) 
(see Table B.9 in Appendix B). Among the control variables, none had a significant effect on 
perceived betrayal or brand attitude at Time 2 and results did not change whether or not we 
included the control variables into our analysis.  
These results provide evidence for hypothesis H7 that those consumers with moderate 
brand trust felt betrayed after exposure to a CBS activity, decreasing their attitude toward the 
brand. Those consumers with low brand trust felt less betrayed and, consequently, the effect 
of their perceived betrayal on their attitude toward the brand was not significant. In addition, 
perceived betrayal only affected consumers’ attitude toward the brand for those consumers 
with low to moderate actual self-congruence but not for those with very low actual self-con-
gruence, demonstrating that actual self-congruence reinforced the effect of perceived betrayal 
on consumers’ attitude toward the brand.  
Purchase Intention. We conducted a second conditional mediation analysis using 
PROCESS model 21 with CBS as independent variable, perceived social identity threat at 
Time 2 as mediator, purchase intention at Time 2 as dependent variable, and CBI and actual 





on perceived social identity threat and actual self-congruence as moderator on the effect of 
perceived social identity threat on purchase intention. Perceived social identity threat and pur-
chase intention at Time 1, perceived betrayal at Time 1 and 2, and our control variables were 
included as covariates into our analysis. In line with the results of the simple moderation 
model, the results of this analysis showed again a non-significant interaction effect of CBS 
exposure and CBI on perceived social identity threat (a3 = −.139, t(168) = −.823, p = .412). 
Among the control variables, whether consumers had contact between Time 1 and 2 had a sig-
nificant effect on their purchase intention at Time 2. However, whether or not we included the 
control variables into our analysis did not change the results. 
Consequently, we excluded CBI from our analysis and conducted another conditional 
mediation analysis using PROCESS model 14 (bootstrapping of 10,000 samples; Hayes 2013, 
2015) which allows to probe how the mediation depends on only one moderator. In this 
model, CBS served as independent variable, perceived social identity threat at Time 2 as me-
diator, purchase intention at Time 2 as dependent variable, and actual self-congruence as 
moderator of perceived social identity threat on purchase intention. We again included per-
ceived social identity threat and purchase intention at Time 1, perceived betrayal at Time 1 
and 2, and our control variables as covariates into our analysis. The results of this analysis re-
vealed a significant moderated mediation (index for moderated mediation = −.042) where the 
bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval was entirely below zero (−.1116, −.0020). 
The exposure to the CBS video increased consumers’ perceived social identity threat (a = 
.443) which in turn decreased their purchase intention but only among those with a “moder-
ate” (θ(X→M→Y)|M=3.968 = −.160, 95% CI = [−.3663, −.0265]) and “low” actual self-congruence 
(θ(X→M→Y)|M=2.505 = −.098, 95% CI = [−.2217, −.0133]) but not among those with a very “low” 
actual self-congruence (θ(X→M→Y)|M=1.042 = −.037, 95% CI = [−.1259, .0416]). Among the con-





Table B.10 in Appendix B). However, results did not change, whether or not we included the 
control variables into the analysis. 
These results suggest partial evidence for hypothesis H8a in that consumers’ actual 
self-congruence reinforces the indirect effect of CBS exposure on consumers’ purchase inten-
tions via their perceived social identity threat but only among those with low to moderate ac-
tual self-congruence and not for those with very low actual self-congruence. However, coun-
terintuitively, CBI does not moderate the effect of an exposure to a CBS activity on consum-
ers’ perceived social identity threat, indicating that consumers may perceive a social identity 
threat independent of their CBI level after exposure to a CBS activity.  
NWOM. We conducted another conditional mediation analysis using PROCESS model 
21 with CBS as independent variable, perceived social identity threat at Time 2 as mediator, 
NWOM as dependent variable at Time 2, and CBI and actual self-congruence as moderators. 
Thereby, CBI was included as moderator on the path of CBS exposure on perceived social 
identity threat and actual self-congruence on the path of perceived social identity threat on 
consumers’ intention for NWOM. In this analysis, perceived social identity threat and 
NWOM at Time 1, perceived betrayal at Time 1 and 2 and our control variables served again 
as covariates. This analysis again revealed a non-significant interaction effect of CBS expo-
sure and CBI on perceived social identity threat (a3 = −.131, t(168) = −.780, p = .436). Among 
the control variables, brand awareness had a significant effect on consumers’ perceived social 
identity threat at Time 2. However, whether or not we included the control variables into our 
analysis did not change the results. 
Consequently, we again excluded CBI from our analysis and conducted a further con-
ditional mediation analysis using PROCESS model 14 (bootstrapping of 10,000 samples; 





Time 2 as mediator, NWOM at Time 2 as dependent variable, and consumers’ actual self-con-
gruence as moderator of perceived social identity threat on NWOM. Perceived social identity 
threat and NWOM at Time 1, perceived betrayal at Time 1 and 2, and our control variables 
were included as covariates. The results of this analysis revealed a non-significant moderated 
mediation (index for moderated mediation = .013) where the bias-corrected 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval included zero (−.0331, .0709). Among the control variables, none had a 
significant effect on NWOM at Time 2 and the results did not change, whether or not we in-
cluded the control variables into the analysis. 
Similar to the results from the simple moderation models, CBI and actual self-congru-
ence did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of an exposure to a CBS activity on 
consumers’ intention to engage in NWOM via perceived social identity threat, rejecting hy-
pothesis H8b. 
Discussion 
This study addresses the consequences of the novel phenomenon of CBS and examines 
whether and how a CBS activity of a consumer brand saboteur affects other consumers who 
observe the CBS activity. Thereby, the processes by which CBS as a form of hostile aggres-
sion affects other consumers and how these processes depend on the brand relationship qual-
ity of those consumers are studied. Our results show that a CBS activity harms the brand by 
decreasing consumers’ attitude toward the brand and purchase intention and also by increas-
ing their intention to engage in NWOM. More specifically, we show that this damage occurs 
via two different mechanisms: (1) an exposure to a CBS activity increases consumers’ per-
ceived betrayal, decreasing their attitude toward the brand and (2) an exposure to a CBS activ-
ity increases consumers’ perceived social identity threat, decreasing consumers’ purchase in-





that these mechanisms depend on the brand relationship quality, i.e., consumers’ brand trust 
and actual self-congruence.  
Academic Implications and Further Research 
Despite its high damage potential, research has not yet examined whether and how CBS af-
fects other consumers who observe such hostile consumer activities. With our study, we show 
that CBS indeed influences other consumers’ attitude and behavior toward the brand and, 
thereby, shed some light on the negative consequences of this under-researched phenomenon. 
Furthermore, we also show that the processes by which CBS affects other consumers include 
consumers’ cognitions such as perceived betrayal. In the context of brand transgressions, prior 
research already showed that perceived betrayal strongly affects subsequent behavior such as 
revenge (Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge, research 
on the consequences of negative consumer behavior has not yet looked at the cognitions of 
other consumers who observe aggressive forms of consumer behavior and how they affect 
consumers’ attitude toward the brand as well as their subsequent behavior. Thereby, our study 
makes an important contribution to the existing literature on negative consumer behavior 
(e.g., Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009; Klein, Smith, and John 2004; Zhang, Feick, and 
Mittal 2014) by identifying the drivers of consumers’ responses to CBS behavior. 
With our findings on consumers’ cognitions, we also introduce consumers’ perceived 
social identity threat as a new mechanism by which consumers are affected by negative infor-
mation about a brand (here: by the CBS activity) to the marketing literature. This mechanism 
could also be interesting for further research on consumer boycott or NWOM because these 
behaviors also include self-expressiveness and self-enhancement (e.g., Hennig-Thurau et al. 
2004; Klein, Smith, and John 2004) which are linked to the social identity (see also Escalas 





However, the indirect effect of CBS exposure on consumers’ attitude toward the brand 
through perceived betrayal was only significant when perceived social identity threat was ex-
cluded as covariate from the analysis. Thus, perceived betrayal may be a more important con-
struct in the context of brand transgressions where the customer is directly involved in the 
brand’s behavior such as in the setting of Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux (2009). Observing 
negative brand behavior through a CBS activity may be too weak to trigger perceptions of be-
trayal. These findings may indicate that, in our study, consumers felt betrayed after observing 
a CBS activity through empathic reactions (e.g., Eisenberg and Miller 1987) rather than a per-
ception of a violation of their own relational norms (e.g., Fitness 2001) which may activate 
perceptions of betrayal more strongly than empathy. A future study should empirically exam-
ine which of the two paths (i.e., empathic reactions or a violation of relational norms) leads to 
perceived betrayal after exposure to a CBS activity.  
Yet, in our study, we also found that consumers’ relationship with the brand affects the 
influence of a CBS activity on consumers’ attitude toward the brand and subsequent behavior 
(i.e., purchase intention). More specifically, we could show that a CBS activity only increased 
other consumers’ perceived betrayal among those with moderate brand trust and not among 
those with low or very low trust. Consumers’ perceived betrayal, in turn, only decreased con-
sumers’ attitude toward the brand among those with moderate and low actual self- congruence 
but not among those with very low actual self-congruence. These results provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the non-significant findings of the simple mediation model with CBS af-
fecting consumers’ attitude toward the brand via perceived betrayal, when controlling for per-
ceived social identity threat. Those consumers who had low to very low trust in the brand 
only perceived the brand’s behavior as described in the CBS activity as a small or no violation 





might have led to the non-significant results for the unconditional effect of CBS on brand atti-
tude via perceived betrayal (when controlling for perceived social identity threat).  
In addition, in our conditional mediation analysis, we also found that the exposure to a 
CBS activity increased consumers’ perceived social identity threat, which in turn decreased 
consumers’ purchase intention. However, this indirect effect was only observed for those con-
sumers with moderate and low levels of actual self-congruence but not among those with very 
low actual self-congruence with the brand. With these findings, we contribute to the ongoing 
debate on the buffering (e.g., Hess, Ganesan, and Klein 2003; Tax, Brown, and Chan-
drashekaran 1998) versus love-becomes-hate effect, which discusses the role of the brand re-
lationship quality on the impact of service failures on consumer behavior (e.g., Aaker, Four-
nier, and Brasel 2004; Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). Our findings support a love-be-
comes-hate effect and take up the explanation of Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux (2009) from 
their study on the interplay of brand transgressions and the brand relationship quality. They 
explain the opposing effects of brand relationship quality by the reciprocity norm. Consumers 
wish to harm the company that they feel has hurt them and they reduce their negative re-
sponses when the company shows signs of redemption. Therefore, in our case, consumers 
with a high relationship quality may have felt hurt because of the statement by A&F’s CEO, 
as described by the brand saboteur, and showed more negative responses to the CBS activity 
than consumers with a low relationship quality. Yet, further research is needed to better un-
derstand the opposing effects of the brand relationship quality on consumers’ attitude and 
subsequent behavior after exposure to negative information about the brand or a brand trans-
gression. Also, prior research on these two schools of thoughts did not yet consider consum-





brand into our analysis, we showed that consumers’ actual self-congruence amplifies consum-
ers’ cognitive responses such as perceived betrayal. This could be a fruitful path for further 
analyses in the area of negative consumer behavior and its impact on other consumers. 
Although we expected that CBI moderates the effect of CBS on consumers’ perceived 
social identity threat, the results of our study proved otherwise as no significant moderation 
effects of CBI were found. Research on brand defensiveness by consumers has found that sit-
uational factors such as self-activation influences the effect of CBI on consumers’ attitude to-
ward the brand (Lisjak, Lee, and Gardner 2012). In our setting, it could be that consumers’ so-
cial identities were not salient enough to allow their CBI to influence their perceived social 
identity threats. An alternative explanation for these non-significant moderation effects can be 
found in the overall very low levels of CBI among participants in our sample (M = 1.586, SD 
= .947, 75% percentile = 1.833). Presumably, there were too few people with a moderate to 
moderately high CBI to reveal any significant effects (3.2% had a mean of M ≥ 4, Max. = 
5.5). In general, the levels of brand awareness (M = 3.574, SD = 1.825, Min. = 1, Max. = 7) 
and also of our measures for the brand relationship quality, i.e., brand trust (M = 2.991, SD = 
1.505, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), CBI (M = 1.586, SD = .947, Min. = 1, Max. = 5.5), and actual 
self-congruence (M = 2.505, SD = 1.463, Min. = 1, Max. = 6.5) were very low. This might be 
because A&F is a US brand that is not very well-known in the German-speaking countries. 
However, this unfamiliarity in the German-speaking countries allowed us to test the impact of 
the CBS video as most consumers’ have not seen it before our study. Nevertheless, a future 
study should replicate our study with a US sample where brand awareness and brand relation-
ship quality measures should have higher levels and additionally measure consumers’ self-ac-
tivation to control for its effect on the moderating effect of CBI. 
Furthermore, actual-self congruence did not significantly moderate the impact of per-





self-congruence stated that self-congruence is contingent on personality factors such as self-
esteem and public self-consciousness (Malär et al. 2011). In NWOM, consumers actively talk 
with other consumers about the brand and, thus, expose their connection with the brand to 
others. Therefore, personality factors such as public self-consciousness (e.g., Gould and Barak 
1988) may have a stronger effect on consumers’ intention to engage in NWOM than on their 
attitude toward the brand or purchase intention. Thus, a future study should include personal-
ity factors such as self-esteem and public self-consciousness into the analysis and examine 
whether the moderating effect of actual self-congruence depends on said personality factors.  
In this paper, we already included three important moderators related to the consumer–
brand relationship into our analysis. Yet, further research should also examine product- or 
brand-related factors. Clothes of the brand A&F could be regarded as hedonic products. In 
contrast, utilitarian products may reveal different results, especially as they serve less of a 
self-expressive purpose than hedonic products (Park and Moon 2003).  
In our study, participants were only shown the CBS video without any subsequent re-
sponse from the management. Although such a research design was needed to reveal whether 
and how CBS affects other consumers as a baseline, a future study should examine different 
responses by the management to the CBS activity. This could reveal highly relevant implica-
tions for managers on how to adequately react and respond to a CBS activity.   
Managerial Implications 
Our study helps managers to understand if, when and why a CBS activity harms other con-
sumers. From our results managers can learn that a CBS activity can substantially harm the 
brand by decreasing consumers’ attitude toward the brand and purchase intention. Further-
more, after exposure to a CBS activity, consumers also increasingly engage in NWOM about 





potentially affecting many more consumers than have initially observed the CBS activity. 
These findings are highly relevant for managers as they show that CBS indeed affects other 
consumers in a negative way. As such, a CBS activity does not only affect the dyad between 
the brand saboteur and the brand in a negative way but also other consumers who were not in-
volved in the initial brand failure but who observed the CBS activity. Therefore, ideally, man-
agers should try to de-escalate and prevent CBS from occurring to avoid a possible damage 
on other consumers’ attitude and subsequent behavior. If such prevention attempts fail and 
CBS does occur, managers should respond to CBS in order to limit its damage on the brand. 
To prevent its damage from spreading further through NWOM, they should be well-prepared 
(e.g., by engaging in training based on a variety of different scenarios of CBS activities) and 
react within a short period of time.  
Furthermore, our findings provide insights to managers which consumer segments are 
especially vulnerable to the negative effects of CBS activities by other consumer brand sabo-
teurs. Our results point in the same direction as recent findings in the context of customer re-
venge (Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). Consumers with a high brand relationship quality 
are stronger negatively affected by a brand transgression (here: a CBS activity) in terms of 
their attitude and subsequent behavior than consumers with a low brand relationship quality. 
Therefore, based on our results, managers are advised to pay special attention to the preven-
tion of CBS and to take adequate measures once CBS occurred such that its customers with a 
high brand relationship quality are as little affected as possible (see also suggestions from 
Kähr et al. 2016). Based on the principles of the reciprocity norm (e.g., Gouldner 1960), con-
sumers with a high relationship quality should react more favorably to signs of redemption by 
a brand (e.g., a compensation or an apology) than consumers with a low relationship quality. 
Thus, once CBS occurred, managers should provide an accommodative response to the CBS 





as they “have a hostile mindset and have burned all bridges with the brand” (Kähr et al. 2016, 
p. 38), but it may mitigate the negative effects of CBS on other consumers’ attitude toward 
the brand and subsequent behavior, especially of those consumers with a high brand relation-
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE PRETEST AND THE EXPERIMENT 
Additional Information on the Sample of the Pretest 
In our sample, 33.3% of the participants had a University degree, 28.9% an apprenticeship, 
17.8% Matura (qualification for University entrance), 11.1% higher vocational training, 2.2% 
compulsory education, 2.2% of the participants had no educational qualification, 4.4% indi-
cated “other,” and none had a PhD. 
Additional Information on the Sample of the Main Experiment  
In our sample, 34.4% of the participants had a University degree, 19.4% an apprenticeship, 
17.7% higher vocational training, 17.2% Matura, 4.3% compulsory education, 1.1% had a 
PhD, 1.1 % of the participants had no educational qualification, and 4.8% indicated “other.”  
Additional Information on the Study Design of the Main Experiment 
To control that participants watched our videos, the button to continue to the next question ap-
peared at the end of the videos. We also asked a control question at the end of the survey 
about the content of the videos to ensure that participants watched it. If they watched the 
video, the questions were easy to answer with a 25% chance to take the correct guess. For our 
CBS video, they had to indicate which of the following statements was correct: (1) The 
speaker / producer of the video mentions a quote of A&F’s CEO, in which the CEO says that 
he only wants the cool kids to wear his clothes and that there are people who don’t belong in 
his clothes. (2) The speaker / producer of the video mentions a quote of A&F’s CEO, in 
which the CEO says that all kids can wear his clothes and that he does not want to exclude an-
yone. (3) The speaker / producer of the video wants to help A&F to increase their revenue. (4) 
The speaker / producer of the video asks the audience of the video to wear their clothes they 





values other than (1)). For our filler video, participants had to indicate which of the following 
statements was correct: (1) The second speaker in the video would never drive an autonomous 
car. (2) The second speaker in the video does not mind having no control over his vehicle. (3) 
The second speaker in the video drives an autonomous car in the video. (4) The second 
speaker in the video does not talk about autonomous cars in the video. 10.19% answered this 
question incorrectly (i.e., values other than (3)).  
Additional Information on the Analysis of the Results of the Main Experiment 
In our analysis, we excluded the valence of the last contact consumers had with A&F at Time 
1 and 2 as covariates because 37.1% (n = 69) of the participants never came in contact with 
A&F before this experiment and, consequently, did not answer our question about the valence 
of the last contact at Time 1. At Time 2, even 73.1% (n = 136) did not come in contact with 
A&F between our surveys at Time 1 and 2. Consequently, there would have been a substan-
tial amount of missing data if we included the valence of consumers’ last contact with A&F at 
Time 1 and 2 as covariates into our analysis. Also, so far, PROCESS has no sophisticated 
missing data handling routines. It uses listwise deletion for cases missing on any variable in 
the model. This would have reduced our sample size by far too much for the analysis required 
to test our hypotheses. However, to make sure that the valence of the last contacts did not act 
as confound (e.g., they could be the true mediators and our measured mediators only corre-
lated with said true mediators), we looked at the correlations between contact valence at Time 
1 and 2 and perceived betrayal (rTime 1 = .103, rTime 2 = −.095) and perceived social identity 







CONSTRUCTS INDICATORS, MEASUREMENT ITEMS, AND SCALE RELIABILITIES 
Measure Items 




Moderators:    
Trust a  .945  
  I trust A&F.   
  I rely on A&F.   
  A&F is an honest brand.   
  A&F is safe.   
Consumer-Brand Iden-
tification a  
.916  
 A&F’s successes are my successes.   
 I am interested in what others think about A&F.   
 When someone praises A&F, it feels like a personal compliment.   
 When I talk about A&F, I usually say “we” rather than “they.”   
 If a story in the media criticized A&F, I would feel embarrassed.   
 When someone criticizes A&F, it feels like a personal insult.   
Actual Self-Congru-
ence a  
.933  
  The personality of A&F is consistent with how I see myself (my 
actual self).  
  
  The personality of A&F is a mirror image of me (my actual self).   
Mediators:    
Perceived Betrayal a  .943 .966 
  When I think of A&F, I feel…   
  …betrayed (two items in German).   
  …as if A&F broke the promise made to me.   
  …that A&F has let me down in a moment of need.   
Perceived Social Iden-
tity Threat a  
.891 .892 
  When I think of A&F, I feel…   
  …uncomfortable.   
  …threatened.   
  …attacked personally.   
a measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “completely disagree”, 7 = “completely agree”, b 
measured by a seven-point semantic differential scale, c 1 = “very sad”, 7 = “very happy”, d 1 = “very bad”, 7 = 
“very good”, e (r) indicates reversed scoring, f measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “never”, 





TABLE B.1 (Continuing) 
CONSTRUCTS INDICATORS, MEASUREMENT ITEMS, AND SCALE RELIABILITIES 
Measure Items 




Dependent variables:    
Attitude toward the 
Brand b  
.951 .957 
  unappealing – appealing   
  bad – good   
  unpleasant – pleasant   
  unfavorable – favorable   
  unlikable – likable   
NWOM a  .954 .966 
  I intend to say negative things about A&F to friends, relatives, 
and other people. 
  
 I intend to recommend to my friends, relatives, and other people 
that they not buy products of A&F. 
  
  I intend to discredit A&F with my friends, relatives, or other 
people. 
  
Purchase Intention b  .963 .979 
  never – definitely   
  definitely do not intend to buy – definitely intend   
  very low – very high purchase interest   
  definitely not buy it – definitely buy it   
  probably not – probably buy it   
Control Variables:    
Mood b  .881 .946 
 How do you feel at the moment? c   
 How is your mood right now? d    
Product Involvement a  .967  
 Because of my personal attitudes, I feel that clothes ought to be important to me.    
 Because of my personal values, I feel that clothes ought to be important to me.   
 Clothes are very important to me personally.   
 Compared with other products, clothes are important to me.    
 I’m interested in clothes.   
a measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “completely disagree”, 7 = “completely agree”, b 
measured by a seven-point semantic differential scale, c 1 = “very sad”, 7 = “very happy”, d 1 = “very bad”, 7 = 
“very good”, e (r) indicates reversed scoring, f measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “never”, 





TABLE B.1 (Continuing) 
CONSTRUCTS INDICATORS, MEASUREMENT ITEMS, AND SCALE RELIABILITIES 
Measure Items 




Brand Awareness a  .896  
 I can recognize A&F among other competing brands.   
 I am aware of A&F.   
 Some characteristics of A&F come to my mind quickly.   
 I can quickly recall the symbol or logo of A&F.   
 I have difficulty in imagining A&F in my mind. (r) e   
Brand Experience  .946  
 Have you ever bought clothes of A&F? f    
 How many clothes do you currently own of A&F? g   
 How often do you currently wear clothes of A&F? f   
Contact Valence b  .973 .982 
 The last contact with A&F was…   
 very negative – very positive   
 very unpleasant – very pleasant   
 very bad – very good   
a measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “completely disagree”, 7 = “completely agree”, b 
measured by a seven-point semantic differential scale, c 1 = “very sad”, 7 = “very happy”, d 1 = “very bad”, 7 = 
“very good”, e (r) indicates reversed scoring, f measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “never”, 







ESTIMATED MARGINAL MEANS, STANDARD ERRORS, ROY’S LARGEST ROOT, F- AND P-VALUES FOR THE MANCOVA MODEL 











Error Θ df1 df2 F Sig. 
Baseline Effect of CBS            
Condition       .374 3 169 21.080 .000 
Control Group 3.940 .118 2.995 .129 2.365 .171      
CBS 2.827 .109 2.338 .120 3.956 .158      
Attitude toward the Brand T1       .198 3 169 11.151 .000 
Purchase Intention T1       .057 3 169 3.205 .025 
NWOM T1       .150 3 169 8.460 .000 
Product Involvement       .013 3 169 .710 .547 
Brand Experience       .082 3 169 4.602 .004 
Brand Awareness       .020 3 169 1.153 .329 
Last Contact T1       .007 3 169 .375 .771 
Last Contact T2       .017 3 169 .959 .413 
Mood T1       .011 3 169 .610 .609 
Mood T2       .006 3 169 .317 .813 
Knowledge of Video       .017 3 169 .949 .418 
Gender       .044 3 169 2.477 .063 
Age       .014 3 169 .814 .488 






REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED BETRAYAL AND 
BRAND ATTITUDE SIMPLE MEDIATOR MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Betrayal T2 (M)  Attitude toward the Brand T2 (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
CBS (X) a 1.111 .230 .000 c' −.811 .174 .000 
Perceived Betrayal T2 (M)  — — — b −.273 .058 .000 
Constant i1 −1.364 2.220 .540 i2 1.201 1.988 .547 
Perceived Betrayal T1 f1 .357 .116 .002 g1 .094 .097 .338 
Attitude toward the Brand T1 f2 .108 .102 .288 g2 .615 .070 .000 
Product Involvement f5 −.010 .091 .911 g5 .004 .061 .954 
Brand Experience f6 .073 .122 .552 g6 .194 .079 .015 
Brand Awareness f7 .009 .091 .918 g7 −.001 .061 .988 
Last Contact T1 f8 .074 .084 .382 g8 .029 .050 .571 
Last Contact T2 f9 .489 .325 .134 g9 .113 .181 .534 
Mood T1 f10 −.149 .124 .232 g10 −.028 .086 .745 
Mood T2 f11 .035 .129 .784 g11 −.018 .082 .830 
Knowledge of Video f12 1.017 .750 .177 g12 −.300 .733 .683 
Gender f13 −.509 .259 .051 g13 .067 .162 .681 
Age f14 .011 .018 .525 g14 .019 .011 .076 
         
  R2 = .223  R2 = .610 
  F(13, 172) = 4.012, p < .001  F(14, 171) = 28.492, p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 





TABLE B.4  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED SOCIAL IDEN-
TITY THREAT AND PURCHASE INTENTION SIMPLE MEDIATOR MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 (M)  Purchase Intention T2 (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
CBS (X) a .443 .193 .023 c' −.315 .188 .095 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 (M)  — — — b −.202 .082 .014 
Constant i1 2.021 1.462 .169 i2 2.090 1.955 .287 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T1 f1 .237 .112 .036 g1 −.087 .090 .334 
Purchase Intention T1 f2 −.104 .070 .143 g2 .352 .085 .000 
Perceived Betrayal T1 f3 −.040 .113 .725 g3 .121 .086 .162 
Perceived Betrayal T2 f4 .668 .063 .000 g4 −.093 .078 .233 
Product Involvement f5 −.048 .058 .411 g5 −.019 .069 .787 
Brand Experience f6 .001 .075 .995 g6 .368 .105 .001 
Brand Awareness f7 −.125 .063 .047 g7 .016 .073 .823 
Last Contact T1 f8 .006 .053 .913 g8 .048 .058 .408 
Last Contact T2 f9 −.001 .175 .996 g9 .435 .204 .035 
Mood T1 f10 .014 .098 .889 g10 −.032 .095 .740 
Mood T2 f11 −.003 .087 .975 g11 −.039 .093 .675 
Knowledge of Video f12 .133 .413 .748 g12 −.322 .673 .634 
Gender f13 −.169 .176 .339 g13 −.360 .191 .062 
Age f14 −.018 .011 .112 g14 .009 .013 .519 
         
  R2 = .650  R2 = .543 
  F(15, 170) = 23.714, p < .001  F(16, 169) = 18.344, p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 





TABLE B.5  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED SOCIAL IDEN-
TITY THREAT AND NEGATIVE WORD-OF-MOUTH SIMPLE MEDIATOR MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 (M)  NWOM T2 (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
CBS (X) a .469 .191 .015 c' .949 .252 .000 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 (M)  — — — b .364 .134 .007 
Constant i1 1.288 1.348 .341 i2 1.068 2.272 .639 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T1 f1 .213 .121 .079 g1 −.054 .117 .643 
Negative Word-of-Mouth T1 f2 .113 .067 .095 g2 .355 .100 .001 
Perceived Betrayal T1 f3 −.047 .113 .679 g3 .000 .110 .997 
Perceived Betrayal T2 f4 .634 .061 .000 g4 .174 .124 .163 
Product Involvement f5 −.054 .057 .349 g5 .134 .083 .109 
Brand Experience f6 −.040 .062 .515 g6 −.073 .093 .429 
Brand Awareness f7 −.124 .059 .038 g7 −.087 .097 .375 
Last Contact T1 f8 .012 .052 .818 g8 −.114 .084 .178 
Last Contact T2 f9 −.016 .172 .926 g9 −.192 .296 .517 
Mood T1 f10 .004 .098 .966 g10 .183 .151 .227 
Mood T2 f11 .000 .086 .999 g11 −.049 .159 .759 
Knowledge of Video f12 .276 .379 .468 g12 .150 .666 .822 
Gender f13 −.147 .176 .405 g13 −.123 .219 .574 
Age f14 −.017 .011 .141 g14 −.015 .017 .360 
         
  R2 = .653  R2 = .513 
  F(15, 170) = 23.466, p < .001  F(16, 169) = 11.718, p < .001 
Note.—Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 





TABLE B.6  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE BRAND TRUST AND PER-
CEIVED BETRAYAL SIMPLE MODERATION MODEL 
    
  Coeff. SE t p 
Intercept i1 −.266 2.271 −.117 .907 
CBS (X) b1 .199 .541 .368 .714 
Brand Trust (M) b2 −.110 .119 −.927 .356 
X x M b3 .304 .160 1.901 .059 
Perceived Betrayal T1 g1 .336 .105 3.209 .002 
Product Involvement g2 .005 .092 .053 .958 
Brand Experience g3 .087 .116 .749 .455 
Brand Awareness g4 −.022 .095 −.231 .818 
Last Contact T1 g5 .057 .083 .687 .493 
Last Contact T2 g6 .415 .326 1.274 .204 
Mood T1 g7 −.147 .124 −1.182 .239 
Mood T2 g8 .030 .133 .228 .820 
Knowledge of Video g9 .949 .760 1.248 .214 
Gender g10 −.439 .258 −1.699 .091 
Age g11 .010 .018 .586 .559 
      
   R2 = .236 
   F(14, 171) = 4.029, p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 






TABLE B.7  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE ACTUAL SELF-CONGRUENCE 
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BRAND SIMPLE MODERATION MODEL 
    
  Coeff. SE t p 
Intercept i1 .222 2.078 .107 .915 
Perceived Betrayal (X) b1 −.112 .107 −1.049 .296 
Actual Self-Congruence (M) b2 .555 .149 3.720 .000 
X x M b3 −.099 .044 −2.275 .024 
Perceived Betrayal T1 g1 .096 .094 1.014 .312 
Attitude toward the Brand T1 g2 .516 .088 5.828 .000 
Product Involvement g3 −.058 .068 −.852 .396 
Brand Experience g4 .057 .084 .677 .499 
Brand Awareness g5 .056 .067 .834 .406 
Last Contact T1 g6 .029 .053 .546 .586 
Last Contact T2 g7 .110 .183 .601 .548 
Mood T1 g8 −.098 .086 −1.140 .256 
Mood T2 g9 .064 .085 .746 .457 
Knowledge of Video g10 −.286 .705 −.406 .685 
Gender g11 −.028 .175 −.158 .875 
Age g12 .025 .011 2.230 .027 
      
   R2 = .607 
   F(15, 170) = 28.942, p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 






TABLE B.8  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE ACTUAL SELF-CONGRUENCE 
AND PURCHASE INTENTION SIMPLE MODERATION MODEL 
    
  Coeff. SE t p 
Intercept i1 1.527 1.964 .778 .438 
Perceived Social Identity Threat (X) b1 −.053 .118 −.451 .652 
Actual Self-Congruence (M) b2 .600 .178 3.374 .001 
X x M b3 −.102 .048 −2.104 .037 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T1 g1 −.003 .078 −.040 .968 
Purchase Intention T1 g2 .275 .078 3.521 .001 
Product Involvement g3 −.086 .063 −1.361 .175 
Brand Experience g4 .193 .101 1.917 .057 
Brand Awareness g5 .077 .074 1.040 .300 
Last Contact T1 g6 .055 .060 .919 .360 
Last Contact T2 g7 .399 .205 1.947 .053 
Mood T1 g8 −.040 .088 −.453 .651 
Mood T2 g9 −.031 .091 −.335 .738 
Knowledge of Video g10 −.572 .656 −.872 .385 
Gender g11 −.311 .195 −1.597 .112 
Age g12 .010 .013 .823 .412 
      
   R2 = .580 
   F(15, 170) = 19.285, p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 






TABLE B.9  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED BETRAYAL AND 
BRAND ATTITUDE MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Betrayal T2 (M)  Attitude toward the Brand T2 (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
CBS (X) a1 −.379 .367 .302 c' −.650 .160 .000 
Perceived Betrayal T2 (M)  — — — b1 −.007 .099 .944 
Brand Trust (W) a2 −.075 .093 .420  — — — 
X x W a3 .199 .110 .072  — — — 
Actual Self-Congruence (V)  — — — b2 .458 .111 .000 
M x V   — — — b3 −.080 .029 .006 
Constant i1 −2.199 1.402 .119 i2 .496 1.268 .696 
Perceived Betrayal T1 f1 .159 .081 .051 g1 .042 .075 .574 
Attitude toward the Brand T1 f2 .230 .081 .005 g2 .540 .073 .000 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T1 f3 −.025 .081 .755 g3 .109 .075 .145 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 f4 .746 .057 .000 g4 −.124 .074 .096 
Product Involvement f5 .045 .058 .440 g5 −.036 .053 .498 
Brand Experience f6 −.010 .081 .906 g6 .086 .078 .275 
Brand Awareness f7 .091 .066 .172 g7 .035 .060 .563 
Last Contact T1 f8 .019 .054 .722 g8 .050 .049 .307 
Last Contact T2 f9 .150 .182 .412 g9 .082 .165 .619 
Mood T1 f10 −.070 .087 .421 g10 −.040 .080 .620 
Mood T2 f11 −.014 .079 .857 g11 .005 .073 .941 
Knowledge of Video f12 .359 .409 .381 g12 −.347 .380 .362 
Gender f13 −.068 .172 .694 g13 .082 .156 .598 
Age f14 .016 .011 .150 g14 .019 .011 .071 
         
  R2 = .632  R2 = .657 
  F(17, 168) = 19.995, p < .001  F(18, 167) = 17.782,  p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 





TABLE B.10  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED SOCIAL IDEN-
TITY THREAT AND PURCHASE INTENTION MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 (M)  Purchase Intention T2 (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
CBS (X) a .443 .193 .023 c' −.276 .177 .120 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T2 (M)  — — — b1 .015 .126 .905 
Actual Self-Congruence (V)  — — — b2 .584 .187 .002 
M x V  — — — b3 −.095 .054 .081 
Constant i1 2.021 1.462 .169 i2 1.138 2.138 .595 
Perceived Social Identity Threat T1 f1 .237 .112 .036 g1 −.077 .105 .464 
Purchase Intention T1 f2 −.104 .070 .143 g2 .290 .081 .001 
Perceived Betrayal T1 f3 −.040 .113 .725 g3 .134 .095 .158 
Perceived Betrayal T2 f4 .668 .063 .000 g4 −.078 .072 .286 
Product Involvement f5 −.048 .058 .411 g5 −.069 .065 .291 
Brand Experience f6 .001 .075 .995 g6 .197 .100 .051 
Brand Awareness f7 −.125 .063 .047 g7 .088 .075 .240 
Last Contact T1 f8 .006 .053 .913 g8 .072 .061 .242 
Last Contact T2 f9 −.001 .175 .996 g9 .425 .203 .038 
Mood T1 f10 .014 .098 .889 g10 −.050 .088 .566 
Mood T2 f11 −.003 .087 .975 g11 −.038 .090 .672 
Knowledge of Video f12 .133 .413 .748 g12 −.500 .711 .483 
Gender f13 −.169 .176 .339 g13 −.299 .195 .126 
Age f14 −.018 .011 .112 g14 .012 .013 .327 
         
  R2 = .650  R2 = .594 
  F(15, 170) = 23.714, p < .001  F(18, 176) = 19.858, p < .001 
Note.— Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 
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The Effectiveness of a Defensive versus Accommodative Response Strategy to Negative 
Electronic Word-of-Mouth: The Role of Message Credibility 
As consumers increasingly rely on electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) to form their pur-
chase decisions, negative reviews on virtual opinion platforms can significantly diminish 
companies’ sales. Prior research has already empirically examined these adverse effects 
of negative eWOM. However, how organizational response strategies to negative eWOM 
influence other consumers’ attitudinal and behavioral responses has not been investi-
gated in depth so far. In the anonymity of the Internet, credibility of eWOM plays a cru-
cial role in the processing of web-based information. Based on attribution and impres-
sion formation theory, this study examines how different organizational response strate-
gies to negative eWOM influence other consumers’ brand evaluation (i.e., attitude to-
ward the brand and perceived service quality) and purchase intention depending on the 
credibility of negative eWOM. This study shows that the credibility of negative eWOM 
moderates the effect of an organizational response (defensive vs. accommodative) on 
other consumers’ brand evaluation and purchase intention. Findings suggest that when 
credibility of the negative eWOM is low, companies should react with a defensive rather 








Recently, on the review platform TripAdvisor, a very dissatisfied customer shared a highly 
negative review of a hotel in London with other consumers: “This shouldnt even be rated 1 
star!! Should be minus 1!!! I dont know where to begin! Firstly we opened curtains and wads 
of dust fell everywhere. Room was stuffy so asked for fan but that just blew DUST every-
where! Toilets were broken and there was RAT DROPPINGS in the wardrobe. (…) There 
were CRAWLIEA everywhere we looked. We didnt take anything out of our suitcase. (…) 
Please DO NOT VISIT if you do not want to come home with crawlies. We thought to take 
some pics of the aftermath before we left. This experience has left us traumatised. What was 
supposed to be a nice trip to london turned out to be hell on the first nyt!!!” (Naz 2016, em-
phasis in original). Such negative online reviews have rapidly grown into a major challenge 
for many companies. There is a growing number of virtual opinion platforms such as TripAd-
visor, Booking.com, and Amazon.com where customers not only share their positive but also 
their negative experiences with products and services with other potential customers. Such 
negative online reviews, online recommendations, or online opinions are often referred to as 
negative electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM; Serra Cantallops and Salvi 2014), which is de-
fined as “negative statement made by potential, actual, or former customers about a product or 
company, which is made available to a multitude of people and institutions via the Internet” 
(Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004, p. 39).  
Existing research has reported that negative (e)WOM such as the example in the be-
ginning of this article can keep potential customers from buying the respective product or ser-
vice, decreasing companies’ sales (Chang et al. 2015; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). Consumers in-
terpret (e)WOM information provided by existing customers as a signal of product or service 
quality of the company and rely on other consumers’ experiences with products and services 





Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). According to a study by McKinsey, 20 – 50% of all purchasing deci-
sions are primarily influenced by (e)WOM (Bughin, Doogan, and Vetvik 2010). Due to its 
easy access and speed (time at which reviews to new products or services are available), 
eWOM has a much broader reach than traditional WOM (Sun et al. 2006). As such, the poten-
tial negative effects of negative eWOM on other consumers’ purchase decision and compa-
nies’ sales can be much more dramatic than those of traditional WOM. Therefore, by engag-
ing in negative eWOM about a company or brand, consumers can cause a decrease in compa-
nies’ sales and, thereby, harm the company or brand. Thus, recent research has also denoted 
negative (e)WOM as instrumental aggression wherein consumers intend to harm the company 
or brand in order to vent their negative emotions or to restore equity (Kähr et al. 2016). 
Consequently, due to its negative effects on companies or brands, there has been an 
increasing research interest in negative eWOM (e.g., Chang et al. 2015; Lee and Cranage 
2012; Serra Cantallops and Salvi 2014). So far, the focus mostly lay on the antecedents (e.g., 
Sun et al. 2006), especially the motivation to generate eWOM (e.g., Hennig-Thurau et al. 
2004; Serra Cantallops and Salvi 2014), and its immediate outcomes such as a decline in com-
panies’ sales (e.g., Chang et al. 2015; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). 
Only few studies examined how potential customers incorporate eWOM and whether and 
how companies should respond to negative eWOM (e.g., Chang et al. 2015; Lee and Cranage 
2012; Sparks, So, and Bradley 2016). However, by responding adequately to negative 
eWOM, companies can regain customer trust and decrease their concerns (Sparks, So, and 
Bradley 2016). Furthermore, due to the broad reach of eWOM, responding to negative 
eWOM is not only important to regain the dissatisfied customer’s trust but also to convince 
potential customers who encounter negative eWOM of the quality of the evaluated company. 
Prior research has already established that the adequacy of organizational responses to 





et al. 2015), the company’s culpability (Kim et al. 2004), and the consensus for positive and 
negative eWOM (Lee and Cranage 2012). However, despite its strong influence on whether 
and how information is adopted (Cheung et al. 2009) – prior research has even denoted it as 
one of the most important factors influencing the processing of web-based information (Metz-
ger 2007) – the credibility of eWOM has not yet been addressed in research on response strat-
egies to eWOM. According to literature on credibility and information adoption, consumers 
believe and accept eWOM they regard as credible, influencing their subsequent behavior 
(Cheung, Sia, and Kuan 2012; Sussman and Siegal 2003; Wathen and Burkell 2002). On the 
other hand, they evaluate eWOM with low credibility as less persuasive (e.g., Jain and 
Posavac 2001) and, thus, its influence on their attitude and subsequent behavior is weaker. 
Therefore, based on its credibility, companies can decide on whether and how to respond to 
negative eWOM depending on the degree to which consumers have adopted its message. 
Against this background, we first examine how negative eWOM affects other consum-
ers’ perceptions of and behavior toward the brand, i.e., their perceived service quality, attitude 
toward the brand, and purchase intention and to what degree an organizational response to it 
can mitigate its potential adverse effects on consumers. By drawing on impression formation 
and attribution theory, we then investigate which response strategy is adequate depending on 
the credibility of the negative eWOM. Based on a large-scale online experiment where we 
confront consumers with positive and negative online reviews, we subsequently report empiri-
cal findings on the effects of negative eWOM on other consumers and how organizational re-
sponses can buffer these effects depending on the credibility of the negative eWOM. Thereby, 
this study contributes to the literature on the response effectiveness to negative eWOM as 
well as to impression formation and attribution theory and derives important implications for 





Conceptual Foundation and Hypotheses 
The Effect of Negative eWOM on Consumers’ Perception of and Behavior toward the 
Brand 
In the last years, eWOM information has gained a prominent role in influencing customers’ 
attitude and purchase decision, especially for service products (e.g., Sparks, So, and Bradley 
2016; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). According to Litvin, Goldsmith, and Pan (2008), (e)WOM re-
flects the most important information source when consumers make a purchase decision. Gen-
erally, (e)WOM is perceived as a trustworthy source of information and consumers value 
(e)WOM stronger than company communication (Chiou and Cheng 2003; Dickinger 2011; 
Park, Lee, and Han 2007; Senecal and Nantel 2004). In addition to the high trustworthiness of 
eWOM, it reduces consumers’ search time and risks in a buying decision (Dickinger 2011; 
Hennig-Thurau and Walsh 2003; Kim, Mattila, and Baloglu 2011). Compared to other 
sources such as magazines or television, eWOM is easily and usually freely accessible which 
decreases search costs (Klein 1998; Papathanassis and Knolle 2011; Xiang and Gretzel 2010). 
Furthermore, due to the intangibility of services and the difficulty of their evaluation prior to 
consumption, experience reports of other customers about a service can serve as a substitute 
of consumers’ own experiences, thereby reducing the risk in the buying decision (Litvin, 
Goldsmith, and Pan 2008).  
The impact of eWOM on other consumers’ purchase intention and companies’ sales 
has increasingly gained attention in recent research (e.g., Chang et al. 2015; Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006; Serra Cantallops and Salvi 2014; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). For example, prior 
research has shown that positive eWOM increased sales, whereas the opposite was true for 
negative eWOM (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). However, there is rarely only positive or only 
negative eWOM about a product or service available. Mostly, consumers are confronted with 





attribution theory, individuals are naïve scientists who try to find explanations for the behav-
ior of others (e.g., why does a consumer engage in negative eWOM?). Thereby, attribution 
refers to the inference of the reason why a behavior occurred (Kelley and Michela 1980). In a 
service context, attribution theory predicts that the perceived cause of a service failure influ-
ences how a consumer responds (Folkes 1984). Thereby, it is not necessarily the knowledge 
that the product or service failed that predicts the behavior, but rather why it failed. In Hei-
der’s (1958) attribution theory, he distinguishes between internal and external attribution of 
cause. Internal attribution refers to a cause for the behavior that is due to the individual, his or 
her personality, or opinion and external attribution is due to the environment or situation. In 
our context of negative and positive eWOM, a consumer may wonder whether the negative 
eWOM is really due to a service failure (external attribution) or due to the person who re-
viewed the product or service (internal attribution) (see also Gelbrich 2010).  
An important construct that influences this attribution process is consensus. In the con-
text of eWOM, consensus refers to the extent to which consumers agree on the performance 
of a product or service (Doh and Hwang 2008). High consensus among consumers who re-
view a product or service implies that their reviews share the same valence, i.e., positive or 
negative (Lee and Cranage 2012). According to Kelley’s covariation model from attribution 
theory in social psychology (1967), consensus influences the attribution of cause, especially 
whether it is attributed internally or externally. A high consensus thereby leads to an external 
attribution (it is not due to the consumer who reviewed the product or service because all or 
most people agree, therefore, the failure must have been due to the company’s behavior) and a 
low consensus to an internal attribution (the opinion of the reviewer is not in line with others, 
therefore, it must be due to personal characteristics). In case of only few negative and a ma-
jority of positive eWOM, consensus for the negative eWOM would be low and, consequently, 





majority of negative and only few positive eWOM, the causes for the negative eWOM would 
be attributed externally (see also Folkes and Kotsos 1986). Prior research has found that when 
the cause is attributed to the brand (here: company), brand evaluations decreased whereas 
when the cause was attributed to the communicator (here: author of the negative eWOM), 
brand evaluations increased (Laczniak, DeCarlo, and Ramaswami 2001).  
Furthermore, existing research on impression formation theory has provided empirical 
evidence for a negativity effect, i.e., that negative information is stronger weighted than posi-
tive information in the formation of overall evaluations (e.g., Ahluwalia 2002). A widely ac-
cepted explanation for this effect lays in the perceived diagnosticity of information (Herr, 
Kardes, and Kim 1991). If a piece of information allows the consumer to assign a product to 
one particular cognitive category, it is seen as diagnostic. In contrast, information that allows 
for an assignment to multiple categories is ambiguous or nondiagnostic. Whereas positive in-
formation allows a categorization to high-, average-, and low-quality products (especially if it 
is only moderately positive), negative information is seen as more diagnostic because it al-
lows categorizing a product or service to lower quality products (Skowronski and Carlston 
1987). Consequently, we assume that with a minority of negative and a majority of moder-
ately positive eWOM, the moderately positive eWOM is perceived as nondiagnostic and dis-
counted. Therefore, the consensus for the negative eWOM should increase and lead to an ex-
ternal attribution of the blame, decreasing the brand evaluations (here: attitude toward the 
brand and perceived service quality) as well as subsequent purchase intentions of other con-
sumers. Therefore, we suggest: 
H1: A minority of negative eWOM in combination with a majority of moderately posi-
tive eWOM negatively affects a company’s performance by decreasing consumers’ (a) 
perceived service quality, (b) attitude toward the brand, and (c) purchase intention 





Effectiveness of Organizational Responses 
Due to the adverse effects of negative eWOM on other consumers’ brand evaluation and pur-
chasing behavior, the knowledge of whether and how to respond to negative eWOM is critical 
for companies. When looking at responses in a buyer-seller context, such responses have typi-
cally been examined in case of service failures followed by recovery efforts such as apologies, 
refunds, or free products or services (Keller 1993; Kelley, Hoffman, and Davis 1993). 
Thereby, the recovery efforts target the immediate customer who experienced the service fail-
ure. However, in the context of eWOM, response strategies should not only focus on the dis-
satisfied customer (i.e., the author of the negative eWOM) but also on the general public be-
cause eWOM is usually accessible for everyone (Klein 1998; Xiang and Gretzel 2010) and 
may have an effect on their brand evaluation and purchase intention. Correspondingly, re-
search on the response effectiveness of eWOM is often based on responses from crisis com-
munication management (Chang et al. 2015; Lee and Song 2010), which refers to the sym-
bolic resources managers invest to protect or repair the organizational image (Coombs 1998). 
Response strategies in crisis communication typically distinguish between accommodative 
and defensive response strategies (Coombs 1998, 2007; Marcus and Goodman 1991). With 
accommodative responses, organizations admit the existence of a problem, accept responsibil-
ity, or take measures to improve the situation (Marcus and Goodman 1991). In contrast, de-
fensive responses deny the existence of a problem or try to deny responsibility (Coombs 
1998). 
Prior research on negative eWOM has shown that companies should respond in any 
case (accommodative or defensive) to negative eWOM and regard their response as an oppor-
tunity to provide (prepurchase) signals about their quality to other consumers (Sandes and Ur-
dan 2013; Sparks, So, and Bradley 2016). The underlying logic here may be found in the in-





service quality whereas the buyer often cannot fully judge its quality, especially in case of ser-
vice goods (Boulding and Kirmani 1993). An organizational response to eWOM conveys fur-
ther information about the company, its staff, and their customer treatment, reducing the in-
formation asymmetry (Slater and Rouner 1996). Thus, by providing a response to negative 
eWOM, the company increases the quality perceptions of other consumers and may reduce 
the severity of the negative eWOM, weakening the negativity effect. Thereby, the company’s 
response creates a stronger consensus for the moderately positive eWOM, leading to an inter-
nal blame attribution of the problems described in the negative eWOM. Therefore, by provid-
ing a response, the company should decrease the effect of the negative eWOM on consumers’ 
brand evaluation. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2: A response to negative eWOM by the company (accommodative or defensive) has a 
positive effect on consumers’ (a) perceived service quality and (b) attitude toward the 
brand compared to no response by the company. 
A widely accepted relation in research on the consequences of attitude formation is 
that attitudes influence behavior (Ajzen 2001; Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Fazio, Powell, and 
Williams 1989). As a behavioral measure, consumers’ purchase intention can be regarded as a 
proxy for their actual behavior that has an impact on companies’ sales. Thus, we assume that 
consumers’ brand evaluation influence their subsequent purchase intention and suggest: 
H3: A response to negative eWOM by the company (accommodative or defensive) has a 
positive effect on consumers’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand 






The Moderating Role of Message Credibility  
Although we expect an organizational response to have a positive effect on consumers’ brand 
evaluation and purchase intention compared to no response, this effect may differ depending 
on which response strategy is chosen. An accommodative response is usually used to regain a 
favorable impression of the organization and to mitigate the severity of a problem (Lee and 
Cranage 2012). However, by accepting that a problem has occurred (as claimed in negative 
eWOM), an accommodative response may increase the consensus for the negative eWOM. 
Consequently, an accommodative response may favor an external attribution of the problems 
mentioned in the negative eWOM. On the other hand, a defensive response has been shown to 
be negatively related to firm reputation (Chang et al. 2015). However, by denying that there is 
a problem, a defensive response decreases the consensus for the negative eWOM and may in-
crease the consensus for the moderately positive eWOM. Thereby, a defensive response may 
favor an internal attribution of the problems proclaimed in the negative eWOM. In this case, a 
defensive response may lead to more positive outcomes (i.e., a higher brand evaluation and 
purchase intention) than an accommodative response. Indeed, prior research observed that in 
case of weak consensus for negative (e)WOM, a defensive response may be more effective to 
lessen organizational blame than an accommodative response (Lee and Cranage 2012). 
However, which response strategy is adequate in a given situation may not only de-
pend on the valence and proportion of eWOM but also on other factors such as the credibility 
of eWOM. Credibility has previously been defined as “believability or the characteristic that 
makes people believe and trust someone or something” (Cheung, Sia, and Kuan 2012, p. 619). 
Accordingly, prior research on information adoption reported that consumers adopt infor-
mation they regard as credible, influencing their subsequent behavior (Cheung, Sia, and Kuan 





mation they see as little credible as less persuasive, having less of an influence on their subse-
quent behavior (e.g., Ajzen, Brown, and Rosenthal 1996, Jain and Posavac 2001). As such, 
the credibility of eWOM cannot only influence consumers’ brand evaluation but also their 
subsequent behavior.  
With regard to the credibility of eWOM, the credibility of its messages is based on an 
interaction of source credibility, message characteristics (e.g., message quality), and receiver 
characteristics (e.g., product experience) (Cheung, Sia, and Kuan 2012; Wathen and Burkell 
2002). Thereby, source credibility comprises the two sub-dimensions expertness which refers 
to “the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions” and 
trustworthiness which has previously been defined as “the degree of confidence in the com-
municator’s intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid” (Hovland, Janis, 
and Kelley 1953, p. 21). Due to the anonymous environment of the Internet, source credibility 
of eWOM is often difficult to judge (Metzger 2007) and authenticity of eWOM doubtful 
(Chang et al. 2015). Such concerns regarding the (source) credibility of eWOM have in-
creased with opinion spamming where fake reviews are written in order to promote some enti-
ties (e.g., products or services) or to damage the reputation of competitors (Mukherjee, Liu, 
and Glance 2012). With only few clues about expertness and trustworthiness of the source of 
eWOM available, message characteristics such as the message quality (e.g., argument 
strength, writing style) deliver important clues about the author of the message and, therefore, 
influence the source and message credibility (Luo et al. 2013).  
With regard to the impact of eWOM credibility, source credibility has been shown to 
influence the weighting of contradictory information (e.g., when positive and negative infor-
mation is available) (Rosenbaum and Levin 1968). More specifically, information from a 
source with high credibility is weighted stronger than information of a source with low credi-





Posavac 2001). As such, credibility may affect the negativity and, consequently, the consen-
sus effect. Based on these prior research findings, we can assume that when negative eWOM 
is of low credibility, (moderately) positive eWOM may be seen as more persuasive, decreas-
ing the negativity effect (Skowronski and Carlston 1987). In this case, the consensus for the 
moderately positive eWOM is higher and, therefore, the blame for the experience as described 
in the negative eWOM with low credibility should be internally attributed, weakening its neg-
ative effect on other consumers. On the other hand, for negative eWOM with high credibility, 
the negativity effect persists and, consequently, the moderately positive eWOM is again per-
ceived as nondiagnostic and, therefore, discounted. As a consequence, the blame for the nega-
tive eWOM with high credibility should be attributed externally. 
Consequently, for negative eWOM with low credibility, the company may use a de-
fensive response that denies the existence of the problem because the blame for the negative 
experience proclaimed in the negative eWOM is attributed internally. Therefore, consumers’ 
brand evaluation should not decrease as a result of the negative eWOM commented with a de-
fensive response (see also DeCarlo et al. 2007; Laczniak, DeCarlo, and Ramaswami 2001). In 
contrast, an accommodative response that admits the existence of a problem or accepts re-
sponsibility might increase the persuasiveness of and the consensus for the negative eWOM 
with low credibility, making an external attribution more probable. Consequently, consumers’ 
brand evaluation should be less favorable with an accommodative response to negative 
eWOM with low credibility than a defensive response.  
On the other hand, when the credibility of the negative eWOM is high, its blame 
should be attributed externally. In this case, a defensive organizational response which denies 
the existence of the problem or denies its responsibility may fail to decrease the consensus for 
the negative eWOM to favor an internal attribution due to the negativity effect. Then again, an 





responsibility increases the consensus for the negative eWOM and supports an external attrib-
ution. Therefore, whether an accommodative or a defensive response is chosen should not af-
fect consumers’ brand evaluation because the blame should be externally attributed in both 
cases. Thus, we suggest: 
H4: A defensive (vs. accommodative) organizational response to negative eWOM in-
creases consumers’ (a) perceived service quality and (b) attitude toward the brand when 
credibility of the negative eWOM is low but not when it is high. 
As individuals’ attitude influence their subsequent behavior (Ajzen 2001; Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1977; Fazio, Powell, and Williams 1989), we again assume that in our context con-
sumers’ brand evaluation will affect their purchase intention. More specifically, we hypothe-
size: 
H5: A defensive (vs. accommodative) organizational response to negative eWOM increases 
consumers’ (a) perceived service quality and (b) attitude toward the brand when credibility 
of the negative eWOM is low but not when it is high and consumers’ perceived service 
quality and attitude toward the brand in turn increase their purchase intention.  
Method 
To test the proposed hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment with a 3 (organizational 
response to a negative review: accommodative, defensive, or no response) × 2 (message cred-
ibility of the negative review: high vs. low) between-subjects design. We also included a con-
trol group with no negative review (and also no organizational response). Participants were 
recruited through different channels, i.e., social networks, Google Adwords, and an e-mail 
newsletter. As our experiment was based on fictitious online reviews of a virtual opinion plat-





ing” and a comment section), this sampling procedure assured that only Internet savvy cus-
tomers participated in our experiment. Unless indicated otherwise, we used seven-point Likert 
scales ranging from 1 = “completely disagree” to 7 = “completely agree” for all measures in 
this study.  
Participants and Stimuli 
Eight hundred participants (40.9% female; Mage = 37) from Switzerland, Germany, and Aus-
tria completed the online experiment. The participant sample was involved in hotel accommo-
dation (product involvement: M = 5.054, SD = 1.357, high self-reported product category pur-
chase experience). Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven scenarios with each 
of them containing three sections. The first section contained some general information about 
a fictitious hotel named Hotel Zentrum. Besides the hotel description, section one contained 
two moderately positive reviews of the hotel, one 3-star and one 4-star review. To the control 
group, only this basic scenario was shown. In section 2, we manipulated the credibility of the 
negative review by adding a negative 1-star review with high or low credibility to the two 
positive reviews of the basic scenario. In the comment section of the negative review, both 
source and message characteristics were varied to manipulate message credibility (Wathen 
and Burkell 2002). To affect source credibility, we manipulated both trustworthiness through 
a rating of the reviewer by other users (high: 4.6 / 5; low: 2.1 / 5) and expertness by showing 
how many reviews the author had already written (high: 15; low: 2) (see also Hovland, Janis, 
and Kelley 1953). With regard to message characteristics, the highly credible review was well 
written and well structured. In contrast, the little credible review featured a basic language 
with several spelling mistakes and some vulgar expressions. To eliminate content-related ef-
fects such as the influence of argument quality on information processing (e.g., Cheung, Sia, 
and Kuan 2012; Sussman and Siegal 2003), in both reviews the same points were criticized. 





either showing an accommodative, defensive, or no response. To ensure that responses only 
differed in terms of being accommodative or defensive, we provided the same arguments for 
the negative experience described in the negative review. Based on the conceptualization of 
Marcus and Goodman (1991) and Coombs (1998, 2007), the accommodative response pro-
vided an apology and expressed concern for the customer. In addition, it acknowledged re-
sponsibility, explained the experienced service failure, and described measures to improve 
service in the future. On the other hand, the defensive response denied the existence of a prob-
lem and responsibility thereof and described the experience from the hotel’s point of view 
(see also Chang et al. 2015) (see Appendix A for the scenarios).  
Pretest 
To ensure that the negative review differed in terms of credibility and the responses with re-
gard to being accommodative versus defensive, we conducted a pretest among 75 of our stu-
dents in business administration. Each student was presented with a negative review of low or 
high credibility and an accommodative or defensive response. The accommodative response 
should be stronger perceived as being an apology than a denial but both responses should not 
differ in terms of credibility. The negative review and organizational responses were then re-
vised according to the students’ feedback in order to fit the desired manipulation. 
Measures 
In our main experiment, after participants read the scenarios, they first had to respond to the 
manipulation checks. We measured the credibility of the negative review with the item “the 
information in this review is credible” and the perceived difference between the accommoda-
tive and defensive response with the item “the hotel has apologized.” After the measures for 





three-item scale of Taylor and Baker (e.g., “Overall, I consider the hotel’s services to be ex-
cellent,” Cronbach’s α = .745; 1994), their attitude toward the brand with a five-item seven-
point semantic differential scale adapted from Menon, Jewell, and Unnava (e.g., “bad / good”, 
Cronbach’s α = .940; 1999), and their purchase intention with a three-item scale adapted from 
Baker and Churchill (e.g., “Would you book this hotel if it was suggested to you by a travel 
agency?,” Cronbach’s α = .858; 1977) ranging from 1 = “definitely not” to 7 = “yes, defi-
nitely.”  
Subsequently, we measured control variables to account for other factors that may have 
an impact on participants’ perceived service quality, attitude toward the brand, and purchase 
intention, besides our independent and moderating variables. As consumers’ cognitive state at 
the time of evaluation (see Metzger 2007) as well as reviewer characteristics (Wathen and 
Burkell 2002) affect their assessment of the message presentation and content, we measured 
participants’ product involvement with the three-item scale from Chandrashekaran (e.g., “I am 
particularly interested in hotel accommodation,” Cronbach’s α = .794; 2004) and their product 
category purchase experience with the item “How often do you book a hotel accommodation?” 
adapted from Yoo and Donthu (2001) on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “never” to 
5 = “very often.” Also, we measured the personal importance of a user review, for which we 
developed four items (e.g., “I do not buy important and expensive products without reading 
user reviews first,” Cronbach’s α = .872). In addition, we assessed consumers’ quality con-
sciousness which is defined as “orientation characterized by the degree to which a consumer 
searches for the best quality in products” (Shim and Gehrt 1996, p. 314) with the four-item 
scale from Shim and Gehrt (e.g., “Getting very good quality is very important to me,” 
Cronbach’s α = .875; 1996) and price consciousness which is defined as a “consumer’s reluc-
tance to pay for the distinguishing features of a product if the price difference for these features 





“I tend to book the lowest-priced hotel that fits my needs,” Cronbach’s α = .837; 1999). Finally, 
we asked participants to indicate their gender, age, and education (see Table B.1 in Appendix 
B for all items of this study). As prior research has shown that product-related features such as 
brand or price (e.g., Metzger 2007; Sinha and Batra 1999) and situational factors (e.g., date of 
the review; Sparks, So, and Bradley 2016) may also have an effect on participants’ evaluation 
of products, we omitted such product-related and situational information or used a fictitious 
brand name respectively in our experiment. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
We conducted one-way independent analyses of variance to test if the experimental factors 
varied as intended. Subjects in the highly credible review condition reported significantly 
higher scores on the measured credibility item (M = 4.411, SE = .083) than in the condition 
with low credibility (M = 2.804, SE = .076, F(1, 674) = 205.364, p < .001). The score on the 
apology response measure was significantly higher for the accommodative response (M = 
5.748, SE = .102) than for the defensive response (M = 3.248, SE = .124, F(1, 400) = 
241.181, p < .001). Also, the two responses did not significantly differ in credibility (Maccom-
modative = 4.589, SEaccommodative = .103, Mdefensive = 4.822, SEdefensive = .098, F(1, 420) = 2.681, p 
= .102). 
The Effect of Negative eWOM on Consumers’ Perception of and Behavior toward the 
Brand – The Baseline Effect 
We conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with the control variables 
as covariates to test the baseline effect of the negative review (without an organizational re-





brand, and purchase intention. Using Pillai-Bartlett’s trace statistic, we found a significant ef-
fect of the negative review on the dependent variables (V = .118, F(3, 363) = 16.264, p < 
.001) (see Table B.2 in the Appendix B). Those participants who were exposed to the negative 
review (without a response by the company) reported significantly lower levels of perceived 
service quality (EMM = 3.775), brand attitude (EMM = 3.674), and purchase intention (EMM 
= 3.464) than those who were not exposed to a negative review (i.e., the control group) 
(EMMperceived service quality = 4.269, EMMbrand attitude = 4.561, EMMpurchase intention = 4.248; see Fig-
ure 1). Among the control variables, quality and price consciousness had a significant effect 
on the dependent variables. However, results did not change, whether or not we included the 
control variables into the analysis. Thus, despite the low consensus for negative eWOM, it 
had a negative effect on consumers’ perceived service quality, their attitude toward the brand, 
and their purchase intention, providing evidence for hypotheses H1a-c.  
FIGURE 1 
The Baseline Effect of a Negative Review on Consumers’ Perceived Service Quality, At-
titude toward the Brand, and Purchase Intention 
 
Effectiveness of Organizational Responses to Negative eWOM 





























an organizational response on perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand compared 
to no organizational response. Using Pillai-Bartlett’s trace statistic, we found a significant effect 
of the organizational responses on our dependent variables (V = .065, F(4, 1,336) = 11.227, p 
< .001) (see Table B.2 in Appendix B). A simple contrast analysis with the “no response”-
condition as reference category revealed that participants’ perceived service quality and attitude 
toward the brand differed significantly for those who received an accommodative or defensive 
response compared to those who received no response (ps < .01). For consumers’ perceived 
service quality, both an accommodative (EMM = 4.111) and a defensive response (EMM = 
4.271) generated significantly higher scores than no organizational response (EMM = 3.784). 
A repeated contrast analysis revealed no significant difference between the accommodative and 
the defensive response strategies on perceived service quality (p = .144). The same pattern was 
found for participants’ attitude toward the brand (EMMaccommodative = 4.277; EMMdefensive = 
4.434; EMMno response = 3.700; difference between accommodative and defensive response: p = 
.201) (see Figure 2). Among the control variables, price consciousness, review importance, and 
age had a significant effect on consumers’ perceived service quality and brand attitude. How-
ever, results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis. 
These results show that an organizational response (accommodative or defensive) to negative 
eWOM leads to a higher perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand of consumers 






The Effect of an Organizational Response on Consumers’ Perceived Service Quality and 
Attitude toward the Brand 
 
A mediation analysis using ordinary least squares path analysis with PROCESS model 
4 (bootstrapping of 10,000 samples; Hayes 2013) was conducted to examine whether the effect 
of an organizational response on purchase intention was mediated by consumers’ perceived 
service quality and attitude toward the brand. As the organizational response variable was mul-
ticategorical, two dummy variables were coded using indicator codes (X1: no response = 0, 
accommodative = 1, defensive = 0; X2: no response = 0, accommodative = 0, defensive = 1). 
The control variables were included as covariates into the analysis. As can be seen in Table B.3 
in Appendix B, relative to no response by the company, an accommodative (a1 = .327) and a 
defensive response (a3 = .487) increased consumers’ perceived service quality and consumers 
who perceived a higher service quality reported a higher purchase intention (b1 = .406). A bias-
corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval (CI) for the indirect effect of the accommodative 
response relative to no response (a1b1 = .133) was entirely above zero (.0443, .2435). The same 
result was found for the defensive response (a3b1 = .198, 95% CI = [.0972, .3252]). Similarly, 




























(a4 = .733) increased consumers’ attitude toward the brand and consumers who had a more 
positive attitude toward the brand reported a higher purchase intention (b2 = .607). A bias-
corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of the accommodative re-
sponse relative to no response (a2b2 = .350) was again entirely above zero (.1961, .5317). The 
same result was found for the defensive response (a4b2 = .445, 95% CI = [.2849, .6232]). Coun-
terintuitively, independent of participants’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the 
brand, receiving an accommodative response relative to no response decreased participants pur-
chase intention (c1′ = −.321, p < .01) and the same results were found for a defensive response 
(c2′ = −.254, p < .01). Among the control variables, price consciousness had a significant effect 
on consumers’ perceived service quality, review importance, price consciousness, and age on 
their attitude toward the brand, and product involvement on their purchase intention. However, 
results did not change, whether or not we included the control variables into the analysis. Thus, 
our results show that an organizational response (accommodative or defensive) versus no re-
sponse increases consumers’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand which in 
turn increase consumers’ purchase intention, providing evidence for hypothesis H3.  
The Moderating Effect of Message Credibility on the Effectiveness of a Defensive versus 
Accommodative Organizational Response Strategy 
We conducted moderation analyses using ordinary least squares path analysis with PROCESS 
model 1 (Hayes 2013) to probe how the response by the company (0 = accommodative, 1 = 
defensive) affects consumers’ perceived service quality and their attitude toward the brand de-
pending on the credibility of the negative review (0 = low credibility, 1 = high credibility), in-
cluding control variables as covariates.  
Perceived service quality. We found a significant interaction effect of organizational 





.494, SE = .217, t(421) = – 2.277, p < .05) (see Table B.4 in Appendix B). A spotlight analy-
sis which probes the moderation at the two levels of the moderator (i.e., 0 = low credibility 
and 1 = high credibility) revealed that a defensive (vs. accommodative) organizational re-
sponse only increased those consumers’ perceived service quality who were shown the review 
of low credibility (θ(X→Y)|M = 0 = .394, p < .01) but not those who were shown the review of 
high credibility (θ(X→Y)|M = 1 = –.100, p = .552) (see Figure 3). Among the control variables, 
age had a significant effect on consumers’ perceived service quality. When we excluded the 
control variables, the interaction effect for perceived service quality was only significant at 
the 7% level (b3 = – .398, SE = .214, t(423) = – 1.861, p = .063). 
FIGURE 3 
The Moderating Effect of Review Credibility on the Impact of Organizational Response 
on Consumers’ Perceived Service Quality 
 
Attitude toward the brand. We also found a significant interaction effect of organiza-
tional responses with the credibility of the negative review on consumers’ attitude toward the 
































plying a spotlight analysis, we again found that a defensive (vs. accommodative) organiza-
tional response only increased consumers’ attitude toward the brand for those consumers who 
were shown the review of low credibility (θ(X→Y)|M = 0 = .417, p < .05) but not among those 
who were shown the review of high credibility (θ(X→Y)|M= 1 = –.138, p = .452) (see Figure 4). 
Among the control variables, review importance, price consciousness, gender, and age had a 
significant effect on consumers’ attitude toward the brand. When we excluded the control var-
iables, the interaction effect for brand attitude was not significant anymore (b3 = –.410, SE = 
.250, t(423) = –1.639, p = .102). 
FIGURE 4 
The Moderating Effect of Review Credibility on the Impact of Organizational Response 
on Consumers’ Attitude toward the Brand 
 
Thus, when including control variables, our results show that a defensive response 
leads to a higher perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand than an accommoda-
































high, the choice of response strategy (accommodative vs. defensive) does not significantly af-
fect consumers’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand, providing some evi-
dence for hypotheses H4a and H4b.  
We conducted a conditional mediation analysis using PROCESS model 7 (bootstrap-
ping of 10,000 samples; Hayes 2013, 2015) with perceived service quality and attitude toward 
the brand as parallel mediators, organizational response as independent variable (0 = accom-
modative, 1 = defensive), and purchase intention as dependent variable. The review credibil-
ity (0 = low credibility, 1 = high credibility) served as moderator of the organizational re-
sponse on consumers’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand and the control 
variables as covariates. This analysis revealed a significant moderated mediation (index of 
moderated mediationperceived service quality = −.231, index of moderated mediationattitude toward the brand 
= −.298) where the bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence intervals did not include zero 
(CIperceived service quality = [−.4572, −.0358], CIattitude toward the brand = [−.5854, −.0439]) (see Table 
B.6 in Appendix B). A defensive (vs. accommodative) organizational response only increased 
consumers’ perceived service quality among those who were shown the negative review of 
low credibility which in turn increased their purchase intention (θ(X→M→Y)|M= 0 = .184, 95% CI 
= [.0557, .3360]) but not among those who received the negative review of high credibility 
(θ(X→M→Y)|M= 1 = −.047, 95% CI = [−.2042, .1089]). Similarly, a defensive (vs. accommoda-
tive) organizational response increased consumers’ attitude toward the brand only among 
those who were shown the negative review of low credibility which in turn increased their 
purchase intention (θ(X→M→Y)|M= 0 = .223, [.0542, .4200]) but not among those who received 
the negative review of high credibility (θ(X→M→Y)|M= 1 = −.074, [−.2773, .1129]). Independent 
of participants’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand, receiving a defensive 





tention (c1′ = .071, p = .479). Among the control variables, age had a significant effect on per-
ceived service quality, price consciousness, review importance, gender, and age on attitude 
toward the brand, and product involvement on purchase intention. When the control variables 
were excluded, the moderated mediation was not significant anymore (index of moderated 
mediationperceived service quality = −.188, 95% CI = [−.4113, .0098], index of moderated media-
tionbrand attitude = −.218, 95% CI = [−.4972, .0405]). Therefore, when control variables are in-
cluded, we find that a defensive vs. an accommodative response increases consumers’ per-
ceived service quality and attitude toward the brand which in turn increase purchase intention 
only when credibility of the negative review is low but not when it is high, providing some 
evidence for hypothesis H5. 
The fact that our moderation effects were only significant under inclusion of control 
variables means that our control variables, especially participants’ gender, age, review im-
portance, and price consciousness play an important role in explaining our dependent varia-
bles. However, these control variables are all related to the individual whom the company 
cannot influence. Therefore, our moderation effect is highly relevant because it shows that a 
company can increase consumers’ perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand by 
an adequate response above the effect that our control variables (related to the individual) 
have on the dependent variables.  
Discussion 
This study examines how negative eWOM and different organizational response strategies 
(accommodative, defensive, no response) to it affect other consumers’ brand evaluation (i.e., 
perceived service quality and attitude toward the brand) and purchase intention in a situation 
with a majority of moderately positive and a minority of negative eWOM. Thereby, it takes 





organizational response strategy to such negative eWOM depends on its credibility. Our re-
sults confirm that negative eWOM can damage the company by decreasing consumers’ brand 
evaluation and purchase intention (even though a minority of negative and a majority of mod-
erately positive eWOM were presented to consumers). In addition, our study also shows that 
companies can decrease this damage by providing a response to the negative eWOM. 
Thereby, the credibility of the negative eWOM determines which response strategy is ade-
quate. More specifically, we find that when credibility of the negative eWOM is high, the 
choice of response strategy does not affect consumers’ brand evaluation and subsequent pur-
chase intention. However, when credibility of the negative eWOM is low, companies should 
choose a defensive rather than an accommodative response to best decrease its damage. 
Academic Implications and Further Research 
This article makes important contributions to existing literature: First, our study provides em-
pirical evidence that when a majority of moderately positive and a minority of negative 
eWOM is available, negative eWOM nevertheless negatively affects other consumers’ brand 
evaluation and purchase intention. These findings indicate that the negativity effect overruled 
the consensus effect to some degree, i.e., even though there was a higher consensus among 
reviewers for the positive eWOM, the negative eWOM still negatively affected consumers’ 
brand evaluation and purchase intention. Thereby, we contribute to the literature on eWOM 
by providing additional empirical evidence that negative eWOM can negatively affect compa-
nies (Chang et al. 2015; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009), even when more moderately positive than 
negative eWOM is available. Furthermore, prior research has already examined the consensus 
effect (Kelley 1967) and the negativity bias (e.g., Ahluwalia 2002) separately but, to the best 
of our knowledge, not its interaction. With our initial evidence that the negativity effect over-
ruled the consensus effect to some degree, we also contribute to theories of attribution and im-





of this interplay by examining different proportions of positive and negative eWOM com-
bined with different levels of credibility.  
Second, our empirical study shows that an organizational response (accommodative or 
defensive) compared to no response increases consumers’ brand evaluation which in turn in-
crease their purchase intention. With these findings, we contribute to the literature on eWOM 
and response effectiveness (Chang et al. 2015; Lee and Cranage 2012; Lee and Song 2010) in 
that we show that an organizational response can indeed decrease the damage of negative 
eWOM by increasing consumers’ brand evaluation and subsequent purchase intention (indi-
rectly via their brand evaluation) compared to no response. 
Surprisingly, in our study, the relative direct effects of an accommodative and a defen-
sive response compared to no organizational response on consumers’ purchase intention were 
negative. A possible explanation for these findings could be the potential impact of platform 
type. Prior research has found that organizational responses to negative eWOM were evalu-
ated less favorably in consumer-generated platforms such as review sites or consumer blogs 
than in brand-generated platforms such as brand-generated blogs (Van Noort and Willemsen 
2012). On consumer-generated platforms, consumers may perceive the company’s response 
as intrusive because their presence is unsolicited (Fournier and Avery 2011). In our experi-
ment, the negative eWOM as well as the organizational response were posted on a fictitious 
virtual opinion platform which may be considered as a consumer-generated platform by con-
sumers. Therefore, consumers did not expect a response by the company and may have con-
sidered it as intrusive, decreasing their purchase intention for the brand. An alternative expla-
nation may lie in consumers’ risk aversion (Forsythe and Shi 2003). Due to the organizational 





negative eWOM because otherwise, the company would not make the effort to provide a re-
sponse. Due to consumers’ risk aversion of a negative purchase experience, they might not 
want to purchase products or services of that brand.  
These counterintuitive negative relative direct effects of organizational responses on 
consumers’ purchase intention indicate that consumers’ attitude toward the brand and per-
ceived service quality do not simply translate into behavior (here: purchase intention) (see 
also Ajzen 2001) but that for consumers’ purchase intention other additional mechanisms and 
factors (e.g., platform type, risk aversion) may be involved. Thus, these counterintuitive find-
ings open an interesting path for further research to examine and understand its underlying 
mechanisms. 
Third, when including control variables, our results showed that when credibility of 
the negative eWOM is low, a defensive response leads to a higher brand evaluation than an 
accommodative response. By contrast, when credibility is high, the choice of organizational 
response (accommodative vs. defensive) has no effect on consumers’ brand evaluation. In ad-
dition, we show that an organizational response (defensive vs. accommodative) influences 
consumers’ purchase intention via their brand evaluation and that this indirect effect is moder-
ated by the credibility of the negative eWOM. Therefore, organizational responses again not 
only affect consumers’ brand evaluation depending on the credibility of eWOM but also their 
purchase intention. By including credibility of eWOM into our analysis, we make an im-
portant contribution to existing literature on the effectiveness of organizational responses to 
eWOM. Prior research has already studied organizational responses by taking different factors 
into account such as the severity of the service failure (Chang et al. 2015), the company’s cul-
pability (Kim et al. 2004), and consensus for positive and negative eWOM (Lee and Cranage 
2012). However, so far the credibility of eWOM has not been examined in the context of or-





2015). Prior research has reported that credibility strongly influences information adoption of 
eWOM (e.g., whether the consumer learns from the eWOM and uses it; Cheung et al. 2009). 
Yet, credibility is often problematic in the context of eWOM due to the anonymity in the 
online environment. Therefore, it represents a highly relevant factor in the context of eWOM 
which further research should take into account when examining adequate response strategies 
to eWOM. 
Finally, our study also provides some evidence for the service recovery paradox in the 
context of responding to negative eWOM. We conducted another MANCOVA to compare the 
brand evaluation of the participants who were shown the negative review of low credibility 
commented with a defensive organizational response to the control group, including the con-
trol variables as covariates. Using Roy’s largest root, for the negative eWOM with low credi-
bility, a defensive response led to a significantly higher brand evaluation, i.e., perceived ser-
vice quality (EMM = 4.594, SE = .091) and attitude toward the brand (EMM = 4.764, SE = 
.098, Θ = .030, F(2, 220) = 3.266, p < .05), than when consumers were only confronted with 
moderately positive eWOM and no negative eWOM was presented (i.e., compared to the con-
trol group; EMMperceived service quality = 4.275, SEperceived service quality = .088, EMMbrand attitude = 
4.562, SEbrand attitude = .095). Thus, this study shows that the service recovery paradox could 
also be a valid concept in the context of negative eWOM (e.g., de Matos, Henrique, and Rossi 
2007). Thereby, our study further contributes to the literature on response effectiveness to 
negative eWOM by providing some initial evidence that an adequate response strategy can 
increase consumers’ brand evaluation above the initial level prior to the product or service 
failure.  
To determine the scope and boundaries of our observed effects, further research 





rant or a product such as a camera) and also empirically examine the processes by which or-
ganizational responses affect consumers depending on the credibility of eWOM. For example, 
a future study should measure the persuasiveness of negative (and positive) eWOM to deter-
mine the impact of the negativity bias on the effect of the response strategy on other consum-
ers in situations when credibility for eWOM is high or low. In addition to persuasiveness, 
consensus with others’ views of the reviewer’s opinion and subsequent blame attribution 
should also be measured to examine their interactions with the negativity bias. Such a pro-
ceeding would allow for a determination of whether the company’s responses increased (de-
creased) the consensus for positive (negative) eWOM, which in turn increased consumers’ 
brand evaluation through their blame attribution. Furthermore, prior research has suggested 
that distinctiveness and consistency of the communicator’s opinions or experiences interact 
with the consensus of others’ views of the brand (Kelley 1967; Laczniak, DeCarlo, and 
Ramaswami 2001). Further research should examine how these two factors affect consensus 
of others’ views of the company or brand.  
In addition, a future study could examine the distinct influence of source credibility 
and message characteristics on consumers’ brand evaluation and purchase intention. For ex-
ample, Luo and et al. (2013) found that the effect of information credibility on information 
adoption is moderated by source credibility. As such, examining both concepts separately 
could provide an interesting path for further research, allowing for a more detailed view on 
the effects of credibility on information adoption and subsequent response effectiveness.  
Overall, this article adds to a highly relevant yet understudied field of research. 
Whereas existing research focused on the impact of negative WOM, especially on its detri-
mental effect on companies’ sales (Chang et al. 2015; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009), research on ad-
equate response strategies to it has been scarce. There is considerable research on recovery ef-





the service failure and the customer who experienced it (e.g., Hess, Ganesan, and Klein 2003; 
Keller 1993; Kelley, Hoffman, and Davis 1993). Yet, the present setting is different from this 
dyad as it involves other consumers outside this dyad who read about the negative experience 
of another customer and possible organizational responses to it. Thereby, this paper takes a 
network perspective on all the potential customers who can be affected by the negative 
eWOM and subsequent organizational responses. The examination of organizational re-
sponses to negative eWOM provides a fruitful path for further research in lowering the detri-
mental impact of such communication. Furthermore, the study of adequate organizational re-
sponses could also be worthwhile in other research fields such as positive eWOM. For exam-
ple, can a company amplify the beneficiary impact of positive eWOM by thanking the re-
viewer for it? Other interesting research fields for the investigation of organizational re-
sponses include negative consumer behaviors such as customer revenge (Grégoire, Tripp, and 
Legoux 2009) or even more hostile forms of consumer aggression such as consumer brand 
sabotage (Kähr et al. 2016). 
Managerial Implications 
In the last 10 years, more and more virtual opinion platforms have emerged to help consumers 
decrease their search costs and reduce their risk of the buying decision (Dickinger 2011; Hen-
nig-Thurau and Walsh 2003; Kim, Mattila, and Baloglu 2011). At the same time, research has 
empirically shown that negative reviews on such virtual opinion platforms can significantly 
decrease company’s sales (Chang et al. 2015; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009). In the era of Web 2.0, 
dissatisfied customers can now significantly harm a company by engaging in negative 
eWOM. Against that background, our study provides important insights for managers on the 
damage of negative eWOM and how to respond to it. First, we replicate findings of prior re-
search on the adverse effects of negative eWOM on companies by showing that negative 





that companies can buffer these adverse effects of negative eWOM by actively responding to 
it. Furthermore, our findings also show that when responding to negative eWOM, companies 
need to take the credibility of negative eWOM into account. More specifically, while for 
highly credible negative eWOM the response strategy (i.e., accommodative or defensive) to 
negative eWOM does not affect consumers’ brand evaluation and subsequent purchase inten-
tion, for negative eWOM with low credibility, the company should respond by a defensive ra-
ther than an accommodative response.  
Whereas in previous research an accommodative response is generally regarded as in-
creasing customers’ trust and brand reputation (Lee and Cranage 2012), a defensive response 
is often seen as threat to the brand reputation (Chang et al. 2015). In this study, we show that 
an adequate response strategy also depends on situational factors such as the message credi-
bility of negative eWOM. Thus, our results not only suggest that companies can reduce the 
adverse effects of negative eWOM on consumers’ brand evaluation and purchase intention by 
providing a response to it but also that the adequacy of a company’s choice of response strat-
egy depends on the credibility of the negative eWOM. Therefore, we recommend managers to 
take a more contingency-based point of view when determining an adequate response strategy 
to negative eWOM. 
Additionally, our results provide initial evidence for a service recovery paradox when 
responding defensively to negative eWOM with low credibility. More specifically, consumers 
who were shown the negative eWOM of low credibility commented with a defensive organi-
zational response evaluated the company more favorably than consumers who were only 
shown moderately positive eWOM. Thus, by choosing an adequate response strategy to nega-
tive eWOM, managers can not only reduce its negative impact on the company’s sales but 
they can also use negative eWOM as an opportunity to raise consumers’ brand evaluation 
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Das Hotel Zentrum ist ein 3*-Hotel in zentraler Lage. Das Hotel verfügt über ein Res-
taurant, das Frühstück ist inbegriffen. Die 40 Zimmer auf 4 Stockwerken sind mit Dop-
pelbetten oder 2 Einzelbetten ausgestattet. Computer mit Internetzugang sind in der 
Lobby verfügbar. Ein Pool ist nicht vorhanden. 
 
 
Bewertungen von Reisenden 
 „Mit Abstrichen in Ordnung“  
Das Preis-Leistungsverhältnis ist gut, die Zimmer sind gross und sauber. 
Sehr zentral gelegen ist es auch, was mir ziemlich wichtig war. Weniger gut war das Essen, 
war für mich aber weniger wichtig da ich selten im Hotel gegessen habe. Die Angestellten 
sind nicht die Freundlichkeit in Person, ich hatte jedoch auch kein Problem mit ihnen. Ins-
gesamt knapp eine Empfehlung. 
 Anzahl Reviews des Autors:  8 
 Bewertung des Autors:  4.1 / 5
  
 
 „Ideal gelegen“  
Das Hotel ist wirklich ideal als Ausgangspunkt für die Erkundung der Stadt: Direkt neben 
dem Hotel befindet sich eine Metrostation mit verschiedenen Linien, alle wichtigen Sehens-
würdigkeiten sind somit schnell erreichbar. Auch zu Fuss gibt’s im Umkreis einiges zu ent-
decken! Mit dem Hotel bin ich auch zufrieden, die Zimmer waren gross und sauber und der 
Zimmerservice erledigte seinen Job gut. Das Hotel hält was es verspricht! 
 Anzahl Reviews des Autors:  9 







Negative Review of Low Credibility 
„Schlechtestes Hotel!!!“  
Dieses Hotel ist eine Katastrofe ich gehe nie mehr dorthin!!! Die haben uns behandelt wie 
Dreck!! Wir mussten ewig warten bis wir ein Zimmer bekamen aber sie haben sich nicht 
entschuldigt sondern gesagt ich könne sonst in dreckigem Zimmer wohnen wenn ich will!!! 
Die an der Rezeption ist sowieso sehr arogant und auch die anderen Angestelten sind nicht 
besser… Der schlechteste Service denn ich erlebt habe!! Ich wollte eine Stadtkarte aber  die 
gaben mir keine, unglaublich!! Die Zimmer sind schrott alle anderen Hotels wo ich gewesen 
bin sind viel besser!!! Das Essen ist auch scheuslich wir haben dann nur einmal im Hotel 
sonst immer im Restorant gegessen auch wenn wir im Hotel schon bezahlt haben. Ich habe 
euch gewahrnt geht nie in dieses Hotel, es gibt viel bessere Hotels!!! 
 Anzahl Reviews des Autors:  2 
 Bewertung des Autors:  2.1 / 5 
Negative Review of High Credibility 
„Miserabel“  
Ich war nun bereits zum 9. Mal in dieser Stadt in verschiedensten Hotels. Dieses hier war 
eine einzige Enttäuschung und das bisher schlechteste Hotel in der Gegend. Ich muss allen 
dringend davon abraten, hier zu übernachten.  
Zuerst zum Positiven: Gebucht habe ich dieses Hotel primär wegen der Lage, diese war 
dann auch ideal. Zudem sind die Zimmer einigermassen sauber. Das wars dann  leider schon 
mit den positiven Punkten. 
Die Zimmer machen einen stark heruntergekommenen und schmuddeligen Eindruck. Eine 
Renovation wäre hier längstens überfällig! Auch zur Küche gibt’s leider nichts Positives zu 
sagen. Die Qualität der Speisen ist schlicht schlecht. Obwohl ich das Hotel inklusive Früh-
stück gebucht habe, habe ich daraufhin nur einmal im Hotel gegessen…  
Die Krönung des Ganzen sind schliesslich der Service und die Umgangsformen der Ange-
stellten. Beim Einchecken mussten wir eine Stunde warten, bevor wir das Zimmer beziehen 
konnten. Statt sich zu entschuldigen, meinte die Rezeptionistin in arrogantem Tonfall, wir 
könnten ja ein schmutziges Zimmer beziehen, wenn uns dies nicht passe! Und als ob dies 
nicht genug gewesen wäre, verweigerte sie auch noch meinen Wunsch nach einer Stadt-
karte. Dass man als Gast so behandelt wird, habe ich noch nirgends erlebt! Auch die anderen 
Angestellten geben einem das Gefühl, in diesem Haus lediglich geduldet zu sein. 
Ich möchte mit diesem Review alle warnen, welche dieses Hotel in Betracht ziehen. Das 
Hotel ist sein Geld nicht wert, es gibt weitaus bessere Alternativen! 
 Anzahl Reviews des Autors:  15 






Organizational Response: Accommodative Response  
Managementantwort von Hotel Zentrum 
Vielen Dank für Ihr Review. Die negativen Erfahrungen, die Sie in unserem Hotel gemacht 
haben, tun uns leid. Wir sind den Schilderungen nachgegangen und werden Gegenmassnahmen 
ergreifen. Konkret möchten wir uns wie folgt äussern: 
− Die einstündige Wartezeit beim Check-In war eine Ausnahmesituation, welche der 
verspäteten Abreise der vorherigen Gäste geschuldet war. Wir werden die Zeitpla-
nung zukünftig anders handhaben, um solche Vorkommnisse zu vermeiden. 
− Die Umgangsformen der Rezeption und des übrigen Personals haben noch nie zu 
Beschwerden Anlass gegeben. Dennoch nehmen wir Ihre Kritik ernst. Wir sind uns 
bewusst, dass auch unsere Angestellten nicht unfehlbar sind und möchten uns für 
den Eindruck, den Sie von unserem Personal hatten, entschuldigen. Anlässlich der 
nächsten Personalschulung werden wir Ihren Fall behandeln und entsprechende 
Konsequenzen ziehen. 
− Vielen Dank für Ihr Feedback bezüglich Essensqualität. Wir bedauern, dass Ihnen 
unsere Küche nicht geschmeckt hat und nehmen dies als Anregung auf, uns weiter 
zu verbessern. Wir werden erst zufrieden sein, wenn es sämtliche Kunden auch sind. 
Dennoch möchten wir betonen, dass wir bezüglich unserer Küche fast ausschliess-
lich positive Reaktionen erhalten. 
Wir nehmen Ihre Kritik ernst, sie wurde bereits dem Top-Management und den betreffenden 
Angestellten weitergeleitet. Für Ihre negativen Erfahrungen möchten wir uns entschuldigen. Es 
würde uns freuen, Sie  bald wieder bei uns begrüssen zu dürfen, damit Sie sich von den Quali-
täten unseres Hotels  überzeugen können. 
Organizational Response: Defensive Response  
Managementantwort von Hotel Zentrum 
Vielen Dank für Ihr Review. Leider ist Ihr Bericht jedoch sehr subjektiv und enthält einige 
Halb- und Unwahrheiten. Um für Transparenz zu sorgen und unserer Informationspflicht unse-
ren Kunden gegenüber nachzukommen, möchten wir Ihren Bericht nach ausführlicher Recher-
che der geschilderten Vorfälle wie folgt kommentieren: 
− Es ist zwar korrekt, dass Sie eine Stunde bis zum Zimmerbezug warten mussten. 
Dies war jedoch nicht auf einen Fehler unsererseits zurückzuführen. Wie auf unserer 
Homepage vermerkt ist, können die Zimmer jeweils um 14.00 Uhr bezogen werden, 
um eine vorgängige Reinigung zu ermöglichen. Da Sie bereits um 13.00 Uhr ange-
reist sind, liess sich die Wartefrist leider nicht vermeiden. 
− Die Umgangsformen der Rezeption und des übrigen Personals haben bisher noch 
nie zu Beschwerden Anlass gegeben. Wir sind ein stark serviceorientiertes Unter-
nehmen und investieren viel in die Ausbildung unserer Mitarbeiter. In zahlreichen 
Gästefeedbacks wird die Freundlichkeit unserer Angestellten denn auch stets ge-
schätzt. Nach Rücksprache mit den betreffenden Angestellten gehen wir davon aus, 
dass die geschilderten Vorfälle nicht in dem geschilderten Ausmass stattgefunden 
haben können, sondern stark einseitig und überzeichnet wiedergegeben wurden. 
− Wir legen grossen Wert auf gute Küche und sind überzeugt, in unserem Preisseg-





dies regelmässig. Da Sie leider nur einmal bei uns gegessen haben, können Sie die 
Qualität unserer Speisen nur schlecht beurteilen. Dennoch bedauern wir natürlich, 
dass Sie mit unserer Küche nicht zufrieden waren. 
Wir hoffen, mit diesem Statement unsere Sicht der Dinge klar dargelegt zu haben. Die Beur-












Dependent Variables   
Perceived Service Quality  .745 
 
I believe that the general quality of the hotel’s services is low. a (r) b 
Overall, I consider the hotel’s services to be excellent. a 
The quality of the hotel’s services is generally 
poor / excellent c 
 
Attitude toward the Brand c  .940 
Instruction: Please rate Hotel 
Zentrum on the following 
scales.  
bad / good 
not trustworthy / trustworthy 
not likeable / likeable 
not customer-oriented / customer-oriented 
negative / positive 
 
Purchase Intention d  .858 
 
Would you like to visit this hotel? 
Would you book this hotel if offered by a travel agency? 
Would you actively seek out offers of this hotel to book it? 
 
Control Variables   
Product Involvement a  .794 
 
I am particularly interested in hotel accommodation. 
Given my personal interests, hotel accommodation is not very rele-
vant to me. (r) b 
Overall, I am quite involved when I am booking a hotel accommoda-
tion for personal use. 
 
Quality Consciousness a  .875 
 
Getting very good quality is very important to me. 
When it comes to purchasing products, I try to get the very best or 
perfect choice. 
In general, I usually try to buy the best overall quality. 
I make special effort to choose the very best quality products. 
 
Price Consciousness a  .837 
 
I tend to book the lowest-priced hotel that fits my needs. 
When booking a hotel, I look for the cheapest hotel available. 
When it comes to booking hotels, I rely heavily on price. 
Price is the most important factor when I am choosing a hotel. 
 
Review Importance a  .872 
 
I regularly read user reviews on important products. 
I do not buy important and expensive products without reading user 
reviews first. 
User reviews have already influenced my purchase decision. 
To me, user reviews are more credible than official communication 
of the manufacturer. 
 
a measured with a 7-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree,” b indicates re-
versed scoring, c measured by a 7-point semantic differential scale; d measured by a 7-point Likert scale anchored 





TABLE B.2  
ESTIMATED MARGINAL MEANS, STANDARD ERRORS, PILLAI-BARTLETT’S TRACE, F- AND P-VALUES FOR MANCOVA MODELS 
 Perceived Service Quality 
Attitude toward the 







Error V df1 df2 F Sig. 
Baseline Effect Negative Review            
Condition       .118 3 363 16.264 .000 
Control Group 4.269 .100 4.561 .108 4.248 .138      
Negative Review (No Response) 3.775 .067 3.674 .073 3.464 .093      
Product Involvement       .003 3 363 .315 .815 
Product Category Purchase Experience       .009 3 363 1.057 .368 
Quality Consciousness       .026 3 363 3.189 .024 
Price Consciousness       .023 3 363 2.796 .040 
Review Importance       .012 3 363 1.526 .207 
Gender       .003 3 363 .343 .795 
Age       .004 3 363 .457 .713 
Main Effect Organizational Response            
Condition       .065 4 1336 11.227 .000 
Negative Review, No Response 3.784 .070 3.700 .078 - -      
Negative Review, Accommodative 4.111 .077 4.277 .087 - -      
Negative Review, Defensive  4.271 .077 4.434 .086 - -      
Product Involvement       .004 2 667 1.231 .293 
Product Category Purchase Experience       .001 2 667 .258 .773 
Quality Consciousness       .003 2 667 .891 .411 
Price Consciousness       .011 2 667 3.552 .029 
Review Importance       .018 2 667 6.154 .002 
Gender       .005 2 667 1.778 .170 





TABLE B.3  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED SERVICE QUAL-
ITY AND ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BRAND PARALLEL MULTIPLE MEDIATOR MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Service Quality (M1)  Attitude toward the Brand (M2)  Purchase Intention (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
Accommodative vs. No Response 
(X1) 
a1 .327 .106 .002 a2 .577 .121 .000 c1' −.321 .102 .002 
Defensive vs. No Response (X2) a3 .487 .106 .000 a4 .733 .116 .000 c2' −.254 .096 .008 
Perceived Service Quality (M1)  — — —  — — — b1 .406 .076 .000 
Attitude toward the Brand (M2)  — — —  — — — b2 .607 .072 .000 
Constant iM1 3.709 .344 .000 iM2 3.783 .410 .000 i1 −.502 .377 .183 
Product Involvement f1 .038 .039 .325 h1 .003 .045 .953 g1 .082 .036 .024 
Product Category Purchase Experi-
ence f2 .004 .040 .919 h2 −.015 .047 .743 g2 −.021 .036 .555 
Quality Consciousness f3 −.053 .042 .205 h3 −.052 .048 .285 g3 −.074 .042 .077 
Price Consciousness f4 .073 .034 .031 h4 .095 .040 .017 g4 .048 .032 .134 
Review Importance f5 .029 .031 .355 h5 .094 .036 .010 g5 −.010 .029 .732 
Gender f6 −.060 .093 .524 h6 −.168 .105 .109 g6 .034 .086 .697 
Age f7 −.006 .004 .135 h7 −.010 .004 .017 g7 .002 .003 .585 
             
  R2 = .056  R2 = .113  R2 = .597 
  F(9, 668) = 4.345, p < .001  F(9, 668) = 9.012, p < .001  F(11, 666) = 130.554, p < .001 
       
Note.—  Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 




TABLE B.4  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW CREDIBILITY AND 
PERCEIVED SERVICE QUALITY SIMPLE MODERATION MODEL 
    
  Coeff. SE t p 
Intercept i1 3.583 .486 7.378 .000 
Organizational Response (X) b1 .394 .138 2.853 .005 
Review Credibility (M) b2 .248 .350 .709 .479 
X x M b3 −.494 .217 −2.277 .023 
Product Involvement f1 .031 .049 .634 .526 
Product Category Purchase Experience f2 .028 .052 .540 .590 
Quality Consciousness f3 −.017 .053 −.328 .743 
Price Consciousness f4 .078 .043 1.818 .070 
Review Importance f5 .065 .039 1.694 .091 
Gender f6 −.110 .113 −.976 .330 
Age f7 −.011 .005 −2.265 .024 
      
   R2 = .107 
   F(10, 411) = 4.489, p < .001 
Note.—  Regression coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 





TABLE B.5  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW CREDIBILITY AND 
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BRAND SIMPLE MODERATION MODEL 
    
  Coeff. SE t p 
Intercept i1 3.734 .563 6.637 .000 
Organizational Response (X) b1 .417 .165 2.524 .012 
Review Credibility (M) b2 .299 .396 .755 .450 
X x M b3 −.555 .246 −2.255 .025 
Product Involvement f1 −.009 .058 −.161 .872 
Product Category Purchase Experience f2 .031 .062 .497 .620 
Quality Consciousness f3 .005 .062 .080 .936 
Price Consciousness f4 .112 .051 2.210 .028 
Review Importance f5 .148 .045 3.323 .001 
Gender f6 −.262 .132 −1.990 .047 
Age f7 −.017 .005 −3.327 .001 
      
      
   R2 = .150 
   F(10, 411) = 6.738, p < .001 
Note.—  Regression coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 




TABLE B.6  
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND MODEL SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE PERCEIVED SERVICE QUAL-
ITY AND ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BRAND MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL 
 Consequent 
  Perceived Service Quality (M1)  Attitude toward the Brand (M2)  Purchase Intention (Y) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE  p 
Accommodative vs. Defensive  
(X) a1 .394 .138 .005 a2 .417 .165 .012 c1' .071 .100 .479 
Credibility (W) a3 .248 .350 .479 a4 .299 .396 .450  — — — 
X x W a5 −.494 .217 .023 a6 −.555 .246 .025  — — — 
Perceived Service Quality (M1)  — — —  — — — b1 .467 .100 .000 
Attitude toward the Brand (M2)  — — —  — — — b2 .536 .094 .000 
Constant iM1 3.583 .486 .000 iM2 3.734 .563 .000 i1 −1.180 .509 .021 
Product Involvement f1 .031 .049 .526 h1 -.009 .058 .872 g1 .110 .047 .021 
Product Category Purchase Expe-
rience f2 .028 .052 .590 
h2 .031 .062 .620 g2 -.003 .045 .943 
Quality Consciousness f3 −.017 .053 .743 h3 .005 .062 .936 g3 -.023 .057 .685 
Price Consciousness f4 .078 .043 .070 h4 .112 .051 .028 g4 .054 .042 .203 
Review Importance f5 .065 .039 .091 h5 .148 .045 .001 g5 −.027 .034 .434 
Gender f6 −.110 .113 .330 h6 −.262 .132 .047 g6 .008 .109 .938 
Age f7 −.011 .005 .024 h7 −.017 .005 .001 g7 .000 .034 .434 
             
  R2 = .107  R2 = .150  R2 = .591 
  F(10, 411) = 4.489, p < .001  F(10, 411) = 6.738, p < .001  F(10, 411) = 90.318, p < .001 
       
Note.—  Regression Coefficients are unstandardized. PROCESS models were calculated with the HC3 estimator, which means that all standard errors for continuous outcome 
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